TWO ARGUMENTS FOR CATHOLICISM

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WITHDRAWN

By

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INTRODUCTION

WHAT are these *Two Arguments*? Reduced to their simplest expression, they are as follows:

1. Unless the Catholic religion is divine, it cannot possibly avoid presenting, *in its doctrinal system*, innumerable and evident contradictions:
Now, as a matter of fact, it does not present such contradictions:
Therefore it is divine:

2. Unless the Catholic religion is divine, it cannot possibly avoid presenting, *in the course of its history*, innumerable and evident variations in its doctrine:
Now, as a matter of fact, it does not present these variations:
Therefore it is divine.

The first of these arguments demonstrates the *coherence*, the second, the *stability* of the doctrine.

Theologians have, we think, hitherto seen only the "negative sides" of these two characteristics; namely, that the absence of them is sufficient to disqualify a revelation, while their presence is not sufficient to authenticate it. Theoretically, it is true, a doctrine which appears stable and coherent may nevertheless be false.

Theoretically, yes; but religious doctrines, and above all the Catholic doctrine, present themselves under special conditions, which permit us to establish upon our major argument what amounts to a principle; and this principle, when confronted with the facts

revealed in the minor argument, leads us to a *positive* conclusion.

Moreover, thanks to the words " innumerable and evident," introduced into the formula of the principle, we have an easy and practical means of verifying our position. It is no longer necessary to examine microscopically or to make a minute inventory of all the exceedingly complex aspects of dogma and all the details of an extensive history, for a general survey is sufficient to enable us to know whether or not we have before us a multitude of characteristic and perfectly evident facts. Hence, the required elements of coherence and stability, being thus easily discernible, become positive *notes*, that is to say, practical signs enabling us to distinguish the true religion from religions which are false.

There are, of course, other signs which may be preferred ; but in the multiplicity of differing minds, some, please God, will be able to find light in those presented here.

PART I

THE COHERENCE OF THE DOCTRINE

TWO ARGUMENTS FOR CATHOLICISM

Chapter I

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ARGUMENT

Summary. I.—Contradiction, a sign of the false; it can be concealed. *Difficulty* of this concealment for every religion, especially for a religion calling itself revealed. II.—*Impossibility* for the Catholic religion: its complexity, prophecies, dogmas, contrasts, the manner of its propagation: its medium, its heralds.—*Conclusion.*

Contradiction is the authentic mark of the false. The lawyer who wishes to unmask a false witness, proves that there is a contradiction in his testimony, and concludes: "You contradict yourself; therefore you are deceiving." The scientist who wishes to refute a theory and the philosopher who desires to invalidate a system, show that there is a contradiction between their different parts, between principles and conclusions or between conclusions and facts, and they draw the inference: "Therefore, you deceive yourself." Wherever there is contradiction, there is error or falsehood.

But contradiction does not always let itself be seen; it can wrap itself in a mass of seductive appearances or delicate sophisms and, thus protected, can defy the investigations of criticism. Hence it is that lies flourish and errors abound.

Nevertheless, it is very difficult for contradiction to conceal itself from a mind that wishes to see it, when it is a question of a religious system. For every religion

implies, willingly or unwillingly, a philosophy which touches the most serious problems. It has, or gives itself, the mission of regulating human actions with its code of morals, of solving before the bar of intellect and heart the riddle of our destiny, and of furnishing, at least in brief, an interpretation of the universe, especially when this religion pretends to base its claims on a divine revelation. If it invokes no other light than that of reason, it can, while telling what it thinks it knows, confess its ignorance of everything else. But if it is God that speaks, He cannot be ignorant nor can He let His faithful children remain in ignorance of the homage which He demands from their intelligence and free will. A religion which claims to be revealed comes into gear, therefore, by means of manifold contacts with the thought and life of its followers. But in this perpetual meeting face to face with living realities it will be very difficult for it, if it is false, not to come into violent collision with the protests of logic, and equally difficult for some contradiction not to reveal itself, at least to the minds of thinkers.

And if it be a religion which is made for thinkers and appeals to cultivated people, its difficulties become more formidable. The more inquisitive minds and the more refined consciences of its adherents will begin to ask many questions about the nature of beings, their origin, their destiny, the government of Providence, the moral code of individuals, families and societies, the rights and duties of mankind and what it is necessary to believe and above all to do. It cannot then have recourse to expedients invented for the occasion ; an illusory explanation which should free it from its embarrassment of to-day, might through a sudden shifting of opinion or the discovery of new facts, become the inextricable embarrassment of to-morrow. In order to know whither it is going, it must, so to speak, draw

its reply from its own breast, from a clear, exact, complete doctrine which can hold its ground, which answers every need, which adapts itself to all men, to all ages, to all civilisations, to all circumstances and to all times ; which meets and mingles with all sciences without the fear of shock ; which accommodates itself to all discoveries without letting itself be destroyed thereby ; which, in a word, meets fearlessly all the hazards of events, and all the curiosity, audacity, malevolence and progress of the human mind.

Well! that is certainly beyond the power of man to do. If such a religion is a human invention, it is very difficult, almost impossible, for some contradiction not to show itself.

And, if it is a question, not of any sort of a religion, but of *Catholicism*, then it is impossible, absolutely impossible, that it should not, if human, contain a multitude of evident contradictions, either among its dogmas, clashing one with another, or between these on the one hand and reason or facts on the other.

For to the already enormous difficulties common to all religions Catholicism adds others which are insurmountable.

It addresses all peoples, but it has always preferred to implant itself in the most cultivated, and it cannot count on the complicity of ignorance ; men will study it closely and in detail. By its unbending precepts it pitilessly destroys all the lustful impulses of passion, and it cannot count on any instincts of compliance ; men will study it with the secret desire of surprising it in guilt. Now it presents a wide enough surface, it lays down the most marked, the most complex and the most complete of all doctrines, entering by its principles into gear with all the movement of thought, and by its moral code with all the movement of action. See,

therefore, how it stands, continually confronting all the reactions of the world's ideas and all the realities of life: Woe to such a doctrine if its inventor is only a man!

But there is something better, or else something worse. This man has also to face an enormous multitude of facts which have preceded or are to follow his earthly existence. He applies to himself prophecies written in a book well known to all, which he cannot therefore alter or retouch. He quietly declares: "I am the Messiah; I who am speaking with thee am he: *Ego sum qui loquor tecum.*"[1] Consequently, he affirms that in his life and in his death are to be realised a whole mass of details, foretold centuries before and dependent on a multitude of free wills, which could easily give him the lie; dependent also upon chance, which, for example, could snatch him by a sudden, ordinary death from the tragic ending predicted by the prophets.

And, with the same tranquillity, too, he foretells the future.[2] He announces, for instance, that people will feel passionate love or hate for him until the end of the world. A strange prophecy! Who, among all the dead, has ever been able to retain, after the lapse of a century, feelings of love or hate around his tomb? We admire

[1] John iv, 26.

[2] This is only one example. Jesus multiplied the prophecies; see Matt. v, 17-18; xvi, 18-21; xx, 18-19; xxiv; xxvi, 34; xxviii, 20; Mark viii, 31-32; ix, 30-32; x, 33; xiii; xiv; Luke xiii; xviii, 31; xix, 43; xxi, 24-32; John xiii, 19; etc. See also the discussion by L. de Grandmaison in the *Dictionn.* edited by d'Alès, II, col. 1417-1446. Now, without speaking of the impossibility of a man foreseeing the future, it has happened that men, who had the natural means at their disposal, have actually sought to prevent the fulfilment of the prophecies of Jesus. Thus Titus had commanded his troops, under the severest penalties, to spare the Temple after capturing Jerusalem (see Josephus, *De Bello judaico*, t. VI). Thus, with the positive intention of disproving the words: "There shall not remain one stone upon another," Julian the Apostate tried to rebuild it, but succeeded only in *finishing* its destruction (see Paul Allard, *Julien l'Apostat* (Paris, Lecoffre, 1903), Vol. III, pp. 130-7).

or despise a dead man ; above all, we forget him ; but how can we love or hate him, when we have never seen him ? This man predicted for himself a savage hatred which would pursue him even among his friends, and a love which would surpass all other loves. If this man, who declares that he comes to fulfil the ancient prophecies, and who pronounces other prophecies which are impossible to foresee and realise, is not God, who reads the future as well as the past, who is master of hearts as well as of history, then he is a madman and facts are certain to belie him cruelly.

But he has committed yet another folly : his dogmas, in their essence, come into violent collision with all accepted opinions ; for example, they promulgate one and the same religion for all peoples, in a world in which religion and the State are blended ; they proclaim one God only, in a world where there are innumerable gods for every people and for every home ; they preach redemption through the humiliations of the Cross, in a world where the Messiah was expected to be a King of glory ; they declare the equality of all men before God, in a world in which the weak were mere chattels for the strong ; and they teach the supremacy of inward devotion, in a world where the outward rite alone was of importance.

At the same time, these dogmas, which shock public opinion, collide with one another in striking contrasts : they teach one God in three distinct Persons ; a God-Man consisting of two natures in one Person, so good and loving as to ascend to Golgotha, so terrible as to condemn men to hell ; so merciful as to see no crimes that repentance cannot efface ; so just as not to let the gift of a glass of water go unrecompensed, nor a guilty thought remain without expiation. The Church which he founds is one, yet universal, and it must adapt itself to all individuals ; it is changeless yet progressive and

must accommodate itself to all epochs; the act of faith which it exacts is obligatory, yet a gift of grace; an act of the reason, yet meritorious and free; the sacraments are connected with man's interior dispositions, yet conditioned by formulas; and in the Eucharist there is a divine reality under the most frail appearances. And so in everything. Not only is there mystery but violent contrast, and to such a degree that we ask at first sight, whether it is not even contradiction.

Doubtless reality is too complicated for the mind of man to condense into a simple formula, and God is too profound to be fathomed by us in one clear glance; so that if all these mysteries are linked together in proportion as they are contemplated, and if all these contrasts ultimately harmonise, they make us presume that they are true; and they become also beautiful, like those musical dissonances which Gounod delighted in and which, just as the ear is about to suffer from them, are suddenly resolved into magnificent harmonies. But though the musician is able to regulate, count and measure his notes, where is the man who can regulate a principle after he has once cast it into the minds of men, and who can say to it: "Thou shalt go no further?" And what audacity this would be in a man who wished to lie! What folly to proclaim ideas which not only do violence to all the passions, prejudices and accepted opinions of mankind, but even seem to clash with one another and, in a word, provoke suspicion on all sides! If, therefore, these mysteries and contrasts are not the disclosures of God, who says things as he sees them, if they are only the fancies of a human intelligence, they constitute in their inventor a colossal blunder, and expose the doctrine itself to the evident peril of speedily ending in a noisy crackling of manifest contradictions.

Full of mysteries and contrasts which seem to provoke a denial from reason, and replete with prophecies which seem to force a repudiation from facts, may it not be that this doctrine was at least distilled cautiously, drop by drop, into a society already eminently calm, united and prepared to receive it ?

Far from it. It was implanted as a whole and all at once, in the least favourable, the most heterogeneous and the most dissimilar surroundings imaginable. It was proclaimed to every chance crowd, to peoples who were in a political ferment, to all varieties of intelligence, education and prejudices, and in the midst of racial quarrels. The Jews would have liked to interpret it after their fashion, the Gentiles after theirs, a very different one. To-day, in the tranquillity of a hall of justice, magistrates of the same race and culture and prepared for their task by the same theoretical and practical training, sometimes can hardly come to an understanding about clauses of the Code, which men have already tried to make clear, and which treat of the commonest things in the world. But in this case, men of every age, of all countries, of every civilisation and taken at random from the masses, must agree together and interpret all the essential points and dogmas in the same way. They will have to agree on the most complicated, the profoundest and the most mysterious questions which man's intelligence can possibly deal with. And, to help them form their opinion, they will have, not the clear and precise texts of a code, but merely apostolic answers by the way which subsequently passed from mouth to mouth—thus giving us Tradition ; or a few narratives and letters written for the occasion—the *Gospels*, the *Acts* or the *Epistles of the Apostles*—which have circulated from hand to hand, thus giving us the written texts.

And these Apostles, to whom we owe the texts and

the traditions, what sort of men were they? Even had they been geniuses, by such means and in such conditions they would never have successfully accomplished a coherent and enduring work; but they were not geniuses.

They were twelve fishermen of a small country, twelve ordinary men, illiterate, without philosophy and without education, who in fact knew scarcely more than how to cast their nets into the lake; and yet at once they began to cast into the world this stupendous doctrine, as broad as the mind, as rich as the heart, as complicated as life.

And to crown all, they preach at a distance of hundreds of miles from one another. They start out towards the four winds of heaven without taking the trouble to agree beforehand on the precise formulas in which they should clothe the new doctrine. If they had thus agreed, they could have avoided or explained their apparent contradictions. But they explained nothing. They did not even think of doing so. They go forth and they speak; they tell what they know, what they have seen with their own eyes, what they have heard with their own ears, along the roads of Galilee, on the borders of the lakes, or on the way to Golgotha. They emphasise this or that doctrinal point, according to the questions asked them; they lay stress on this or that point of conduct, as the circumstances suggest. Wherever they pass they install a faith, a religion, a moral code; and the moral code, the religion and the faith which each of the Twelve preaches must be identical.

Some of them write or cause to be written a few hastily composed pages on these subjects, mere outlines of their discourses or résumés of their conversations; and they write these amazing things just as they speak, with imperturbable serenity, artlessly,

unsuspectingly, free from apprehension, pausing with uplifted pen, and using the words that come to them. These words they scatter broadcast to the world, committing them to history and to all the criticisms of the present and future ; and whosesoever may be the pen or the mouth from which they come, it is essential that they shall all agree with one another and shall bequeath to the future a coherent, flawless doctrine, in which no contradiction shall ever appear.

What will be the result ? From the pupils of some philosopher, sociologist or moralist, select twelve. Let them travel in different directions through the world, there to speak, to write and to found their schools, as circumstances permit ; then, thirty or perhaps fifty years later, pay a visit to those schools, collect the writings which issued from their pens, and the traditions created by their words, and compare them all one with another ; what chaos you will find! Try, for example, to harmonise to-day the followers of Kant, of Darwin, or even of Bergson.

What do I say ? Select any twelve men you like, as intelligent as you wish, and cause them to be witnesses of some casual incident which stirs the passions—a palpable, material fact, a street scene, for example ; and, I will not say thirty or fifty years later, but *next day*, take up twelve newspapers and read the narratives of those twelve eye-witnesses. If they agree, you will call it a miracle.

As for the message of the Gospel, it is a question not merely of a material fact to be related, but of a life to be led ; and what a life! In this case it is a matter of proclaiming a profound and complicated doctrine, which claims to give a meaning to both life and death, to insist upon faith, to regulate conduct, to give the interpretation of the universe and to respond to the aspirations of humanity ; a doctrine wholly impreg-

nated with mysteries, offering the most violent and unlooked-for contrasts, advancing from all sides to the farthest limits of thought, and traversing intact the most varied minds, always within the comprehension of the humble, yet grand enough to satisfy the greatest intellects. And the men who launched these ideas into the world and who made themselves the masters of geniuses as well as of children, were twelve ignorant men, twelve barbarians with narrow minds, who knew nothing of the sciences and philosophies with which the roots of their new doctrine came in contact, who proclaimed it at random in their rapid journeys, without having leisure for reflection, without indeed pretending to such a thing, but merely pouring forth a torrent of words in a fury of zeal, with quick replies to the objections of philosophers, waverers and enemies. And, as I have said, they spoke thus, separated hundreds of miles from one another, each uttering his own thought, with his own peculiar expressions and formulas and without troubling beforehand to agree as to what they were to say.

Well, contemplate this doctrine, as the Apostles made it, or as Catholicism collected and presented it to men at any moment in its long career. Contemplate this doctrine. If it is a human composition, its error must be manifest, and in it fatal, undeniable, evident and overwhelming contradictions must everywhere be revealed. Look at it ; and if, from the very first, you cannot say : " It is false," then say that it is true. If from the very first you see no contradiction in it, if in the course of nineteen centuries no one has been able to show and demonstrate such contradiction, then be assured that this doctrine is not human and that, behind those twelve uncultured men, there was God.

Chapter II

THE FACTS CONFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE

I

RAPID SURVEY OF SEVERAL RELIGIONS

Summary. I.—*Rapid Survey* of Polytheism, Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Brahminism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Judaism. II.—*The "Orthodox" Church*: (1) Its origin; (2) its doctrinal position; (3) its historical development. III.—*Protestantism*: (1) Luther; (2) Calvin; (3) The Anglicans; (4) the Protestants at the beginning; (5) those of our day.—*Conclusion.*

The history of the religions which share the world among them (Catholicism being for the moment excepted), ought to provide a brilliant confirmation of the principle we have just established. All, without a single exception, have succumbed to the difficulty. They all, of course, offer a certain number of true and noble ideas; but one tree does not make a forest nor one stone a house. If a building is to remain standing, its main walls must not crumble; and if a religious system is to endure, nothing of what it gives out as a divine revelation must crumble either. Nothing that God says can be false.

Now everywhere, even in the least complicated religious systems, whatever may be the truth of their details, the most casual examination shows us contradiction, displaying itself as the authentic note of what is false.

We will not speak of Polytheism. A plurality of gods: there is a contradiction in the very idea. The Infinite

can be One only.[1] And if the gods are regarded as finite beings, they have no *raison d'être*. They are not gods. Let us pass on.

Zoroastrianism proclaims the existence of two supreme beings, both of them creators, one of good, the other of evil, each independent of the other, each making war on the other : Ormazd, the God of good, Ahriman, the god of evil. But even this means two gods, and two are still too many. Let us pass on.

Confucianism? Here the difficulty lies in discovering not its error, but its substance. It is so pliable, and it has in the course of thousands of years undergone so many reincarnations. We do not know where to take hold of it. Confucius was a worthy man who, terrified by the abuses of his time (about 551-479 B.C.), wished to bring his contemporaries back to the traditions of their ancestors. Some of these traditions were excellent, as for example a belief in one God only. He shared this belief[2] ; but by a singular irony, a thousand years after his death the people began to make him a god himself. And to crown all, it was a dynasty of emperors strange to his race and doctrine, who defied him ; but it is the Chinese who worship him.[3]

The Confucianism of to-day is a queer mixture of three religions (Sinism, Confucianism and Taoism), not to mention traces of Shintoism, while a fourth, Buddhism, is generally resorted to for its moral element.

So much at least for the people. As for the learned, they claim to be the followers of Chu-hi, a miscreant of the twelfth century, whose doctrine an imperial man-

[1] It is a question of the infinite *Being*, of the Infinite in the philosophical, not in the mathematical sense.

[2] Cf. the study of Léon Wieger in *Christus* (Paris, Beauchesne, 1912), p. 107.

[3] Cf. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Manuel d'histoire des religions*, translated under the direction of H. Hubert and I. Lévy (Paris, Colin, 1904), p. 30.

date in 1894 ordered the people to "venerate," "as being equal to the text of Confucius."[1] Now, "although he is the official representative of Confucianism, his doctrine is nevertheless essentially different to that of the master.[2] Thus, in venerating one as highly as the other, we can be very sure of contradicting ourselves; and even if we kept only that of Chu-hi, it would be enough to know that a specialist compares it to "the materialism of Haeckel."[3] It is enough to say also that contradictions are not wanting in it.

Brahminism and Buddhism are not even bundles of contradictions, but mere phantasmagoria; they are like the smoke of opium, floating wreath-like in the sunshine; they are amalgams, inextricable confusions of affirmations which defy all coherent expression and every exact rule. Polytheism is mixed up in them with monotheism, atheism with pantheism and gnosis with agnosticism. Into this medley the transmigration of souls is introduced, and a confused system of metaphysics embroiders fanciful patterns on the whole. The gods of Brahminism do not know how the world was made; they are themselves created, and die when they have exhausted their divine essence, or when men, by the use of magic, take their divinity from them. Moreover they are not for the most part beautiful, either physically or morally, but are always badly formed and in contradiction with themselves, as well as with common sense, Siva,[4] the supreme god who manifests himself on the earth, "is at the same time an ascetic, a brigand and a libertine." The others are no better: "The neo-Brahminic pantheon is the most revolting

[1] Wieger, *ibid.*, p. 117. [2] Chantepie, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
[3] Wieger, *ibid.*, p. 115.
[4] Or Vishnu, or Brahma, or another; for the system varies from village to village, each, on the same vague background, embellishing its dream, as sleepers each in his own way can interpret the same noise.

collection of monsters imaginable."[1] But they are honoured as saints are with us, and " all the absurd superstitions, and the cruel, obscene and revolting usages of modern Brahminism cannot be described."[2] Their disciples, like the gods themselves, pass from one extreme to the other, from the worst depravities to a fanatical asceticism.

Buddhism reacted against these two excesses, yet without becoming any more consistent with itself. If it prescribes a high morality in certain respects, it does not attach much importance to it and reserves it for the use of the imperfect ; supreme perfection consists in the negation of acts and in the absence of desires and thoughts.[3] Pessimism is at the bottom of this uncertain doctrine ; life, existence, is an evil, and the whole ambition of the Buddhist should be, by destroying desire, to arrive at nirvana,—a state of nonentity, which nevertheless is something, namely a state of supreme happiness . . . where man is conscious of nothing. Yet this mournful ideal is reserved for monks alone and perhaps for monks of the superior castes only, the rest of humanity being condemned to the forced labour of hazardous and limitless reincarnations. And to crown all, the *ego*, which thus journeys through numberless millenniums and bears through the most different phases of existence the responsibility of past deeds and the obligation to purify itself little by little, until it has merited nirvana, is an *ego* that changes, irregularly, from one existence to another, perhaps from one moment to another ; or it is even nothing at all, a mere illusion, an appearance devoid of reality.[4] Let us pass on.

[1] Abbé de Broglie, *Conclusions sur l'histoire des religions* (Paris, Putois-Cretté, 4th ed., no date), p. 156.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 159. [3] Cf. Chantepie, p. 391.

[4] In this brief exposition we are not sure of having exactly summarised the thought of Orientalists. But have they themselves

It would seem that Mohammedanism might quite easily escape any appearance of contradiction. It took for its entire intellectual stock-in-trade three very simple and very clear dogmas borrowed from philosophy. These are the unity of God, the immortality of the soul and the reward and punishment of good and evil in eternity. But the little that Mohammed himself contributes over and above these is sufficient to wreck the system. He professes to be the continuator of Jesus[1] and the confirmatory "seal of the prophets."[2] But Jesus declared that he would not be continued in this sense by anyone, and that his church would endure until the consummation of all things and the day of the

stated exactly the doctrine of the Hindus, Brahmins and Buddhists? M. R. Guénon (*Introduction générale à l'étude des doctrines hindoues*, Paris, Rivière, 1921), repeats in each of his chapters that they have understood nothing of it. According to him, there is in Hinduism neither philosophy, nor morals, nor religion. If he himself is not mistaken, there is nothing to do, therefore, in the present instance, but to leave Hinduism alone.

But, at about the same time, a former Low Church Protestant minister, a missionary to India and a convert to Catholicism, published the story of his conversion (William Wallace, *De l'Evangélisme au Catholicisme par la route des Indes*, trans. Humblet, Brussels, Dewit, 1921). In a very attractive study he presents Hindu thought to us as profoundly religious and Hindu religion as fruitfully permeating all the details of life. Fundamentally, he says, it is the aspiration to sacrifice everything in order to attain "the supreme good"; it is the desire for death to self, in order to rise again into the life of God; in short, the "eternal religion" in which are combined aspiration towards the infinite and realisation of human misery. The rest of it—idolatry, pantheism, etc.—is only a series of deviations inspired by despair of attaining the goal; and the idea of successive incarnations is merely a distant hope grafted on to this despair. (See pp. 109-215 and especially chap. xi.) Wallace lived for seven years in contact with Hindus and studied Hinduism at its source and with immense sympathy. He believed that the religion is not to be destroyed, but rather purified and completed; and it was the impotence of Protestantism to fulfil this task which led him to Catholicism. But even if his exposition is correct, the contradictions demonstrated in our text still remain, at least for the most part.

[1] See, for example, sura iii of the Koran, notably verse 77; sura iv, verse 161.

[2] Sura xxxiii, verse 40.

universal judgement.[1] Moreover, it is perfectly evident that the work of Mohammed, in its moral code as well as in its social and religious doctrine, does not indicate an advance upon, but rather a declension from, that of Jesus.[2]

And his sacred book, the Koran? He composed it from beginning to end, and was thus obliged to come to an agreement only with himself. Yet he did not succeed in doing even this, as he himself perceived.

God, in order to extricate him from his difficulty, is said to have then dictated to him this admirable phrase: "If we should omit a verse of the Koran, or if we should efface the memory of it from thy heart, we would bring thee another one, better or similar."[3] A God who makes erasures in his own composition! Accordingly, Mohammedan theologians have withdrawn from the Koran a certain number of passages manifestly "forgotten." Some are abrogated both literally and in meaning; they do not count, they were only little slips made by the Deity. Others are abrogated literally, having been "replaced" in meaning "by similar ones." All these are scratched out. Others still remain in the book, but are nullified in meaning; they constitute the contradictions which are officially preserved. There are in the Koran "207 verses which always appear in the text but which are abrogated by 93 others. The fifth verse of the

[1] Cf. Matt. xxviii, 19; xviii, 17; xxiv, 24; Gal. i, 8; 2 Tim. iv, 3; etc.

[2] See, for example, in the Koran, the parts which refer to marriage, slavery, paradise, the "holy war," etc. The references to the text will be found in the table of contents of the Koran, edited by Kasimirski (Paris, Charpentier, 1855). As to the Paradise of Mohammed, an author passes judgement on it in a single phrase: it offers "vice as the supreme recompense of virtue" (Maurice Landrieux, *L'Islam*, Paris, Lethielleux, 2nd ed., s.d., p. 42).

[3] *Koran*, sura ii, ver. 100, transl. of Savary, *Le Koran* (Paris, Garnier, 1883), p. 123; cf. xvi, 103; xxxiii, 62.

ninth sura . . . alone abrogates 124."[1] The "abrogated" revelations have been replaced by "better" or more convenient ones, which, as fast as the need arose, allowed the Prophet to violate his own laws of marriage and in the name of Allah to perpetrate his thefts, murders and least avowable machinations.[2] He was himself ashamed of this and confessed in the Koran the enormity of his sin.[3]

Does Judaism make any better showing, when tested by logic? One great fact and two great ideas dominate the entire history of the Jewish religion before the coming of Christ. The fact is belief in the Bible, and especially in the Prophets as representatives of a divine revelation. The two ideas which constitute the essence of this revelation are the oneness of God and the approaching advent of the Messiah who, born of the Jewish race, will set his seal upon the revelation and cause the worship of the true God to be proclaimed to the end of the earth. Monotheism and faith in the Messiah—these form the whole foundation of ancient Judaism. Up to this point no contradiction appears.

But, during the last nineteen centuries, there has come into consideration a new fact—Jesus Christ. In view of this fact, Judaism can no longer maintain itself. The Jews themselves, for the most part, at least in cultivated circles, now confess this. They abandon their hopes, or bring them down to an earthly level: "Behind all these suppressions and all these ruins," writes J. Darmesteter, "still exist the two great dogmas which, ever since the Prophets, form the whole of Judaism: namely, divine unity and faith in the Messiah, that is to say, unity of law in the world and the triumph of justice on earth in humanity.

[1] Landrieux, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
[2] See *Koran*, xxxiii, 28-53; lxvi, 1-5, etc.
[3] See E. Power in *Christus*, p. 551.

These are the two dogmas which, at the present day, light mankind onward in its upward path, both in the domain of science and in the social order, and which are called in modern language, one, the *unity of forces*; the other, *belief in progress*."[1] Behold, then! the unity of God becomes the unity of forces; the Messiah becomes Progress; and the French Revolution was the date of his coming," the supreme, prophetic date in the calendar of Jewish destiny."[2] But Judaism, thus understood, has no longer any God nor any hope for human souls. It is no longer a religion.

As for the other Jews, there remains a religion; but henceforth it is a religion with manifest contradictions. The Prophets had, indeed, fixed the date of the Messiah before the destruction of the second temple of Jerusalem (Daniel ix, 24-27; Agg. ii.)[3] Now this temple was destroyed in the year 70 of our era. If therefore the Messiah has already come, there is no more reason for expecting him; if he has not yet come, it is too late, the Prophets were mistaken. On any hypothesis, Judaism might once have been true; but to-day it is manifestly in error.

II

THE "ORTHODOX" CHURCH

UNDER the general name of *Christianity*, there are three religious systems which cannot be made to agree. Apart from Catholicism, the first to present itself, in the order of time, goes back to Photius, and its body of

[1] James Darmesteter, *Les Prophètes d'Israël*. Paris (C. Levy, 1895), pp. 194 *seq.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[3] Cf. Gen. xlix, 8-10; Dan. ix, 24 ff; Matt. ii, 3-4; Luke ii; John iv, 25.

believers might properly be called the Photian Church. But this Church actually calls itself "Orthodox"; that is to say, "conformable to the true doctrine." It is a eulogy which the interested parties award themselves and which does not settle the question in advance.[1] Outside spectators can retain the label for use, yet retain the right of seeing whether it is justified.

Clearly it is not. By its very origin, and by its principles and historical development, the Orthodox Church has been put into a position of complete contradiction.

It professes that for centuries it formed part of the body of the Catholic Church, from which first Photius and then Michael Cerularius afterwards detached it. In order to accomplish this, they put forward two reasons. What are they worth?

The first consists in the claim that the primacy of the Bishop of Rome over the universal Church had its origin in a decision of the Pagan emperor Aurelian in A.D. 268, and that, as this Primacy was always dependent on the presence of the emperor, it therefore passed to Constantinople together with the capital of the empire.

This claim became an established principle in the Orthodox Church and found a place in certain of its articles of faith.[2] But Photius was not so positive. His claim was asserted rather by an attitude, by act and polemic than by a doctrine. His writings contain

[1] See J. de Maistre, *Du Pape* (Lyons, Pelagaud, 8th ed., 1845), pp. 420-8.

[2] See, for example, question 84 in the *Orthodox Confession* of Peter Moghila, in the seventeenth century. (The text is published by E. J. Kimmel, *Monumenta fidei orientalis*, Jena, 1850, Vol. I, p. 153 *seq.*) See also the *Reply* of Anthimus VI to Pius IX (Mansi-Martin-Petit, *Conciliorum amplissima collectio*, Paris and Leipzig, Welter, 1909, Vol. XL, col. 377 *et seq.* § 13) and the Encyclical of Anthimus VII against Leo XIII, § 15 (in Ἐκκλησιαστίκη Ἀλεθεία, 1895, no. 31).

no categorical thesis on the primacy of Constantinople and do not contest the primacy of Peter or the fact that the Pope is Peter's successor in the see of Rome. But has the Pope, by inheriting the see, inherited also the primacy? To this question Photius sometimes says yes and at other times no.[1]

His practical attitude, in regard to such an uncertain doctrine as this, was naturally determined by his own interests. At first in A.D. 859 he recognised the Pope's supremacy, in the hope of inducing him to condone his own machinations against the patriarch of Constantinople, whose place he intended to usurp. Disappointed in his hopes, in A.D. 863 he renounced his allegiance and turned to the side of the emperor.

It was because the Pope had not made him patriarch that he now asked the emperor to make *him* Pope. In this he was finally successful, and in A.D. 867 he "excommunicated" the Pope of Rome. The rupture was complete. But, soon after, the wind changed to the side of the court, and a new emperor undid what an emperor had just done. He imprisoned Photius in a monastery and re-established peace with Rome (A.D. 867). Photius did not give up the struggle. By means of intrigues he returned to the court and to favour and, after the death of the legitimate patriarch, in A.D. 877, had himself elected to the vacant post. Forgetting his former anathemas, he hastened to have recourse to the Pope who, shamefully deceived, gave his approval until, on becoming better informed, in 881 he solemnly condemned Photius. In 886, a new emperor expelled him from Constantinople, and this time the exile was final.[2]

[1] See the study of P. Theophilus Spacil, *Conceptus et doctrina de Ecclesia juxta theologiam Orientis separati*, in *Orientalia, Series Christiana*, 1923, no. 2, pp. 34-54 (Rome, Istituto Orientale).

[2] Concerning all these facts, see Jager, *Histoire de Photius* (Paris, Vaton, 2nd ed., 1845).

Less than two centuries later, the same game began again with the patriarch Michael Cerularius, who, supported by the emperor, in 1054 excommunicated in his turn the Church of Rome; only to see himself subsequently exiled, in 1058, by another emperor. Here, then, are the two founders of Orthodoxy deposed one after the other by the imperial power, which they had respectively invoked to constitute them the Head of the Church of Christ in place of the Pope. But if that power made them, it also unmade them; and consequently, of this claim, whatever value it may once have had, nothing remains.

Photius invoked also another reason, which Michael Cerularius took up in his turn. The Church of Rome, he said, had gone over to heresy, and the Church of Constantinople, which alone had remained "Orthodox," henceforth represented, in itself alone, the Church of Christ. We do not need to discuss the heresies imputed to Rome, or to enter into a mass of genuine Byzantine cavillings. It is enough for us to look the Orthodox Church squarely in the face and to confront it with its own principles.

It asserts that the Ecumenical Councils alone are the sovereign judges of the faith.[1] But what Ecumenical Council ever excommunicated the Church of Rome? And which among the definitions of the first seven Councils has Rome ever rejected? And if Rome admits all that Orthodoxy holds to be necessary and final, in what and how is she heretical?

[1] See the texts of Photius to which Spacil refers, *loc. cit.*, 36. See also the *Catechism of Philaretus*, quest. 22 and 27: *Reply of Anthimus*, vi, 16, *Encyclical of Anthimus*, vii, 3, 5, 7, etc. . . In a study published in 1920, Chrestos Androutsos, who passes for the best modern theologian of Orthodoxy, declared: "The only canonical voice of the Church is the voice of the Ecumenical council." (Quoted by M. Jugie in *Echos d'Orient*, January-March, 1922, p. 82.

Orthodoxy proclaims that the true church is infallible, faultless and changeless ;[1] but the Orthodox Church remained in communion with Rome for centuries both before and after Photius. Photius himself, in fact, did not separate from her until 863, and he "excommunicated" the Bishop of Rome only in 867. In 877 he again solicited Roman communion, without the least allusion to the grievances he had previously alleged. Nor did Michael Cerularius—at least in the beginning—take them up, even if he did invent others.[2]

His successors, however, invented still more. But one day, at the request of the emperor, Michael Paleologus, the Pope sent to Constantinople the profession of faith of the Roman Church. The eastern bishops examined it and discussed it for seven or eight years ; after which they accepted it almost unanimously, and their delegates went to the Ecumenical Council of Lyons, in 1274, to seal the union with the Church of Rome. Two Greek Councils, assembled at Constantinople in 1278 and 1280, ratified and promulgated the decree, adding to it an explicit profession of faith in the dogmas which the Orthodox had formerly contested. Again they separated, however, and again regretted it, going in large numbers to the Ecumemical Council of Florence in 1438. There they held discussions for eighteen months and, with

[1] See Photius, quoted by Spacil, *loc. cit.*, 36. See also *Confession of Peter Moghila*, quest. 16 : *Catechism of Philaretus*, quest. 20 ; *Confession of Dositheus* (*apud* Kimmel, i, pp. 436 *et seq.*) ; Decrees 11, 12, etc.

[2] He reproaches the Roman Church with " the use of unleavened bread, of milk in Lent, with eating the flesh of animals which have been strangled and with fasting on Saturday ; he blames it also for not singing the *Alleluia* during Lent." (Tilloy, *Les Églises orientales dissidentes et l'Église romaine*, Paris, Téqui, 1889, p. 102), and again for permitting clerics to shave their beards (M. Jugie, *Dictionnaire*, ed. d'Alès, II, col. 359-62). It is regrettable that such causes should have cloven Christianity in twain.

the exception of the Metropolitan of Ephesus, finally unanimously concluded, in the words of the most illustrious among them, John Bessarion, that they "could no longer resist without committing a crime." Hence they proclaimed a complete agreement,[1] which nevertheless was again broken.

Now in view of these striking historical facts, it is clear that, if either of these two Churches has been "infallible, faultless and changeless," it can be only the Church of Rome ; and that, if the latter is heretical, then the Orthodox Church, which has so frequently and for centuries at a time made itself one with her, has fallen with her into heresy. In a word, if it was right originally for the Orthodox Church to unite with Rome, then it was wrong for it to separate from her, taking up again the same old grievances which it had already pronounced trifling ; and on the other hand, if it was right to separate from Rome, then it was wrong to reunite with her. In any case, either the Orthodox Church is now or has been mistaken. It is, therefore, not infallible and faultless. It is not the work of God.

And if this method of reasoning is correct in regard to everything which separates the Orthodox Church from Rome, it has especial force against the denial of the Pope's primacy, which has always been, amid all other pretexts, the real motive for the separation, and still remains the principal obstacle to a new reunion. For, whether united to or separated from Rome, the Orthodox Church has always affirmed the infallibility of the first seven Ecumenical Councils. But all these Councils "recognised the primacy of jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome over the Church universal, either by formal acts or by their practical procedure." [2] More-

[1] See Tilloy, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-18.
[2] See Tilloy, *op. cit.*, p. 246. He develops the proof of this in the

over, all these Councils were held in the East, and, except for the Papal legates, scarcely any one was present at them except oriental bishops.

Here, then, we find "Orthodoxy" in flagrant contradiction with the dominant principle which forms the basis of its whole religious theory, and the very point which practically constitutes its reason for existing.

More contradictions appear, however, in the Orthodox Church, if we compare the most salient points of its history with the doctrine of Christ, which it claims to inherit.

Christ separated religion from the civil power: "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, but to God the things that are God's." He had announced that his church should be not only one—a single flock in one sheepfold under one pastor—but also *universal*, spreading out, at first *de jure*, then little by little *de facto*, beyond all national frontiers, to embrace all mankind. Yet here is Photius giving the Church away to Cæsar and shutting it up within the limits of the empire, thus sacrificing at one stroke the *independence*, *catholicity* and *unity* which Christ required!

But by thus binding the Church to the emperor, he identified it with a human and perishable thing. It was not to the emperor of the East that Christ had said: "On this rock I will build my Church, and

following pages, 246-61. See also, concerning the famous canon 28 of Chalcedon, the discussion of M. d'Herbigny, *Theologica de Ecclesia* (Paris, Beauchesne, 1921), Vol. II, pp. 141-52. The appeals to the Pope, even outside the councils, prove that the primacy of Rome was exercised *de facto* just as it was recognised *de jure*. See P. Bernardakis, *Les appels au pape de l'Église grecque jusqu'à Photius*, in *Echos d'Orient*, 1903, pp. 30-42, 118-26, 248-57.

the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." The rock of the empire was neither broad nor solid enough to support the Church of Christ. To break that rock the gates of hell were not needed; the power of men was sufficient. The empire crumbled into ruin, and each of the princes who gathered up its fragments, carried off that portion of the imperial Church nearest to him, thus rending with the sword Christ's seamless robe, and scattering its pieces to the capricious winds of political treaties.

With all its limbs amputated, the Church of Constantinople shrank to the mere district of its capital. Then on the horizon appeared the Turks. In 1451, the brother of the emperor drove away the deputies of the Pope, exclaiming: "Better the turban than the tiara!" Two years later, Mohammed II, coifed with the turban of the Prophet, entered the church of Santa Sophia on horseback, trampled under foot the heaps of corpses there, and placing his fingers dripping with Christian blood upon the frescoes glittering on a golden ground, left upon them, as the symbol of his conquest and his acquisition, the still discernible imprint of a blood-red hand.[1]

Ever since that time the gory hand of the Sultan has retained the crozier of the Church of Constantinople, which had been too proud to accept the crozier of the Pope; and this hand has often been a hard one. For example, in 1869, on the very day when the patriarch refused to receive the invitation to the council of the Vatican, which a messenger from the Pope, Pius IX, had brought him, the Sultan informed him that he had decided to withdraw from his authority the Bulgarian Christians of the empire, in order to form out of them a new Church as an emolument for an exarch of their race. By this act, the patriarch of

[1] Cf. Mgr. Besson, *L'Église* (Bray et Retaux, 6th ed., 1872), p. 138.

Constantinople lost nearly four million subjects out of the five millions which had still remained to him.[1] He submitted; and the successor of Photius and Michael Cerularius—the two men who had thought, by putting themselves under Cæsar, to put themselves above the Pope, and had claimed to represent alone the "Orthodox" and universal Church of Christ—does not to-day govern a million Christians in all.[2]

The others, bound to the land and chained to the soil, if we may say so, by the act which separated them from Peter, have changed religious heads, religious discipline, and their Church itself, whenever the soil has changed masters. The Russian Tsar finally gathered up most of them under his sceptre, and his dominion was also hard. In 1666, the patriarch of Moscow, Nikon, having shown some signs of independence, the Tsar Alexis dispossessed him and confined him in a monastery; Peter the Great, a few years later, placed at the head of the Church the "Holy Synod," governed by a layman of his court; and to the Bishops who requested a new patriarch, he made, it is said, this answer: "I recognise no legitimate patriarch except the Bishop of Rome. Since you do not wish to obey him, you shall obey me alone." And, putting his hand on his sword, he added: "Behold your patriarch." Until 1917 they had no other.

The other Churches which owe their origin to Photius boast of being autocephalous, that is, of having each its own distinct head; but on each of these heads the civil power has laid its hand, and, in case of necessity, it reminds them of the principle

[1] Cf. *Civiltà cattolica*, series vii, Vol. V., pp. 341, 471 *seq.*, and Granderath, *Histoire du Concile du Vatican*, French trans. (Brussels, Albert Dewit, Vol. I, 1908), p. 376.

[2] Since the recent amputations and the exodus of the Greeks, the *Ecumenical* Patriarchate finds itself reduced to 350,000 members, according to J. Lacombe, *Echos d'Orient*, Jan.-Mar., 1923, p. 105.

which a French politician expressed in the rude formula: "Render unto Cæsar that which is Cæsar's; but everything is Cæsar's."[1]

But where everything is Cæsar's, the Church is no longer Christ's. Man cannot serve two masters, and certainly God did not make himself man in order that Cæsar should continue to make himself God. Where Cæsar governs, the Church is no longer Catholic, that is to say *universal*; for every Cæsar, small or great, always comes at last to frontiers where his power ceases, and beyond which other Cæsars rise and cry: "Halt!" It would be therefore useless for all the "autocephalous" Churches, subject to Cæsar, to declare that they are united, for they would not form the required *unity*. Where there are several heads there is not one single body.

Not from the tattered remnants of the Church, which frontiers separate and which the sword of battles or the fluctuations of politics may still cut off from it to-morrow; not from these poor recovered fragments can the seamless robe of Christ be made. There is no longer one Church, but many Churches; a cloud of ecclesiastical dust, in fact, which the wind of politics gathers or scatters, as it may chance to blow.

[1] G. Clemenceau, in a meeting held at Paris in 1876 (according to Lecanuet, *L'Église de France sous la Troisième Republique*, Paris, Poussielgue, 1907, p. 493).

Vladimir Soloviev (*La Russie et l'Église universelle*, Paris, Stock, 5th ed., 1922, p. 5), quotes the Russian Aksakof as declaring that there are in the code of the Tsarist laws "more than 1,000 articles" to indicate "the guardianship of the State over the Church" and to define exactly "the functions of the police in the domain of faith." M. d'Herbigny (*L'Anglicanisme et l'Orthodoxie gréco-slave*, Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1922, p. 11) cites, according to the code, the text of the oath imposed upon the bishops: "I confess under oath that the sovereign judge of this ecclesiastical college is the Emperor of all the Russias." In Greece, according to the same author, Art. I of the *Ecclesiastical Constitution* reads: "The Church has for its head the King." It is the same *de jure* and *de facto* in the other autocephalous Churches. Cf. d'Herbigny, *Theologica*, II, pp. 217 *seq.*

Yesterday there was one Church for the Greeks of Constantinople (the Ecumenical Patriarchate), another for the Greeks of the Kingdom (the synodal Church of Athens), another for Cyprus (Archbishopric), another for the Syrians of Jerusalem (Patriarchate), another for the Greco-Arabians of Egypt (Patriarchate of Alexandria),[1] another for the Monastery of Sinai (Archbishopric), another for the Russians (Holy Synod of Petrograd), another for the Bulgarians (Exarchate), another for Serbia (synodal Church of Belgrade), another for Montenegro (metropolitan Church of Cettinje), another for the Orthodox of Hungary (Patriarchate of Karlovitz), another for those of Austria (autocephalous Church of Chernovitz),[2] another for Rumania (synodal Church), another for Transylvania (metropolitan Church of Sibiu) ; and finally the Church of Bosnia and Herzegovina, legally subject to Constantinople, but actually already independent.[3] Sixteen in all, on the eve of the world war!

But the war has swept over them and, as always, has changed their destinies just as it changed the

[1] In 1921, a priest of this Church, Mark Sergios, separated from it in order to found the " Independent Copt-Orthodox Church," and requested the Khedive's government to recognise it. The latter, by virtue of the present legislation, recognising only the patriarchal Church for all Orthodox Copts, advised the new Church to have itself admitted, as " a Protestant community," by the general Council of indigenous Protestant Churches. See Adhémar Tewfik, in *L'Action*, October 1, 1922, Alexandria, pp. 323-27.

[2] It was made up of pieces and fragments distributed to the four corners of Austria-Hungary : the Slav-Rumanian diocese of Bukovina in the north-west, two Serbian dioceses in Dalmatia in the south-west, the Greco-Serb community of Trieste, the Greek colony of Vienna. This autocephalous Church was governed by the Metropolitan of Chernovitz and the bishops of Zara and Cattaro, united in a synod every year in Vienna.

[3] See M. Jugie, *Dictionn.*, ed. d'Alès, II, col. 346-48, and R. Janin, *Les Églises orientales et les rites orientaux* (Paris, Bonne Presse, 1922), pp. 97-99 *et passim*.

fate of nations. By right of victory, the Churches constituted by the racial Serbs (those of Belgrade, Cettinje, Karlovitz and Bosnia-Herzegovina) form now only one, which is the patriarchal Church of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the State of Jugoslavia. It is governed by the Metropolitan of Belgrade, patriarch of Ipek. As the result of defeat, the Church of Transylvania and that of Chernovitz have disappeared, the former having been absorbed into that of Rumania, the latter distributed piece-meal between that of Rumania and that of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Total, five autocephalous Churches less.[1]

But in the presence of these readjusted fragments, the immense Russian Church has also broken into pieces simultaneously with the empire; Esthonia, Latvia, Finland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Orthodox of Poland all have their separate Churches, like their civil governments. In what is left of Russia, the Church, in spite of the Orthodox principle which subjects it to the civil power, has tried to maintain its old formation, and has even re-established the patriarchate, which has been suppressed ever since the time of Peter the Great. But the former *Starovery*, who refused to recognise the Tsar, find themselves at present, with their own hierarchy, absolutely on the same footing as the former official Church; while, confronting both of them, the Soviets have erected two "red" Orthodox hierarchies, having their seats at Tsaritsin and Moscow.[2]

[1] A third fragment, the Dalmatian diocese of Zara, has fallen to Italy. We do not know if it constitutes one more autocephalous Church, but it is at least probable.

[2] Cf. d'Herbigny, *La Tyrannie soviétique et le malheur russe* (Paris, Editions Spes, 1923), pp. 160-67. Those who have left Russia seem to be divided, moreover, into two parties, one of which is subject to a chief acknowledged by the Patriarch, while the other is practically independent. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 149, 179, 224, 225. In

Albania, like the others, has wished to confine her Church within own changing frontiers, and the government of Czechoslovakia approved, in 1922, the constitution of the " Czechoslovakian Orthodox Church," reduced to an archbishop and a few dozen members,[1] while, at the same time, the government of Angora decided to make a separate group of its Orthodox Turkish subjects.

The list is doubtless incomplete ; for, in the Orient, there is a ferment of political passions, in a game in which the Churches are the stakes. But if we cannot say how it will be to-morrow, there are, for the moment, at least twenty-three " autocephalous " Churches, all practically side by side, in one single corner of the world, possessing neither the means nor the desire to conquer the rest of the earth, having among themselves neither subordination nor co-ordination, delighting in hurling anathemas at one another, and knowing no other rule for living in peace than that of having no intercourse whatever with each other.[2] In a word, they form a multitude of flocks, each in a separate sheepfold, under the crozier of the civil power, in which there is not the least resemblance to the one flock and one shepherd—*unum ovile et unus pastor* (John x, 16)—for which Christ prayed.

1923, an assembly of 46 Soviet bishops declared the Patriarch Tikhon a renegade and traitor, and consequently deposed from his functions. (Cf. *Nouvelles religieuses*, June 1, 1923, p. 255). The recent defection of the Patriarch complicates the imbroglio both in Russia and among the exiles. See the details in the numbers of the *Ruskulta*, latter half of 1923.

[1] Cf. *Nouv. relig.*, June 15, 1923, p. 280. But for three years already there has existed a " National Church," at first supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church, and already cut in two. Cf. *Echos d'Orient*, July-Dec., 1922, pp. 492 *seq.*, and Jan.-Mar., 1923, pp. 115-17.

[2] See Soloviev, *Russie et Église univ.*, pp. 59-66 *et passim*. The Patriarch of Constantinople has commenced regularly by anathematising the new Churches, before recognising them. The Patriarch of Alexandria has never recognised that of Antioch, etc.

If Christ is God, and if His promises are not deceptive, the Church of His Heart, the Church which was taken from His side on Calvary, the Church which Scripture calls His Spouse, which is associated with His mission and His glory, and is the bride of the King of Kings, ought not to be a slave. Since Christ does not desire polygamy, the Church which St. Paul points out as the model of Christian marriage should be unique, the fruitful mother of all redeemed souls and of all the children of God. It should be *Catholic.*

The separated Churches know this. They know the ancient Creed: "*Credo unam, sanctam, catholicam, et apostolicam Ecclesiam.* I believe in one, holy, Catholic Church." [1] Let us grant that they are made holy by the sacraments they still dispense. Let us grant that they are also apostolic through the material succession of their bishops. But they have separated themselves from Peter, who is the centre; and certainly all these numerous Churches are not *one,* nor these local Churches *Catholic.* In chanting their *Credo,* they condemn themselves.[2] Whatever may be the number and importance of the truths they still retain, there blazes forth in them a manifest contradiction between the *Credo* they repeat and the permanent fact of history which they renounce.[3]

[1] Creed of the Second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople in 381. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* (Friburg, Herder, 9th ed., no. 47.)

[2] And also in reciting their catechism: "There is salvation only in the one *Catholic* and Apostolic Church," declares the *exact Catechism of the Orthodox Church of the East, examined and approved by the Holy Synod of Russia.* (Cf. Tilloy, *op. cit.*, pp. 332 *et seq.*)

The Russians had substituted in the Creed the word *conciliary* for the word *Catholic.* But the procedure was so little "conciliary," that they ended, while retaining the word, by agreeing that the meaning "Catholic" should be given to it. Cf. Malvy, *Études,* April 20, 1906, p. 180.

[3] Soloviev, in his long search for truth, has shown other contradictions. See Michel d'Herbigny, *Vladimir Soloviev* (Paris, Beauchesne, 1911), especially pp. 194-200.

Whoever, with a perfectly unbiassed mind, surveys the origin of the Orthodox Church, its doctrinal position and its historical development, sees, therefore, contradictions rising everywhere to confront him.

III

PROTESTANTISM[1]

Luther declared that he had been invested with a special mission to establish the "Reformation." He ascribed his doctrine to a direct revelation: "My doctrine is from God and not from me," he said in 1522; "therefore my judgement is the judgement of God, and not my own."[2]

[1] We regret exceedingly that the needs of our thesis oblige us to criticise religious ideas opposed to our own; and this regret becomes greater when we approach Protestantism, because, even if we see error therein, it is that of a large number of our compatriots and of a certain number—in France and in other countries—of our readers. No doubt, *magis amica veritas*; but when the truth is liable to wound susceptibilities, we may, while telling it, reserve the right to be pained in doing so. We desire at least to protest that we distinguish between the doctrine and those who hold it; that we wish for all our "separated brethren," Protestant or Orthodox, the light and peace of Christ; that we profess for all seeking souls an immense sympathy, and for all souls in good faith an immense respect, and we would not pretend to judge souls of any other kind, even if we thought we knew any such; to do so belongs to their consciences and to God. We claim only the right to set forth the facts and to judge the doctrines.

[2] Quoted in Denifle's *Luther et le Luthéranisme, Étude faite d'après les sources.* Translation by J. Paquier (Paris, A. Picard, 1912-13), Vol. III, p. 495. Luther's literary work is very voluminous (the critical edition of Weimar, commenced in 1883, already comprises 64 volumes), and is not easily found in libraries; but when we have not ourselves been able to draw from the original sources, we have quoted from those who have done so—Denifle, Döllinger, Janssen and Bossuet. Modern criticism has had to concede that "Bossuet has made a report of almost irreproachable accuracy." (Alfred Rebelliau, *Bossuet, historien du protestantisme, Étude sur l'histoire des variations*, Paris, Hachette, 1891, Preface, p. viii.) A prize was offered

In the same year he wrote to Frederick of Saxony: "I receive not the Gospel from the hand of men, but only from heaven through our Lord Jesus Christ."[1] "Whether Luther is a blackguard or a saint," he again writes, "matters little to me; but his doctrine is not from him, it is from Christ Himself."[2] In 1535, when it was proposed that he should convoke a council, he declared to the Papal legate: "We are now enlightened in regard to all the truths of faith by the direct illumination of the Holy Spirit."[3] The Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost—that is, the entire Trinity—thus comes to the aid of the Reformation: such is the assertion of Luther, which he indeed repeats in categorical terms on many occasions.[4]

in 1885 by a German-American, William Fromman, for the purpose of refuting Janssen (Cf. Kannengieser, *Le Reveil d'un peuple*, Paris, Lethielleux, 1892, pp. 403-7) but it has not yet been gained. No doubt, we believe, has ever been raised as to the references of Döllinger. As to Denifle, his thesis has been thoroughly and even violently discussed, but the accuracy of his quotations has not been contested. We have just given the bibliographical indications as regards Denifle. The following concern the other three:

(*a*) Bossuet: We quote his *Œuvres complètes*, edition of Bar-le-Duc, L. Guérin, 1862: *L'Histoire des variations des Églises protestantes* is in Vol. IV.

(*b*) J. Döllinger, *La Réforme et les resultats qu'elle a produits.* Trans. E. Perrot, Paris, Gaume, 1848-49.

(*c*) Jean Janssen, *L'Allemagne et la Réforme.* Trans. E. Paris, Plon, 1887-1911.

[1] Denifle, III, p. 487. Unless there are indications to the contrary, when alluding to Denifle, Döllinger, Janssen or Bossuet, we refer, not to the text of these authors, but to the text of Luther cited by them.

[2] Still in 1522. Denifle, III, p. 486. [3] Janssen, III, p. 481.

[4] Denifle, *Luther aux yeux du catholique et du rationaliste.* In the sequel to Vol. IV of *Luther et le Luthéranisme*, French trans., especially pp. 39-41, he recalls a large number of these passages. And Luther means to be taken seriously. He wishes to be considered as having "more authority in his little finger than a thousand popes, kings, princes and doctors ever had." And he adds: "Whoever teaches anything other than what I teach, or condemns me on this subject, condemns God Himself, and will remain forever a child of hell." (Janssen, II, 231.)

It is true, he frequently declares just the contrary, and in the second part of this work we shall have something to say about these "variations." But even when he makes no reference to a personal revelation, he claims to base his assertions on the Christian revelation and pretends to be restoring it to its pristine purity. In any case, he maintains that he repeats to men the Word of God. He cannot, therefore, involve himself in contradictions without appearing either as a visionary or an impostor.

Moreover, even if he deludes himself, he has one advantage. Mankind had had, already before his time, fifteen centuries of experience in regard to the Christian belief, and had had time to see its strength and weakness. But Luther now arrogated to himself the right to embellish and embroider this rich canvas as he liked and even to add to or take from it. Nor did he fail to do this. He kept at work repairing it all his life. With merely the resources of experience at his disposal, and with ordinary human prudence, it would have been comparatively easy for him to present a coherent system. But he never succeeded in establishing it firmly. Through its innumerable changes, his doctrine always presents itself as a monstrous conglomeration and a defiance to logic and common sense.

Let us take, for example, the central point of his system: the justification of the sinner. It is the point which he most elaborated and affirmed with the greatest possible perseverance, prolixity, vehemence and tenacity. He declared to the Papal legate that "he should think he was denying Christ, if it were necessary for him to change his convictions on this point, and that he would prefer to condemn, reject and deny everything, rather than to retract this doctrine." He also proclaimed a hundred times that it is fundamental and that all his work and all true Christianity rest upon

it. "If this doctrine succumbs and perishes," he says, "the knowledge of the truth perishes and succumbs with it. . . . So long as this point remains pure and intact, Christianity also will remain pure . . . this point being the only one which constitutes and preserves Christianity."[1] It is the "unique point by which we are distinguished, and by which our religion is distinguished from every other religion."[2]

Here is this fundamental point, this essential dogma, defined as far as possible in the very words of Luther: Concupiscence, the tendency to pleasure, is the original sin. In consequence of the fault of Adam, it gained possession of man and will no more let him go.[3] It is not effaced by baptism, still less by confession.[4] We have it in our bodies, transmitted through propagation, riveted to our very nature, indelible, unrestrainable, irremediable. It has vitiated everything in us from top to bottom. "Our person, our nature, our entire being is corrupted by the fall of Adam. . . . Our sin is not a work or an action within ourselves: it is our nature and our entire being."[5]

Not only is our flesh infected with it, but our mind as well. "I say that the intellectual faculties are not merely corrupted, but even annihilated by sin, as

[1] Döllinger, III, 6, 15.

[2] D. Martini Lutheri *Exegetica opera latina*, published by Elsperger (Erlangen, Heyder, 1829-84), Vol. XXIII, p. 140.

[3] One of his disciples, Joachim of Magdeburg, went so far as to say that even the corpses of the elect remain in original sin until the resurrection. He did not convince all his co-religionists, but some of them resorted to singular arguments in order to refute him. One of these was Christopher Irenæus, who thought that original sin was something living, reasonable and intelligent, and could not, therefore, be attributed to a corpse. (See Janssen, Vol. IV, pp. 508 *seq.*)

[4] See Denifle, II, pp. 18 *seq.*, 30 *seq.*, 445 *seq.*; III, 6-72.

[5] Döllinger, III, 31.—A disciple of Luther, Flacius, wishes to be still more scrupulously precise and declares that original sin is not an *accidental* effect, but the *substance itself* of fallen man. Cf. Janssen, VII, 448 *seq.*

completely in man as in the demons, so that there is in them nothing but a corrupt mind, a perverse will, hostile to God in everything and inclined solely to what is contrary and displeasing to God."[1]

It follows that man sins, whatever he does. Whether it be repentance, good works or love of God, sin insinuates itself into all our acts, stamps them with its seal and monopolises them; hence they are always sinful. "Man, being only a rotten stump, can produce nothing but corruption, and can will and do only evil."[2]

"All that you undertake, however beautiful and brilliant it may be, is sin and remains sin. Do what you will, you can only sin."[3] And mortally. There is no such thing as venial sin. God, in His sovereign freedom, can, if He wishes, judge my sin as venial, but in fact and in its essence it is mortal.[4]

And it is fatal. The sin that holds my nature in its grip and is incorporated with it, and is, indeed, my very nature, is invincible, inevitable. It is not in my power to rid myself of it, to subdue it or to escape it. It is not in my power to obey the commandments. When God commands, when He says: "Do that," He says to

[1] Döllinger, III, p. 32.

[2] Janssen, II, 76. Cf. Lutheri *Opera latina varii argumenti ad Reformationis historiam imprimis pertinentia*, ed. Henri Schmidt (Frankfort, Heyder, 1865-73), Vol. I, pp. 243 and 350.

[3] Denifle, III, 179. Cf. 47-51.

[4] "Omne peccatum, quod ad substantiam facti attinet, est mortale." (D. Martini Lutheri *Commentarium in Epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas*. (Irmischer, Erlangen, 1843-44, Vol. III, p. 24.) It is for the believer that sin is venial. "For one who does not believe, not only are all sins mortal, but all his good works are sins. . . . The error of the sophists, who distinguish between sins according to acts and not according to persons, is therefore pernicious. . . To the believer, sin is venial; to the unbeliever it is mortal; not that it is really different, smaller in one and greater in another, but because the persons differ." (*Ibid.* 25.) The same doctrine is developed at length in Martin Luther's *Werke*, ed. Weimar, II, 410 *seq.* Cf. IV, 161.

Himself: "If you can." And He knows perfectly well that I cannot.[1]

Moreover, man is not free. "He is passive. He does nothing, he is absolutely made to do." He does not act; "he is acted upon, like the hatchet or the saw in the hand of the workman."[2]

But this does not please the magistrates. They shall be satisfied. "On the subject of free will," the Augsburg Confession[3] says, the new doctors "teach that man's will has some degree of liberty, that it may fulfil the requirements of civil justice and choose things submitted to reason." Luther had already conceded this: "I speak of free will (in order to deny it) in relation to God and to the things of the soul. For what need have I to dispute much about the freedom (of man) in regard to cows and horses, money and goods?"[4] "But in regard to what pertains to salvation or damnation, man has no free will at all; he is the captive, subject and slave either of the will of God or of the will of Satan."[5] In this respect, my will is dead, most emphatically dead. Free will is a word devoid of ideas, a label without an object to fasten it to, an idol without substance, introduced by Satan into the Church.[6] The *slave-will* is its true name.[7] We are serfs, slaves, "prisoners of the devil; he is our prince and our god and we are *constrained* to do what he wishes."[8]

[1] Döllinger, III, 28. Cf. Denifle, III, 364 note.

[2] *Idem.*, III, 29. Cf. Denifle, III, 364 note.

[3] *Op. var. arg.* VII, 239-41. Cf. 317. It is art. 18. *Corpus Reformatorum*, Brunswick, Vol. XXVI, col. 282 *seq.*

[4] Denifle, III, 267, note.

[5] *Werke*, Weimar ed., XVIII, 638. Cf. *op. var. arg.* I, 240.

[6] Denifle, III, 267 *et passim.*

[7] *De servo arbitrio*: Such is the title of one of his works to which, together with his catechism, he attached most importance (Döllinger, III, 29). It is reproduced in Vol. XVIII of the *Werke*, Weimar ed., and in Vol. VII of the *Op. var. argum.*

[8] Denifle, III, 266, note 5. Cf. Janssen, II, 401 *seq.*

" Satan rides upon our will and urges it against God, as a horseman urges his recalcitrant steed by the use of spurs."[1]

Moreover, the devil is no freer than man is; nor is an angel or any other creature any freer than the devil. God alone is free; " free will is the exclusive prerogative of God."[2] " He foresees everything in advance in his immutable, eternal and infallible will, and he foresees, decides and accomplishes. That is the thunderbolt which overturns and tears to pieces free will. . . . Hence, in spite of apparently fortuitous events and seeming freedom, all that we do really takes place necessarily and incontrovertibly."[3] It is, therefore, God who does everything, "who causes evil in us, as well as good."[4] But He is good when doing evil,[5] just as man is bad when doing good. And the triumph of faith is to love God and to bless Him, whether He " rewards the unworthy " or " damns the innocent."[6]

He damns these and rewards those, without their having anything to do in the matter, without them and, if necessary, in spite of them, exactly as He chooses.

[1] *Opera exeg.*, XXIV, 464. " If Satan rides it, it wills as Satan wills, and goes where he conducts it." (*Opera var. arg.*, VII, 157, Cf. *Ibid.* 312.

[2] Denifle, III, 269; *Werke*, Weimar, XVIII, 664, 786, etc.

[3] *Werke*, Weimar, XVIII, 615.

[4] Bossuet, IV, 435; Döllinger, III, 26.

[5] Luther has tried breathlessly to justify this assertion. See, for example, *De servo arbitrio* (*Werke*, ed. Weimar, Vol. XVIII, pp. 709-712). He himself, however (*Ibid.* 712) raises this objection: " But why does not God (who does everything without man, both good and evil) change the bad wills which he manipulates as He likes? " Reply: " That is His Majesty's secret." See the discussion of Bossuet (*Œuvres*, V, 29 *seq.*).

[6] Bossuet, IV, 435, Döllinger, III, 22-25. God " justifies and saves even very unworthy persons. Justificat et salvat indignissimos." (*Op. var. arg.*, VII, 363 and 155.)

He is the Master.[1] There are men whom He specially created for hell.[2]

It is true, He tells us in Scripture that He desires the salvation of all men. But that is his *revealed* will; that is what he wishes to make us believe; his *hidden* will is, however, wholly different. He wishes only a certain number, and in fact a small number, of elect souls in his heaven.[3]

To whom or to what, then, shall I devote myself? What can I do? *Nihil, vere nihil*;[4] nothing, literally nothing. To what, then, shall I give myself? To hell! And that "not merely hypocritically with the lips, but with a sincere heart, actually desiring to be lost and damned.... If we give ourselves over for good and all to hell... God will take pity on us and deliver us."[5] That is the first scene in the tragedy of salvation.[6] It is a gloomy one. But here is the other, completely inundated with light. After despair, *hope*; after sin—dragging us, whether we will or not, to hell—*the faith that justifies*: Believe and thou shalt be saved.

This lucky discovery is presented by Luther as the core and masterpiece of his doctrine. He reverts to it

[1] Luther (*Op. var. arg.*, VII, 260.) In his *Assertio articulorum damnatorum* (*Werke*, Weimar ed., VII, 114), in 1520, he dares to say that his doctrine on liberty is "to such a degree unanimously confirmed by common sense and by experience that he might be dispensed from proving it." But, in 1525, in his *De servo arbitrio* (*Werke*, XVIII, 719) he confesses that it is "wholly opposed to common sense and natural reason to admit that God, merely by his will, abandons, hardens and damns men." And yet it is this doctrine that he proclaims in these same pages.

[2] Luther, *Op. var. arg.*, VII, 233 *seq.*, 276.

[3] Döllinger, III, 26-9. "It is his secret will that decides the manner and number of those who are to partake of it" (of his grace, and therefore of his heaven.) Cited by Janssen, II, 402, Cf. Luther, *Op. var. arg.*, VII, 221-23.

[4] Luther, *Op. exeget.*, XXIV, 464 *seq.*

[5] Denifle, III, 50, note 3.

[6] The word is Luther's: "*Nostrae vitae tragediam.*" (*Werke*, Weimar, I, 92.

continually with inexhaustible prolixity and rapturous enthusiasm.

To believe is everything. But what must we believe?

Believe that you will be saved. That is the only thing that matters. What is required here is, not an intellectual faith, or an adhesion of the mind to something, but a sudden action of the will, a faith-sentiment, a faith-confidence.[1]

But the will, you say, is dead, absolutely dead to anything good!—Well then, God will make you believe,[2] and so will justify you.—But my nature is wholly sinful.—It remains so; but that no longer matters. "He who believes has as great sins as the unbeliever; but they are forgiven him; they are no longer imputed to him."[3]—How so?—By a sort of disguise. The sinner who believes assumes the mask of Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ assumes the mask of the sinner. Henceforth, in the eyes of God, Jesus Christ is the sinner; "In the whole world there has not been a worse assassin, murderer, adulterer, thief, sacrilegist or blasphemer;"[4] not that He actually committed these sins, but he has clothed Himself with us and has clothed us with Himself. "By a happy exchange He has taken on Himself our sinful personality and given us his own—innocent and victorious."[5] Thanks to this stratagem, God no longer sees sins in us, where they really are, but in Jesus Christ, where they are not.

And Luther in his language heaps up rhetorical figures with an ardour that seems triumphant and

[1] Denifle, III, 422, *seq.*, 299, note 4, etc.

[2] Faith is God who "worketh in us, without our aid" and if need be "in spite of us." Denifle, III, 272, 289, note 1.

[3] Cf. *Comm. ad Galatas*, III, 25. The analogous texts are innumerable.

[4] Döllinger, III, 78. Cf. Denifle, III, 275.

[5] *Comm. ad Galatas*, II, 25.

with a sort of sacred fury; Christ "is the cloak that hides our shame, the cover of our ignominy . . . He lets the sinner leap upon his back and thus saves him from death and the jailer."[1] He is "the robe of gold" beneath which "God can see no sin in us, although we are full of it";[2] He is the hen under whose wings we are to take refuge, in order that his fulfilment of the law may become ours. O amiable hen! O happy chicks!"[3] How easy everything thus becomes!

"Christianity is therefore nothing more than a continual exercise in feeling that thou hast no sin, although thou dost sin, but that thy sins are taken away by Christ."[4] "If thou believest . . . then thou becomest the beloved child, and everything goes on smoothly, and all that thou dost is well. If thou dost not believe, it will be in vain for thee to do anything thou shalt desire to do; thou art damned."[5]

"Is it not therefore good news, if someone is full of sins, that the Gospel comes and says to him: *Have confidence and believe*, and that henceforth all his sins are forgiven? This account once settled, the sins are pardoned, and there is nothing more to wait for."[6]

But at least I must repent?

Not the least in the world. "Believe firmly that you are absolved, and you are absolved, however it may be with your contrition."[7] "Contrition only makes men hypocritical and more sinful."[8] When separated from justifying faith, it "offends God

[1] Denifle, III, 67, 367, 369, etc. [2] Döllinger, III, 120 *seq.*
[3] *Werke*, Weimar, I, 35. [4] *Opera exeget.* XXIII, 142.
[5] Denifle, III, 377. Cf. 410 *et passim.*
[6] Denifle, I, 31 *seq.* Cf. Janssen, II, 76. [7] Bossuet, IV, 428.
[8] Contritio, quae paratur per discussionem, collectionem et detestationem peccatorum, quâ quis recogitat annos suos in amaritudine animae suae, ponderando peccatorum gravitatem, multitudinem, foeditatem, amissionem aeternae beatitudinis, et acquisitionem aeternae damnationis, haec contritio facit hypocritam, imo magis peccatorem." (Luther's *Werke*, Weimar, VII, 113.)

more than it reconciles him." And Luther flies into a rage against those "crazy" priests who demand from the penitent the grief of repentance. From such priests the power of the keys should be taken away, and a stick should be given them to drive cows with.[1]

But if we need not repent for the past, is it not necessary at least to be disposed, in future, to obey the commandments?—No! they are impossible. "Their only purpose is to show man his impotence to do good and to teach him to despair of himself."[2] With his Law and his Decalogue, "Moses is an executioner, a cruel lictor, a torturer who tears our flesh out with pincers and makes us suffer martyrdom . . . Whoever, in the name of Christ, terrifies and troubles consciences, is not the messenger of Christ, but of the devil . . . Let us therefore send Moses packing and for ever.[3] "For us the Law is abrogated . . . Accursed therefore be every doctrine, every mode of life and every religion which claims to justify man before God with the Law or with works!".

And it is not only in its ceremonial parts that the Law of Moses is abrogated, "but the whole of the Law, especially the moral Law, the only one which accuses our consciences, which wishes ill to them and condemns them . . . The Law of the Decalogue has no right to accuse and frighten the conscience in which Christ reigns by grace; Christ has caused this right to fall into disuse.[4] He has fulfilled all the Law; that is no longer to be done. He has paid for me. I owe nothing more. "The game is won; Christ the conqueror has achieved everything, so that we have nothing to do, neither to efface our sins, nor to fight the devil, nor to vanquish

[1] Denifle, III, 352. Döllinger, III, 70-6, shows by what a logical train of ideas Luther was led to see in repentance "sin itself, in its most powerful and most detestable form." [2] Denifle, III, 364.
[3] *Opera exeget.* XVIII, 146 *seq.* [4] *Comm. ad Galatas*, II, 264 *seq.*

death. All that lies already prostrate on the ground . . . He who believes that Christ has wiped out sin, is sinless like Christ . . . He has made his justice mine, He has made my sin his. And if He has made my sin his, then I have it no more, I am free. If He has made his justice mine, then I am made just by his own justice.[1]

"But do not I myself then do anything?

"You cannot do anything.[2]

"But I ought surely to prove my faith by my works?"

Here there is some hesitation. It is a fact that Luther sometimes became alarmed at the consequences of his doctrine, and reprimanded his disciples severely.[3] Occasionally he tried to assure them that the just should devote themselves to good works, even while knowing them to be useless, or that they should do them spontaneously, without thinking of them, as a good tree brings forth good fruit,[4] forgetting that, according to him, no tree has remained good.[5] But his usual teaching, the one most in conformity with his fundamental principles, and the one most relished and followed,[6] was the following:

[1] Denifle, I, 33 and II, 346-440. [2] *Comm. ad Galatas*, II, 266.

[3] See Döllinger, I, 276-432.

[4] For example, in his *Comm. ad Galatas*, I, 235. Cf. Döllinger, III, 89-101.

[5] "Sinners are bad trees and they can bring forth only bad fruit." (*Opera var. arg.*, VII, 350.)

[6] A. Harnack (*Essence of Christianity*. French trans. Paris, Fischbacher, 1907, p. 341) confesses that "the vulgar crowd was not sorry to learn that *good works* were useless and even dangerous for the soul." What Harnack acknowledges, Janssen proves with a crushing mass of documentary evidence. See e.g. Vol. III, Book I, chap. iv and v; Book III, chap. vii; Vol. IV, Book I, chap. i, ii, iii, viii; Vol. VIII, 3rd part, chap. i and ii. See also Döllinger, Vols. I and II, notably, in Vol. I, pp. 276-343, the complaints of Luther; and in Vol. II, pp. 678-89, an eloquent résumé.—The sect of the Antinomians, founded in Luther's lifetime, professed in particular to reject the observance of the Decalogue as injurious to salvation. It counted among its leaders Amsdorf, of whom Waller said that "No one had

"By teaching good works and urging men to do them as necessary to salvation, more harm is done than our human reason can conceive and comprehend."[1] In the first place, there are no good works. Everything that comes from us is sin, and "the good works are bad and are sin like the rest."[2] And then, supposing you do this or that, what good can this or that do to God? Christian liberty wishes that "before God all outward things should be at our free disposition and a Christian make use of them as he likes." By doing this or that, "you render no service to God; and inversely . . . you cause Him neither displeasure nor offence.[3] "There is no deed so bad that it can damn a man . . . It is (merely) the want of faith that damns. If any one commits adultery, it is not that which will damn him."[4]

On the contrary! The great danger is the doing of good works. It is what the Papists call the practice of virtue. "There is no scandal greater, more dangerous, more venomous, than a good outward life, manifested by good works and a pious mode of life. That is the grand portal, the highway that leads to damnation.[5] Woe to those who "are loaded with graces and merits until death!" For "it is very proper that it will be with great difficulty that they shall learn to put their confidence in God."[6] For this reason "Benedictines, Carthusians, bare-footed friars, preachers, Augustinians, Carmelites, as well as all monks and nuns, shall assuredly be damned."[7]

so much of the spirit of Luther as he." (See Perronne, *Le protestantisme et la règle de foi*, trans. Peltier (Paris, Vivès, 1854), Vol. III, pp. 65-79.

[1] Döllinger, III, 101. [2] Denifle, III, 47. [3] Denifle, III, 136.

[4] Denifle, II, 128. Carlstadt by another way had reached the same conclusion: "That sins are not displeasing to God." "Because," he said, "sins have been created (!) and everything created is good." See Janssen, II, 396. [5] Döllinger, III, 124.

[6] See Denifle, III, 378; II, 181 *seq.*; I, 16, etc. [7] Denifle, II, 181.

Speak to me rather of the good big sinners, well authenticated, covered with mire and stains, who have never done anything worthy, but have done much evil; those men and women who are living " in grievous, manifest and public sins " ; there is no danger that they will trust to their good works, and they are thus in better condition to be saved than are the saints. The way to heaven is for them " easier and more certain."[1]

" The true saints of Christ ought to be thoroughgoing and great *sinners* and to *persevere* in this kind of sanctity."[2]

Luther himself has given in a few words the practical conclusion to which his entire doctrine leads, in his famous letter to Melanchthon of August 21st, 1521 : " *Esto peccator et pecca fortiter, sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo.* Be a sinner and sin valiantly, but still more valiantly trust and rejoice in Christ."[3]

But even in spite of these assurances, repeated everywhere, shouted on every occasion in tones of thunder, to the honour of humanity be it said that

[1] " Facilius in peccatis sit sperare in Deum et tutius quam in meritis et bonis." (*Op. var. arg.*, I, 239). Cf. Döllinger, III, 111.

[2] Denifle, IV, 67.

[3] We translate the whole passage from the Latin text (Denifle, II, 207, note 4) : " If you preach grace, do not preach a false grace, but a true one ; if the grace be true, let the sin be also true, and not false. God does not intend to save false sinners. Be a sinner and sin valiantly, but trust and rejoice still more valiantly in Christ, the conqueror of sin, death and the world. We *must* sin, so long as we are what we are. This life is not the abode of justice ; but we, according to the word of St. Peter, look for new heavens and a new earth in which justice dwells. It is enough for us to have known, through the riches of glory, the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world. He will take our sin away from us, even though we should be fornicators or murderers a thousand times and a thousand times a day. Think how cheaply the redemption of our sins is charged up to us in such and so great a Lamb! " See another similar text, in Janssen, II, 74, note 2. It is in the same state of mind that he had already said in 1518 : " True chastity consists in lewdness, and the more hideous the lewdness, the more beautiful the chastity." (Denifle, II, 404.)

Luther's followers still hesitated sometimes and confessed to a revolt of their consciences. Luther himself also was never able to install permanently in his soul this confidence in his salvation, this justifying faith which is sufficient for everything and dispenses with everything; and among his intimates he acknowledged this frequently;[1] but in public he preached it always over and over again, for, whenever contradicted, an attack of fury swept away all his doubts.[2] To the timid disciples who opposed to it the protests of their consciences, he replied: "Do not ask anything of your conscience; and if it speaks, do not listen to it; if it insists, stifle it, amuse yourself; if necessary, commit some good big sin, in order to drive it away. Conscience is the voice of Satan, and it is necessary always to do just the contrary of what Satan wishes."[3]

Here, therefore, is the outcome of this doctrine: war against conscience and the moral law,—*Pecca fortiter*. After the preliminary affirmation that everything is evil, the practical conclusion is that, for everyone who believes, everything is good.

Is it then exaggerated to say that, from one end to the other, everything in this monstrous system cries aloud "*contradiction*"? Man, robbed by the sin of another, not only (as Catholicism says) of the *supernatural privileges*, which this other, the head of the race, would have transmitted to him, had he re-

[1] Döllinger, III, 231-64; Denifle, III, 471 *seq.*; IV, 22, 25, etc. Janssen, II, 182-85.

[2] "It is necessary for me to get angry," he said; "that refreshes my prayer, stimulates my mind, and drives away all thoughts of discouragement and all doubts." (Edit. Walsch, XXII, 1237.) "I do no better work than that which is inspired by zeal and anger. If I want to dictate, write, pray or preach, I must be in a rage; then all my blood gets on fire and my intelligence becomes more keen," etc. (*Table Talk*, trans. G. Brunet, Paris, Garnier, 1884, p. 312.)

[3] Döllinger, III, 248. Cf. 37-58.

mained faithful, but robbed also of his own nature; not only of accessory gratifications, but also of his due; losing his liberty, yet remaining responsible; aspiring to heaven, yet constrained to go to hell; able to save himself only by a faith-confidence demanded from his destroyed liberty and from his absolutely defunct will; retaining, in spite of everything and by some miracle, his moral conscience, yet asked to divest himself of it or to flee from it as a temptation from Satan! And before this man, thus despoiled, stands a truthful God who nevertheless lies to his creature; an intelligent God who lets himself be deceived by him; who no longer sees the most monstrous sins, if only they are covered by the mantle of Jesus Christ, and who allows them to be smuggled into his heaven; a just God who "damns the innocent" with the same carelessness that he shows in "rewarding the unworthy"; a wise God who makes impossible laws, who obliges—at least those who do not believe in him—to keep them, yet compels them to violate them; finally a holy God, who regards with the same aspect saints and sinners, or, if he shows any preference, reserves it for the sinners. All these affirmations fairly howl at being coupled together. All these ideas are unthinkable. Before this mass of manifest contradictions, reason revolts.

And Luther confesses it. He knows that his doctrine is "paradoxical, astonishing and absurd."[1]

"*Even for us,*" he says, "*who have received the fruits of the Spirit,* it is *impossible to comprehend and believe* all these points perfectly, for they *contradict* human reason to the last degree."[2] "It is impossible to make faith agree with reason. . . . Reason is contrary to faith. It belongs to God alone to give

[1] *Comm. ad Galatas*, Vol. I, p. 235.

[2] Denifle, III, 379.



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a faith *contrary to* nature and *contrary to* reason; in a word, to make us believe."[1]

Weary at last of his useless efforts to maintain his doctrine steadfast, he lets it crumble away, saying that it does not need to be maintained and that what is false for human reason can nevertheless be true for theological reason.[2]

That is his last word on the relations of his doctrine with reason. Or, rather, no; the last word of Luther and his last attempt is always insult. No man has ever uttered such abuse as he did, either as regards its quantity or quality. All the most revolting, ignoble and least quotable words that can be found flow from him in torrents against any obstacle, whether it is one of person or ideas. A truly colossal share of this abuse fell upon human reason. In his last sermon at Wittenberg, in 1546, he arraigned it in a long litany, from which we quote—sweetening it somewhat however—this attribute: "The courtesan of the devil."[3]

In short, without speaking of internal contradictions, which others (Denifle, for example) have enumerated, the system of Luther is not in accord with reason. It "contradicts it in the highest degree," and it is Luther himself who says so.

Calvin presents himself before the bar of history, characterised by quite a different style and mode

[1] Denifle, III, 275; cf. 224 *seq.* He says elsewhere (cited by Janssen, III, 593): "Reason can be mastered only by wringing its neck by the aid of faith."

[2] In 1541, he writes: "The Sorbonne, mother of heresies, has just put forth a scandalous principle. It has declared that what is true in theology, is equally true in philosophy. By this abominable doctrine it has superabundantly proved that it submits the truths of faith to the humiliating yoke of human reason." (Quoted by Janssen, VII, 427.)

[3] Denifle, III, 277. Cf. Janssen, III, 594; VII, 424-27.

of life. He was at least true to himself,[1] a man "made out of one piece." Yet he greeted Luther on several occasions as the Head of the Reformation, and he professed to be also a bringer of the authentic word of God to men.

This disciple[2] ought, therefore, to be in agreement with his master, and these two divine messengers should teach the same gospel.

But, as a matter of fact, they contradict each other. For example, in regard to the Church and the nature of the sacraments they differ as widely from each other as they do from Catholicism.[3] And since they do thus contradict each other, one of the two must be in error. Moreover, both of them are manifestly wrong on the point in which they do

[1] This does not mean that his doctrine is perfectly coherent. Thus the *Confession of faith of the Churches of France* of 1559, which expresses in precise phrases the most authentic Calvinism, after having, in Art. 1, recognised in every believer the power of discerning the canonical books "by the testimony and internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit" and declaring that God "alone gives the certainty of this," demands, in Articles 25-28, a teaching and directing Church. (See *Corpus Reformatorum, Calvini Opera*, Vol. IX, col. 741, 749, 750.) Henri Bois, Professor of Protestant theology at Montauban (*La Prédestination d'après Calvin*, in the *Revue de métaphys. et de morale*, Sept.-Dec., 1918, consecrated "to the 4th centenary of the Reformation"), was able to say in his conclusions (p. 694): "Finally, it is an interesting and suggestive spectacle to see Calvin floundering in his own *inextricable contradictions*" (the italics are ours). Bossuet, *Variations*, Books IX and XIV, points out other inextricable contradictions.

[2] "For he was a disciple of Luther," says Adolf Harnack (*Essence du christianisme*, p. 335). "We follow the path which Luther has traced," wrote Calvin (cited in *Études*, March, 1923, p. 708).

[3] See a brief discussion by Mgr. Baudrillart in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie* of Vacant, Vol. II, col. 1,412-1,417. A similar contrast can be seen in the manner of understanding the relations of Church and State. Luther absorbs the Church in the State. (See Janssen, notably Vol. III, Book I, and Vol. IV, Book I.) Calvin absorbs the State in the Church. (See Goyau, *Une Ville Église, Genève*, Paris, Perrin, 1919, Vol. I.) Their heirs did not agree any better. (See in Janssen, Vol. V, Book II, chaps. vii and viii, on the "antagonism" and "denominational hatred" between Lutherans and Calvinists.

agree, for this is precisely the monstrous doctrine of justification by faith which we have just exposed. Like Luther, Calvin also makes of this "the principal article of the Christian religion."[1]

And even here, as if to accumulate purposely the evident indications of the falsity of their doctrine, while agreeing in general, they differ as to details. And what details! They are those which regulate the moral and religious conduct of man, and determine the successful issue of his salvation. We have seen that Luther points out a formidable peril in good works; Calvin, without considering them necessary and whilst rejecting the "fanciful idea of merit," wishes that "we should exercise ourselves in good works."[2] On this point his good sense and honesty triumph over his logic. But on other points his inflexible logic and savage nature revenge themselves and are no longer satisfied even with the excesses of Luther. In the tragedy of salvation, Luther, as we have said, paints the first scene in gloomy and the second in rosy colours. Calvin finds still a way to surpass him.

He lays frantic emphasis on the dark features of the system, even on those which Luther, a little terrified in spite of all, had passed over as lightly as possible—such as the distinction between the revealed and the hidden will of God, the premeditated creation of multitudes of men destined to hell, whatever they may do. "Which subject appears to some very obscure and perplexing, because they find no

[1] Jean Calvin, *Institution de la religion chrétienne*, New edition, carefully revised and corrected from the French edition of 1560 by Frank Baumgartner (Geneva, Béroud, 1888), Book III, chap. ii, sect. 1.

[2] *Ibid.* Book III, chap. xvi, sect. 2, and chap. xviii, sect. 2: He makes of them a consequence or a sign, but not the cause or condition of justification. "We place justice in faith and not in works." (Book I, chap. xvi, sect. 2.)

reason why God should predestine some to salvation and others to death."[1] Calvin, however, is not perplexed by such a trifle. "What is more," he adds, "in this obscurity which frightens them, we shall see not only how useful this doctrine is, but also how sweet and pleasant to the taste is the fruit that comes from it."[2]

Meanwhile, he does not mince his words. "We call predestination" he says, "the eternal counsel of God, by which He determined what he wished to make of each man; for He does not create them all in like conditions, but ordains some to life eternal and others to eternal damnation."[3]

If you quote against him the passage of Scripture where it is said that God desires "not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted and live" (Ezechiel xxxiii, 11), he will reply that "this passage is perverted and far-fetched, if, under the cloak of the words of the prophet, we seek to destroy the eternal counsel of God, by which He has distinguished the reprobates from the elect. Now let us seek the natural meaning . . . The sum and sub-

[1] *Ibid.* Book III, chap. xxi, sect. 1.

[2] *Ibid.* It is curious to compare this phrase with the following page written by a very modern Protestant, Auguste Sabatier (*Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire.* Paris, Fischbacher, 2nd edit. 1897, pp. 249 *seq.*) "The doctrines of grace and predestination form the centre of Calvinism. . . . Souls religiously sluggish see in these doctrines only an abuse of blind power, a sort of divine *fatum*, breaking every impulse of the human soul. Nothing appears more tyrannical or immoral. But that is only an appearance. There is really no predestination for irreligious souls. This doctrine is only the expression of the intimate foundation of all true piety, which would be nothing, if it were not the sentiment of the presence and the constant sovereign action of God in every soul and in the whole universe. How is it that men do not see that no other sentiment gives as much energy to the will of man, and that nothing raises it higher and makes it more invincible to all assaults from within and from without? *If God is for us, who will be against us?*" Very good! But what *if He is against us?*

[3] *Institution*, Vol. III, chap. xxi, sect. 5

stance of it is that sinners must not doubt that God forgives them, as soon as they are converted. He does not therefore desire their death, since He desires their conversion. But experience shows that He desires that many whom He invites to come to Him should repent, *in such a way that He does not touch their hearts.*" (The italics are ours.) St. Paul says, however (1 Tim. ii, 4), that God " will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Here again Calvin calmly corrects the text thus: Instead of all men " All States, all Kings, Princes and Magistrates "—all as subjects, but not *all the men in these different states.* "Since He chooses those to whom He will show mercy, He certainly does not show it *to all men.*"[1]

" For there is the universal call which consists of the external preaching of the Gospel, by which the Lord invites to Himself all men without distinction; nay, even those to whom He proposes it in the odour of death and for a cause of more grievous condemnation. There is another special call of which He makes only the faithful participants when, by the interior light of his Spirit, He causes the doctrine to be rooted in their hearts; although sometimes He makes use of such a call to those whom He enlightens for a time."[2]

And why does God wish to enlighten these " for a time? "

" In order to have them thoroughly convinced and

[1] *Institution*, Vol. III, chap. xxiv, sect. 15. We give only two examples. But all the other texts withstand this very simple and implacable exegesis with no better success. "When Calvin does not find predestination in the texts, he puts it there by main force and imposes it on them by violence." (Henri Bois, Professor of the Protestant Faculty of Theology at Montauban, *La Prédestination d'après Calvin*, in the *Rev. métaphys. et de morale*, Dec., 1918. p. 674).

[2] *Ibid*, Book III, chap. xxiv, sect. 8. The disciples of Calvin called these men " enlightened for a time," *transients.*

to render them thus so much the more inexcusable."[1] God then "does not give the spirit of regeneration to all those to whom He offers his word, in order to ally Himself with them. How many soever may be invited publicly, they have not the virtue to persevere to the end. Thus such an outward call, without the secret efficacy of the Holy Spirit, is like an intermediate grace between the rejection of the human race and the election of the faithful." But despite this "grace," "the gift of eternal life is precluded from all whom He wishes to deliver over to damnation."[2]

The "Sophists" invent distinctions, they pretend that God does not *will* evil, but *foresees* it; and that, if He does not predestine certain men to his heaven, it is because He foresees the sins for which they will make themselves responsible.—"Frivolous objections," replies Calvin. "It is confounding everything to say that God elects or rejects according as He foresees this or that."[3] He does not need to be guided by man. "He does everything that seems good to him."[4]

And nothing is done that He does not will. "All that comes to pass in the world is ordained by the incomprehensible counsel of God."[5]

[1] *Ibid*, chap. ii, sect. 11. [2] *Ibid*. chap. xxii, sect. 7.

[3] *Ibid*. chap. xxi, sect. 5. Cf. chap. xxii and xxiii.

[4] *Ibid*. chap. xxiv, sect. 15: This conception of the free will of God in the salvation or damnation of men recurs everywhere in the work of Calvin, and his disciples for a long time saw in it a title of honour to be guarded for him with jealous care. Nearly two centuries after his death, one of them vindicated him from the accusation of having wavered in the severity of this doctrine. He shows that the few incriminating phrases (the strongest is this: "Decretum Dei in *justitia* et *aequitate* fundatum esse"), when compared with their context, do not mean that God has need to give any reasons. He has no reason to give, unless it is: *stat pro ratione voluntas*." (*Musæum helveticum ad juvandas literas in publicos usus apertum*. Turici, Conrad Orellius, Vol. IV, year 1739, particula XIV, No. IV, pp. 256-76.)

[5] *Instit*. Book I, chap. xvii, sect. 2.

Even evil? Yes, even evil. "But God makes such use of the wicked, and so inclines their hearts to execute his judgements, that He always remains free from every spot and stain."[1] Some timid people find it hard that "a man by the will and decree of God should first be blinded, in order soon after to be punished for his blindness," and they again invent a distinction between "to make" and "to permit." That is "jesting," says Calvin; but he does not jest. Not he! He "puts a stop to such subterfuges" at once. God is not to be defended "by false excuses and lying pretences. . . . The sum total of the whole thing is that, when we say that the will of God is the cause of all things, we establish the existence of his providence to preside over all the counsels of men; and actually not only to show his power in the elect who are led by the Holy Spirit, but also to constrain the reprobate to do what He wishes."[2]

But again the "Sophists" will say: If God wills the existence of evil, why does He punish it? And if He does not will it, why does He cause it to be done? Here it is Calvin who distinguishes: "These jesters who rail against God, aver that if God not only sets the wicked to work for Him, but also governs their counsels and affections, then He is the author of all evil deeds; and consequently that men are unjustly damned. . . . They perversely confound the command of God with his secret will, seeing that it appears evident through innumerable examples that there is a very great distance and diversity between them. Those who give a still freer rein to their detraction, and yelp at God with

[1] It is the title of chap. xviii, Book I.

[2] *Instit.*, Book I, chap. xviii, sect. 1 and 2. Cf. Book III, chap. xxiii, sect. 8.

neither shame nor sense of decency, are not worthy of a longer refutation."[1]

And then, are the reprobates really so interesting? "Let us leave them alone. We ought not to care much about all that can happen to them."[2] Calvin cares only that men should be "held in by a short rein and that God should be always popular."[3]

But what a kind of popularity he gives Him! He makes of Him the worst of despots, the most horrible of monsters; yet, by a strange counterpoise, he makes of Him also the most easy-going and the most ill-advised of administrators. In fact, in the picture which we owe to the brush of Luther, and in which we have seen that, by means of faith, a man ought to consider his salvation certain, Calvin still finds an opportunity of suggesting improvements. For him it is not only present justification that is assured, but salvation as well. Christ has wished "to assure us that we shall have eternal salvation, since we have once been made his."[4] Justice, once received, *cannot be lost*; that he puts beyond doubt: "Our hope must reach out to the future, even beyond the tomb. Nothing is more contrary to its nature than to be in suspense and anxiety, as if we were in doubt about what would be done with us."[5] He

[1] *Ibid.* chap. xviii, sect. 4. He returns to it all the same, but without adding to his reasons: "Since it is notorious that the thing is so, what will they gain by disputing and railing against God?" (Book III, chap. xxii, sect. 1.) "As for those who break out into barking like mastiffs, their cavilling . . . is too frivolous, or else they are too scandalously fallen into error" (*ibid.* sect. 10), etc. He comes back complacently to the double will of God—the one which He manifests to men, the other which is different and which He keeps concealed. Cf. Book III, chap. xx, sect. 43; chap. xxiv, sect. 16, etc.

[2] *Corpus Reformatorum*, Braunschweig (1862-1900), *Calvini opera*, Vol. V, col. 191.

[3] *Ibid.* Vol. XXVI, col. 282.

[4] *Institut.*, Book III, chap. xxiv, sect. 6.

[5] *Ibid.* sect. 7.

knows indeed that the Scriptures in many places "dissuade us from being too certain,"[1] but it is only necessary to explain it otherwise, and it is absolutely essential that the Scriptures should, willingly or by force, always confirm Calvin's ideas. Now, his idea here is that man, when he has the good fortune to be elected and justified, is made just for his whole life and for eternity.[2]

Better still, his children inherit his justice. Calvin again so wills it, and he makes this new dogma a consequence of the first one: "From this it follows that little children, born of Christians, are not baptised in order that they may then begin to be the children of God . . . but rather in order that by this solemn sign it may be declared that they are received into the Church, as children already belonging to its body."[3] Now these children, having once become just, can no more lose that justice; and their children, in their turn, "born of Christians," and again the children of their children, will renew the same cycle indefinitely. Privileged races! Thus, says Bossuet, "if there is only one believer in the whole race, the entire lineage of that believer is predestined. If one single man of it is found to have died in crime, it is necessary to conclude therefrom that all his ancestors are damned."[4]

No; Calvin was no more the messenger of God than was Luther. To the manifest contradictions which he

[1] *Institut.*, Book III, chap. xxiv. sect. 6.

[2] "By this the faithful can have some enjoyment from what we said at the beginning: namely, that predestination, if it is well considered, is not something to trouble or to shake faith, but rather to strengthen it greatly." (*Ibid.* sect. 9.) Calvin, being "assured" of being of the number of the elect, repeats gladly in his heart: "Let us leave the reprobates alone."

[3] *Institut.*, Book IV, chap. liv; chap. xv, sect. 22.

[4] *Hist. des Variations*, Book IX. (*Œuvres*, IV, 567.) The development of this doctrine brought about long quarrels between Calvinists and Lutherans. Cf. Bossuet, Book IX; Döllinger, III, 535-49.

borrows from Luther, he adds others no less evident. Really it is a burden too heavy to be borne. If we try, objectively, to reason out the doctrine underlying the words, we feel it to be unthinkable and unassimilable. The mind can only vomit it.

But Protestantism, in addition to Luther and Calvin, recognises a third source—the Anglican Church. Of all the Protestant systems, said Joseph de Maistre,[1] this is "most clearly the nearest to the truth," but by a singular paradox it is also "clearly the most false. . . . It is false as the sun is luminous. It is sufficient to look at it."

The Anglican Church, indeed, likes to call itself Catholic, that is to say universal; but it calls itself also—as it is—the "Established Church." This word "established" condemns it: *established* when and by whom? In 1534,[2] by Henry VIII, in an act which bears his name and that date. The Anglican Church is royal, but it is not divine. It addresses itself to the English and not to the rest of the world. It is, therefore, not Catholic or universal. "It is an establishment which is civil and local, diametrically opposed to the universality which is the mark of truth. Either this religion is false, or God became incarnate for the English."[3]

If we investigate it still further, other contradictions immediately present themselves. At once we

[1] *Du Pape*. Conclusion (*Œuvres*, Lyons, Pélagaud, 8th edit., 1845, Vol. III, p. 462).

[2] This is, at least, the date of the *oath of royal supremacy*, which completed the schism. But the name *Establishment* is given to the whole body of the acts which constituted the Anglican Church. They all have their date and a royal signature. An Anglican, Lord Amberley (*Fort. Rev.*, No. 37, p. 779) thus defines it: "The Church of England is simply and wholly a creation of the State. The basis of its authority is entirely secular. . . (It) is founded only on Acts of Parliament."

[3] J. de Maistre, *op. cit.*, 462.

find a medley of doctrines, originating from all sources, and united only by caprice or chance, not by logic ; a heap, not a harmony.

Henry VIII, after having written a treatise against Luther, found in the Pope an obstacle to his conjugal fancies. Hence he discarded the Pope and put himself in his place, declaring himself to be " the only master of the Kingdom, both in spiritual and temporal affairs." (*Oath of royal supremacy.*) He took advantage of this to multiply his marriages and to plunder the monasteries. He sent to death promiscuously both the Catholics who refused to deny the Pope and the Protestants who did not bow before his own decrees. Outside of these practical questions, he let the ancient doctrines remain. His successors, however, feeling themselves to be now the masters of men's consciences, fashioned their Church according to their different—very different—notions. Edward VI inoculated it with Lutheranism ; Elizabeth with hierarchical Calvinism ; James I with Arminianism ; Charles I and Charles II with Antiquarianism ; William III with Latitudinarianism ; and so on. And all these heterogeneous ideas, like so many different bacilli manœuvring at random, localise or diffuse themselves, devour one another or combine, in the same ecclesiastical organism ; or even, sometimes, by a strange sort of symbiosis, co-exist in a bundle of stifled contradictions in the same conscience.

For example, the *Thirty-nine Articles* of 1562, which the clergy swear to maintain, and which were drawn up with the design of binding them to the Reformation, still even to-day express the official doctrine. These articles are inspired especially by Calvinism. But the *Prayer Book,* which sums up the Church's religious practice and liturgy, had for its object to make the people believe that nothing essential had been changed

in the religion of their ancestors,[1] and it remains strongly impregnated with Catholicism.[2]

As if this opposition between the faith of the laity and that of the clergy,[3] and between the liturgy and the doctrine, were not enough, the *Thirty-nine Articles* themselves do not agree with one another. The Twentieth, for example, assigns to the Church the right to decide in controversies,[4] and hence to determine the faith. But the succeeding article declares that the General Councils themselves " can err, and have sometimes erred in divine things ; whence it follows that the things decided by them, as being necessary to salvation, have no force nor authority, so long as it cannot be seen that they have been taken from Holy Scripture." And thus, says Joseph de Maistre, " at the same moment, with the same pen, with the same ink, and on the same paper it (the Anglican Church) declares the dogma and yet declares that it has no right to declare it! "[5]

In the same fundamental formulary it forbids the use of private judgement in order to reserve to itself the right of decision ; yet, immediately after, it de-

[1] As for the people, it never apostatised. The authorities merely obliged its faith to fast and, gradually, the people lost it." (Hilaire Belloc, *Revue des Jeunes*, Feb. 10th, 1923).

[2] In the celebrated case of Rev. W. Gorham (1847-1850), who practically denied baptism, his partisans based their standpoint on the *Thirty-nine Articles*, while his adversaries based theirs on the *Prayer Book*. (See Paul Thureau-Dangin, *La renaissance catholique en Angleterre*, Paris, Plon, Vol. II, 6th edit., 1911, pp. 143-48.) Likewise, in 1873, in the discussion for and against confession, between Dr. Tait, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Pusey, the one based his argument on the 25th of the *Thirty-nine Articles* and the other on the *Prayer Book*. (Cf. H. P. Liddon, *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, London, 1897, Vol. IV, pp. 262-69.

[3] This " double truth " is met everywhere in Protestantism. See G. Goyau, *L'Allemagne religieuse. Le protestantisme* (Paris, Perrin, 6th edit., 1908), pp. 179-82, 303, etc. ; and the same, *Une Ville-Eglise*, II, *passim*. Cf. A. Harnack, *L'Essence du Christianisme* (Paris, Fischbacher, 1907), pp. 348 *seq.*

[4] " The Church hath . . . authority in controversies of Faith."

[5] J. de Maistre, *Du Pape*, 464.

clines to decide, in order to restore the right of private judgement. For, if it confesses that it can be mistaken, then everyone may believe without a reason, or may believe in his own reason, which, moreover, is no longer infallible. This means that in the last analysis a man believes what he wishes or what he can.

The result is that, if the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which the Anglican Church inherited from Catholicism, wears, when seen from a distance, an appearance of cohesion, it actually shows itself, within the "Established Church," as a congeries of very incongruous doctrines.

The members are usually classed in three different categories which are themselves subdivided into a multitude of smaller sections; they are the *High Church*, to which belong those who entertain a high idea of the traditional Church, and who, in different degrees, approach the doctrines, discipline and ceremonies of the Catholic Church; the *Low Church*, which, with a contrary tendency, attaches itself to the strictly Anglican, Protestant tradition, and has a repugnance for everything resembling Catholicism; and, finally, the *Broad Church*, which is so broad that it includes within itself all kinds of belief and even of unbelief.

"The Church of England," said the Bishop of Oxford, Samuel Wilberforce, "is a comprehensive Church. It includes men of every opinion, from those who deny its first principles absolutely, to those who maintain the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, which it has expressly condemned."[1]

It is hard to see what remains of its "first principles" in the writings of certain Latitudinarians, whom it still retains in its fold. As for these who "maintain the doctrine of the Roman Church," if the Anglican

[1] Cited in the *Nouvelles Religieuses*, April 15, 1921, p. 182.

Church does not keep them, it is because they do not care to remain there ; but Pusey remained in it till his death, in spite of the repeated condemnations of Puseyism ; and the Ritualists also remain in it, although they have been fully and expressly condemned.[1] In fact, anyone may remain in it who wants to ; and, while doing so, each one believes or denies what he likes.

Certain Protestant theologians say with satisfaction that one can find in the doctrines of the Reformation " the thousand shades of colour of the rainbow." The reverend clergymen Doudiet and Burns, without exactly saying so, are delighted to find this tolerance in Anglicanism.[2] It is a way of acknowledging numberless contradictions in it, and of confessing that, in its formulas, one can equally well see white or black, or violet, indigo, blue, green, yellow, orange, red or any other of the thousand intermediary shades, just as one chooses. But truth does not display so many colours at once.

Nevertheless, for a certain number, it is not a question of truth. " In its relations to the National Church," writes Lord Amberley,[3] " Christianity or the Church of Christ is *a blessed accident*. . . . But Christianity is not an essential part of the National Church." The essential thing is that it should be *national*, and that, by this title, it should reflect " the many beliefs of the nation." For these theologians,

[1] The condemnations against them have increased overwhelmingly. Those of their ecclesiastical superiors not being sufficient, the Privy Council and Parliament have several times taken the matter in hand, notably by the *Public Worship Regulation Act*, which Disraeli caused to be passed in 1874, with the avowed intention of " throwing down and stifling Ritualism." (Cf. Thureau-Dangin, *Renaiss. cath.*, III, chap. vii to ix. Disraeli's words are quoted on page 419.)

[2] Cf. L. N. Bégin, *La Sainte Ecriture et la règle de foi* (Quebec, Aug. Coté, 1874), pp. 143 *seq.*

[3] Article cited.

the true Church is no longer that which teaches men eternal truth, but that which borrows in turn from men the ideas, and therefore also the errors, of their time.

And the English Church, that "comprehensive Church," retains within its maternal fold, as long as they wish to stay, the holders of all these antagonistic doctrines. Whether believers or unbelievers, and whatever may be their "thousand shades" of opinion, they are members of one and the same religion, the children of one and the same Church; they assemble also for the same ceremonies in the same edifice, and are subject to the same bishop. And the bishop, in making his episcopal rounds, whatever may be his personal conviction, procures for himself, as one of them, recently converted to Catholicism, remarks,[1] a "constant change of religious air and temperature." If, one morning, he celebrates mass before a congregation, most of whom believe in the real presence of our Lord, and if he administers confirmation to candidates who understand that they are receiving a sacrament, the next day, the same bishop, performing the same rites, may confront Church-members who see in confirmation merely a ratification of the promises of baptism, and in the mass "a suggestive symbol" of the drama of Calvary, or, more simply still, "an accessory rite, a rather tedious adjunct to morning prayer."

It sometimes happens that these singular congregations, or still worse ones, are formally consecrated by official acts. Such was "that atrocious affair of the bishopric of Jerusalem," as Newman, at the time

[1] Kinsman, of the Episcopalian Church of America. (See *Études*, Nov. 5, 1920, p. 286.) This Church is the same as regards doctrine, but naturally does not recognise either the laws or the hierarchy of the English Church. It is autonomous.

still an Anglican, called it. The circumstance was as follows: Probably under the inspiration of the Minister of Prussia, Baron von Bunsen, and with the approval of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the English government, in 1841, caused a Bill to be passed, establishing an Anglican bishop in Jerusalem. This bishop, chosen by England and Prussia alternately, and consecrated by the English bishops, was to exercise his jurisdiction over the Protestants of other confessions who should wish to place themselves under his authority, without the latter being, on that account, obliged to give up their own particular creeds, or to adhere to the Church of England.[1]

At the head of the hierarchy, the King, who has replaced the Pope,[2] is not in any more logical position

[1] See Newman, *Apologia pro vita sua* (London, Longmans, 1890), pp. 141-46. Newman says that this affair was for him "the beginning of the end" of his Anglican faith (146 and 149). Under many forms there have been repetitions of the offence. For example, "in 1913, at Kikuyu, the Anglican bishops of Uganda and Mombasa admitted to Holy Communion Methodists, Adventists, Quakers, etc. . . . From this fact disputes arose which are still unappeased and are not, we think, yet settled." Cf. *Rev. d'Apolog.*, Feb. 1, 1914, pp. 666-73.

[2] In 1534, the oath of royal supremacy proclaimed the King "the only master of the kingdom, in affairs spiritual and ecclesiastical as well as in affairs temporal." If Anglicanism has greatly changed, it is not on this point that it has done so. "Her Majesty the Queen (Elizabeth) exercises sovereign power over this kingdom of England and its other dominions; to her belongs the supreme government of all institutions ecclesiastical and civil." Thus begins No. 37 of the *Thirty-nine Articles*. It adds that the Queen has not "the administration of the Word of God or the sacraments." This is the only reservation. But what is it worth? Art. 35 defines the "homilies" to be read in the divine service, and this concerns "the Word of God"; and Art. 36 defines the manner of conferring Orders, and decrees ("We decree") that those only who are thus ordained are so "*rightly, correctly and lawfully*." Moreover, Art. 37 is already sufficient. It adds, in fact, that the queen has the right to keep each one in his duty, and as it is for her or her successors to define this duty, it is plain that this right has scarcely any limitation. Indeed, historically, it has had none. See, for example, the "Hampden and Gorham affairs," narrated by Thureau-Dangin (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, chap. iii). A clergyman converted to Catholicism, Horace E.

than that of the laity and bishops. If he is the head of the "Established Church" of England, he is no less the head of the "Established Church" of Scotland.

But while the former is *episcopalian*, and, at least officially, regards the bishops as necessary and instituted by God, the latter is *presbyterian* and considers the bishops as an institution of the devil, or in any case as a perfectly useless piece of machinery. If, therefore, a Church-member addresses himself to the King, as to the head of his religion, and asks him what dogma he is to believe, the King will be able to give his decision only according to the source whence the question comes. If it comes from England, he will say that the bishops have been instituted by God; if it comes from Scotland, they have been instituted by the devil. But he, the King, who is at the same time sovereign of England and Scotland, who is personally and simultaneously a member of the two religions, and the one and only head of these two hostile bodies, must be convinced, if he is sincere in his double faith, that the bishops have been instituted by both God and the devil, that the true Church has need of them, and yet has no need of them.[1]

Chapman (*L'âme anglicane*, trans. Ragey, Paris, Briguet, 1899, pp. 170 *seq.*) relates, on the strength of official documents, that the bishop in full ecclesiastical regalia was solemnly conducted by the Queen's secretary (it was in the reign of Queen Victoria) into the presence of her Majesty. He knelt down, kissed the Bible and pronounced the following oath: "I . . . Doctor of Divinity, elected, confirmed and consecrated bishop of . . . hereby declare that Your Majesty is the only supreme governor in this kingdom of things both spiritual and temporal . . . and I recognise that I hold this bishopric, in both spiritual and temporal affairs, solely from Your Majesty. . . ." Chapman quotes (p. 175) a letter from one of his colleagues, Rev. Mr. Blackmore, who announces to him that, after having thought of becoming a Catholic, he has decided to remain at his post ("in his shell"), and gives for this the following reason: "I could not digest the Pope, but I have decided to swallow the king."

[1] It will be said no doubt that the King, personally, has the religion which he wants, that he has only to choose and that he

A Church established by a king, and for one country, and which calls itself Catholic and divine; a Church which inscribes, in one and the same formulary, the answer yes and no to fundamental questions; a Church whose temples harbour rites to which the participants attach contrary meanings,[1] and whose hierarchy shelters under its wing members who have not the same faith; a Church which has for its head the head of a rival Church: if all this does not constitute a manifest contradiction, it is because words have no longer any sense.

We have briefly surveyed the three branches of Protestantism, as it presented itself in the beginning of its career. All of them bear the evident mark of falsity, and that is enough, whatever may have been their subsequent historical evolution, to disqualify them as revealed religions.

But these three branches, however different they may be, have one and the same trunk in common, one idea which all Protestants in the beginning admitted as fundamental: the exclusive authority of Scripture.

"We believe, profess and teach," say Luther and the

can even have none at all. But then it will be necessary to say that one of the two "established" religions, or both at once, have a head *foreign* to their body, or indeed that it is not a question here of *a religious* body, but merely of a purely *civil* administration, which takes upon itself, as in the days of ancient Rome, the task of governing the souls as well as the bodies of its citizens. Practically, since 1833, the King has exercised supremacy over the Church and religion by means of the Ecclesiastical Committee of the Privy Council. Parliament has instituted this as the supreme Court of appeal for all ecclesiastical cases, in regard to *doctrine* as well as discipline. But laymen are always in a majority on this council, when it is not composed exclusively of them, and not even all of these belong to the Anglican Church. Under these conditions the contradiction is, therefore, no less evident.

[1] The rites themselves can be different, as the Ritualists have sufficiently shown.

Lutherans, " that the only rule and criterion whereby to appreciate and judge all dogmas and all religious teachers, consists absolutely and exclusively in the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testament."[1] " The Holy Scriptures alone constitute the judge, the standard and the rule, by which all dogmas are to be examined and judged."[2]

" We protest," say Calvin and the Calvinists, in Art. 1 of the *Confession of Faith* of Geneva, 1536, " that for the rule of our faith and religion we wish to follow Scripture alone."[3]

The sixth of the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles says also : " The Holy Scriptures contain all that is necessary for salvation, so that nothing that is not found therein or is not derived from them, can be imposed as an article of faith or demanded as necessary to salvation."

The inevitable conclusion, which was, moreover, quickly drawn, is that before this unique authority all Christians are absolutely on the same footing ;[4] that it is not for the pastors to teach the sheep, but for the sheep to judge the pastors ;[5] and, finally, that in every Christian faith is founded on the free interpretation of Scripture. In view of this conception what have we to say ?

We have, first of all, one question to put : If the Scriptures guarantee everything, who guarantees the Scriptures ? It will surely be necessary, unless we are to believe them without a reason, to give ourselves a

[1] *Formula Concordiae*, Art. 1 (in *Die Symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, published by J. T. Müller (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 10th edit., 1907), p. 517. The *Formula of Concord* was drawn up by Melanchthon, but with Luther's approval.

[2] *Formula Concordiae*, Art. 7. And the affirmation is repeated in the second part, *Solida declaratio*, Art. 1 (*Die symb. Bücher*, 518 and 568.

[3] *Corp. Reform.* Calvini *opera*, col. 693.

[4] Prorsus ejusdem juris sumus omnes. (Luther, *De Institut. Minist. Ecclesiae*).

[5] Luther, quoted by Döllinger, III, 214.

reason for believing them ; and unless we are to move in a vicious circle, we must have a reason based on something other than the Scriptures. So that, in order reasonably to admit that the Scriptures contain all the dogmas, it would first be necessary to find one that they do not contain. Here is a sufficiently evident contradiction.

Having passed over this we come to another : Where does Scripture proclaim the fundamental dogma which is proposed to us ? Where is it said to be " the *only* rule and criterion ? " In what text does Scripture affirm that it tells us *all* religious truths ? St. John, in the last verse of his Gospel, declares that there is so much more to say, that all the books in the world would not be sufficient to contain it. The *Acts* (i, 3) tell us that Jesus, after He had risen from the dead, " spoke (to the disciples) of the Kingdom of God." These were no doubt religious truths, which the disciples were able to retain, but about which the Scriptures tell us nothing. Without doubt also, before the date when the Gospels were written, there were already Christians who believed in the teaching of Jesus ; was their faith worth nothing, because the dogmas had not yet been consigned to a written text ? Again, where does Scripture state that it is the only *teaching authority* ? It relates the words of Jesus to the Apostles : " Go, teach (*Ite, docete*) all nations. . . . All that you shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven." And to Peter : " Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church. . . . Feed my lambs, feed my sheep." There are also many other passages in which He proclaims a Church, a society, a hierarchy, that is to say, an inequality of functions, a sheep-fold where the sheep are not " absolutely on the same footing as the shepherds."

Let us pass on still further. To regard a book—and

such a book—as the sole teacher of faith and as the final judge of all controversies, is an idea wholly contrary to all the facts of psychology and human experience. Take the Civil Code, a book drawn up in our own language and for our own time by men expert in their profession, written in a simple, clear style, and concerning material and palpable things. Eliminate now all the judges, and say to the public, showing them the Code : " Everything is in this Code concerning your rights and your duties as citizens. It is for each of you to interpret it for himself, and we are sure in advance that every one of its words will be sacred to you, that all of you will invariably agree about it, and that there will be no more lawsuits in France, or at least that the parties to a suit will have only to open the Code in order to settle the affair between them."

The founders of Protestantism wanted this insensate rôle to be played by a book that dealt with the most difficult subjects which the human mind can approach, and those most liable to be influenced by passions and prejudices ; by a book composed by the most dissimilar authors, who adopted in turn every kind of literary style, from description and anecdote to the most pronounced lyrical poetry ; a book filled with allusions to facts, to proverbs, to the mentality and civilisation of a different race and another age ; a book written in an unknown tongue, transcribed by a line of copyists on papyri more or less perfectly preserved, without punctuation, without vowels (at least in the Hebrew part of the text) until after the sixth century of the Christian era ; finally, a book which, to be properly studied, would require a man's whole lifetime, and, moreover, a man accustomed to the severest intellectual training, possessing a knowledge of Greek, Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac, hiero-

glyphics, cuneiform inscriptions, ancient history and pre-history. Yet it is claimed that it is right to say to every Christian—to the ignorant, the working-man, the house-wife, the child—"Take this book; it will tell you everything. It is the sole teacher of truth. Listen to it alone!"

Everyone will find it perfectly clear, for Scripture, according to Calvin, "has the power to make itself understood, and this by a perception as manifest and infallible as that possessed by black and white objects in exhibiting their colours or by sweet and bitter things in imparting their flavour."[1] "It is the most certain," the easiest and the clearest thing in the world," said Luther of the Bible. "Scripture is its own interpreter.[2] It is clearness itself."[3] "We must hold this as undeniable, that it is a light . . . much clearer than the sun."[4]

Of certain passages of Scripture this is true; but not everywhere and always; evidently not! Even the clearest passages, when passion becomes involved in them, are rendered perplexing. Men can then be seen debating clear questions on opposite sides of party walls. Luther and Calvin saw with their own eyes their disciples wrangling blindly and furiously for and against the clearest texts of the Gospel.

Hoc est corpus meum, for example, is a clear expression. But, before the end of the sixteenth century (1577), the Protestants had already produced two hundred different interpretations of it![5] The first

[1] *Instit.* Book I, chap. vii, sect. 2.
[2] Luther's *Werke*, Weimar ed., VII, 97.
[3] *Ibid.* XVIII, 661. Cf. 606-9.
[4] *Op. var. arg.*, VII, 177. The *Solida declaratio* of the *Formula of Concord*, Art. I (in *Die symb. Bücher*, 568), also affirms that we have in the Scriptures, "limpidissimos purissimosque Israelis fontes."
[5] Cf. Bellarmine, *De Eucharistia*, Book I, chap. viii, No. 2 (Edit. Vivès, Paris, 1893, Vol. IV, p. 24).

two words, *Hoc est,* alone gave rise to three sacramental theologies (those of Luther, Calvin and Zwingli) mutually irreconcilable, subdivided indefinitely in their turn and loaded with barbarous words and incomprehensible to the uninitiated.[1]

And so, in view of the impieties and innumerable extravagances, which even their first disciples pretended to justify by Scripture, the founders could not fail again to contradict themselves. They multiplied invectives and methods of coercion against those who "play their pranks against God," as Calvin said, and who twist Scripture around to suit themselves, "as if it were nothing more than a nose of wax."[2] And Luther, who had extolled the clearness of the Scriptures, and had boasted of not finding, for his part, a single difficult word in the Bible, subsequently exclaimed—passing from one extreme to the other—"We cannot claim to fathom completely the meaning of a single verse of Scripture; we succeed in apprehending only the A B C of it, and even that imperfectly."[3]

And he ended by exclaiming: "If the world is to last, there will be, in view of so many different interpretations, only one means of preserving the unity of the faith, and that will be to take refuge in the decrees of the Councils."[4] Yes, that is true. As in the Civil Code, so, and with greater reason, in Scripture, it is

[1] Panenaria, accidentaria, corporaria, arrhobonaria, tropista, metamorphista, iscariotista, schwenkfeldista, etc.

[2] *Corp. Reformat.* Calvini *opera,* Vol. XXVI, col. 282. As for Luther's invectives, cf. specimens of them in Döllinger, III, 208 *seq.*

[3] Luther, *Table-Talk,* trans. Gustave Brunet, Paris, Garnier, 1844, p. 288. On p. 290 he says with his usual extravagance: "Let no one believe himself competent to understand Holy Scripture, unless he has, for a hundred years, governed the Church with the Prophets, with Elijah and Elisha, St. John the Baptist, Jesus Christ and the Apostles."

[4] *Contra Zwinglium et Oecolampadium,* Book I.

absolutely necessary to have judges to interpret and apply it, who have for their appointed task to give the casting vote between the disputants.

Here, then, we have again in Protestantism, and even in its foundation, in the trunk common to its three branches, contradictions clearly expressed in the very terms which formulate the principle, and in its application to the inevitable facts of human experience.

Since the generic idea which constitutes both the trunk of Protestantism and also each of the systems which form its three principal branches is infected with contradiction, it is evident that the numberless ramifications into which these branches are subdivided will inevitably be poisoned by the nourishment they receive from them.

Whatever may be the bough or twig of Protestantism to which a Protestant of our day may belong, it can be made to face the following series of dilemmas :

Were the Reformers inspired by God ? If they were, why have you, their disciple, abandoned them ? For, as we shall see, no one to-day accepts without qualification the doctrine of the founders.

But if the Reformers were not inspired, how do you know that the Reformation was desired by God ? By a divine inspiration communicated to each Protestant ? But, can God lie ? If He can, why do you believe Him ? If He cannot lie, why does He inspire different sects of Protestants with contradictory beliefs ?

Let us go back still further. You call yourselves Christians, but what do you believe in regard to Christ ? Is Christ God, and is the religion which He founded, with the promise to be with it till the end of the world, divine ?

If you answer No, you are no longer Christians, but

Rationalists, and are excluded from the debate, which is concerned with revealed religion. If you answer Yes, I will put another question: Did the divine Church founded by Christ still exist in the sixteenth century? If so, the Reformers ought to have remained in it; if not, then Christ, faithless to his promise, had let it perish, and all Christianity crumbles into ruin.

Contradiction always and everywhere,—that is the fatal blemish, the robe of Nessus clinging to all Protestantism, whatever the metamorphosis in which it takes refuge. Its dogmas, selected, manipulated and amalgamated in a thousand ways, never present, whatever may be the intellectual effort given to the task, a stable combination. As soon as they are subjected to a thoughtful scrutiny, they burst into contradictions, like those chemical bodies which must be kept in the dark and which explode when a ray of light falls upon them.

There is no reason for being surprised at this. We have foreseen it. But it is a precious confirmation of the principle established in the preceding chapter. The mind of man is not powerful enough to combine and hold together in proper proportions all the innumerable elements which must enter into a religion professing to be revealed.

For this another chemist is needed. That chemist is God. If the work remains intact, if no acid test disintegrates it, it is because God has a hand in it. When God forms no part of it, the work inevitably goes to pieces.

Now, the religions which claim to be revealed have all proved failures, except one, of which we have still to speak. This is because only one can be true and bring to men the authentic signature of God.

W. H. Mallock, an Englishman and a Protestant

by origin but a rationalist by conviction, having passed in review the various religions of the world, reached this conclusion in his celebrated book "*Is Life worth living?*": There is only one serious revelation, and that is Catholicism.[1] This one is indeed *serious*, as we are about to see.

[1] W. H. Mallock, "*Is Life Worth Living?*" The phrase which we attribute to him is not found exactly in those words in his text, and that is why we do not put it in quotation marks, but it virtually forms a résumé of chaps xi and xii. The summary of chap. xi is "Insufficiency of theism.—Vice of Protestantism, which is no longer anything but theism.—The claims of the Church of Rome are the *only serious ones*." In the text of this same chapter we read: "There is only one revelation, one alone, that interests civilised nations, considered as a revelation; and whose claims are worth the trouble of examining. That is the Christian revelation." But he sees in Protestantism a system which, "definitely and practically (constitutes) the *negation* pure and simple of *all revelation*." And in chap. xii he develops these two ideas: "Protestantism cannot answer modern criticism. Criticism cannot injure the Catholic Church." The Catholic form of Christianity, he says finally, "can very well be the truth." (*The italics are ours.*) The phrase inserted in our text, therefore, really epitomises Mallock's thought.

Chapter III

THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO THE FACT OF CATHOLICISM

Summary. The method to be followed. The absence of manifest contradiction: I.—*In the dogmas*, shown (*a*) by the logical defeat of the leaders of heresy; (*b*) by the logical victory of the theologians; (*c*) by the astonishment awakened in attentive minds. II.—*Between the dogmas and the reason*, shown (*a*) negatively, by a general survey of the mysteries; (*b*) positively, by their social productiveness; (*c*) by their intellectual productiveness. III.—*Between the dogmas and the facts*, shown (*a*) in the domain of history; (*b*) in the domain of science.—*Conclusion.*

In the first chapter we have seen that the Catholic religion, if it is of human origin only, must, like the others and with greater reason, resolve itself into a chaos of numberless and manifest contradictions.

Well, let us investigate this doctrine and in perfect sincerity ask ourselves whether manifest contradictions abound in it, either between its dogmas, or between them and reason or facts.

If we think we perceive a contradiction, let us make sure, first, that we understand the terms of the controversy, which we have adopted in order to express its dogmas and its own thought, not that of its enemies; and secondly, that we are opposing it with real arguments, not with prejudices; with positive facts, not hypotheses.

These precautions having been taken, Catholicism no longer fears that it may not receive an honest verdict. But these precautions are necessary. No-

thing is more common than to see, for subsequent refutation, dogmas ascribed to it, which it has never proclaimed, or even absurdities which it has always proscribed. Nothing, I repeat, is more common, unless it be the mania for crushing it under false principles, false science or false history.

Take, for example, a story which periodically makes the tour of the press, to the effect that the second Council of Mâcon, in 585, did not admit, or at least cast doubt upon, the existence of a soul in women. But, in the first place, the Council of Mâcon was not ecumenical and could not bind the belief of the Church. Moreover, the records of this Council are in our possession in their entirety, and in them there is not a single word on this question. The only historical testimony relating to it is an anecdote recounted by Gregory of Tours in his *History of the Franks*. One of the Bishops of the Council—evidently outside the session, for the records do not mention it—raised a question of lexicography about the Latin word *Homo*, which, he said, ought not to be used to designate the two sexes. But his colleagues proved to him that the word is used in both the Old and New Testament (as also by profane Latin writers) to designate the individuals of the human race, both men and women. Whereupon, says Gregory of Tours, the aforesaid bishop "kept quiet."[1] That is all.

And let me cite this example of false science: For half a century the theory of evolution has been declared in the name of science to be contrary to Catholic doctrine. But it is only the integral system of evolution, which eliminates God at the start and the human soul at the finish, that is contrary to Catholic doctrine. Evolution, thus understood,

[1] See G. Kurth, in the *Dictionnaire* of d'Alès, Art. *Femmes*, Vol. I, col. 1,897 *seq.*

far from being a conclusion imposed by science, has not the least resemblance to science, even if it were presented only as a simple hypothesis, since science knows nothing of first causes, and, by definition, is unable to know anything of them.[1]

Men have often wished to banish Catholicism from the world in the name of reason. But the reason appealed to was only the ephemeral opinion of the epoch in which it prevailed. Thus, in the eighteenth century, the doctrine of original sin was condemned on the ground of the natural goodness of man ; but this natural goodness speedily ended in the horrors of 1793, and public opinion in the succeeding century, forgetting the natural goodness of man, pictured him as a "lecherous and ferocious gorilla," and as an animal scarcely "arrived" upon the scene, and still only partially freed from his brutal instincts. But, in refuting the former objection, the nineteenth century substituted for it another in the name of reason ; a certain conception of an in-

[1] So Claude Bernard, among others, has repeated many times. See his "*De la physiologie générale* (Paris, Hachette, 1872), pp. 306, 307, 308, 317, 321, 326 : *Introduction à la médicine expérimentale* (Paris, Delagrave, 2nd edit., 1903), pp. 104, 129, 130 ; *La science expérimentale* (Paris, J. B. Baillère, 5th edit., 1911), pp. 42, 53, 54, 55, 78, 137, 182, 183, 300, 314, etc. Moreover, logic as well as science rejects integral evolution. In order to evolve, there must first be existence, and evolution, which presupposes existence, does not, therefore, replace the Creator. Lamarck, the father of the doctrine of the transformation of species, repeated this to satiety, and many others after him. See our Vol. II, pp. 8-17, 80, etc., in *La part des Croyants dans les progrès de la science* (Paris, Librairie académique, 1920). Let us add this testimony of an ardent evolutionist, Edmond Perrier (*La philosophie zoologique avant Darwin*, Paris, Alcan, 1884, p. 288) : "One has often feared that . . . the doctrine of the transformation of species would cause the Creator to be forgotten. . . . Those who are tormented by such scruples should remember that chemistry, physics and astronomy, while explaining the facts pertaining to their respective domains, have in no way diminished the supremacy of the First Cause. Nor has modern biology done so either. It does not eliminate God from his universe. It merely sees Him at a greater distance and above all upon a higher plane."

evitable, universal and continued Progress.[1] Alas! the world-war, with all the horrors which it brought in its train, has sufficiently demolished this new objection ; and what is at present going on in Russia will hardly permit even the most optimistic of men to return to it.

As for those who ascribe to Catholic doctrine a heap of absurdities, in order subsequently to condemn them, they are innumerable. For example, John W. Draper,[2] a professor of the University of New York, published a book against Catholicism which has passed through many editions in all languages. His procedure is simple. He collects all the stupidities which have been believed by the masses in the name of the science or the superstitions of their time, and incorporates them, on his own private authority, into the Catholic dogma. He then still further enriches this collection with additions of his own invention. Thus he pulverises the dogma of papal infallibility by pointing out that Pius IX in 1870 " did not foresee the result of the Franco-Prussian war." (p. 254). " One may object," he confesses, " that this infallibility is applicable only to things pertaining to morals and religion ; but omniscience cannot be limited to a single category of questions. (Of course, *omniscience*, the knowledge of *everything*, is not the knowledge of *one single thing*! But who spoke to him of omniscience ?) By its very nature it implies the knowledge of all things. Infallibility means omniscience " (p. 162). He returns to this point again : the Pope " cannot claim infallibility in religious matters, without at the same time claiming it in scientific matters. (!) Infallibility includes everything ; it implies omniscience.

[1] See our Vol. *Les buts de guerre de la Providence* (Paris, Librairie académ., 1918), chap. iii.

[2] J. W. Draper, *The Conflict between Religion and Science.*

If it exists in theology, it exists in science" (p. 261). This is the opinion of Mr. Draper, but not that of logic or Catholicism. And in refuting the dogma, thus interpreted by him, Mr. Draper only refutes himself.

And how many times have we heard it said that the apologetic of the Church reduces itself to this : *Credo quia absurdum*?[1] This whimsical outburst was not the utterance of a Pope or of a council, but of that madman Tertullian. It would not be difficult, by restoring it to its context, to make of it an acceptable rhetorical figure ;[2] but it is of little importance to us. Tertullian is not the Church, nor even a submissive child of the Church. He was heretical during a part of his life and perhaps was so to the end.

Another example of the absurdities which are charged to the account of Catholicism is that of understanding the Trinity as meaning 3=1. Of course that is a contradiction. But here is something that is not ; three straight lines, each of which cuts the other two, form *one triangle* ; and father, mother and child form *one single family*. And if I say in the same way : *Three divine Persons* make *one God*, is it so certain that this is a contradiction ? We have shown elsewhere[3] that, in the psychology of man, a tendency, an idea, a sentiment, even if they are clearly distinguished from one another by their reciprocal diversity, also mutually affect one another, blend in

[1] M. Chas. Guignebert (in his *Tertullien : Étude sur ses sentiments à l'égard de l'empire et de la société civile*, Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1901, pp. 256-58) has not disdained this sort of objections.

[2] M. Adhémar d'Alès does this in *La Théologie de Tertullien* (Paris, Beauchesne, 1905), pp. 33-36. Moreover the incriminating formula is not found explicitly in the works of Tertullian ; but there are equivalents, fiery paradoxes which the author addresses only to readers already convinced ; while he accumulates, in his apologetic works, for the benefit of unbelievers, arguments drawn from history and philosophy.

[3] *Le gouvernement de soi-même* (1st series, Paris, Librairie académique, 1906). Epilogue.

a profound reality and constitute one and the same living thing, thereby furnishing us with an unexpected resemblance to the divine psychology, in which, according to Catholic faith, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, even though they are distinct from one another and differ in their own personality, nevertheless constitute only one and the same reality, one and the same nature, one and the same God.

M. Edmond Goblot, in a recent book,[1] maintains that the ideas of resurrection and immortality "are irreconcilable; for, in order to rise from the dead one must have been dead, and if there is immortality, then there is no resurrection." I made a note of this phrase, and, on the 16th of May 1923, meeting at Lyons a colleague who was on his way to teach the catechism, I begged him to ask his pupils for a solution of this difficulty. The same day, he sent me the following report:

"Questions proposed, this evening, in the catechism lesson, to a class of 120 children from seven to nine years of age: and the answers spontaneously given by all of them, speaking together:

Q. Of what is man composed?
A. Of a body and a soul.
Q. When a man dies, what is it that dies?
A. His body.
Q. Is the body of man, therefore, mortal?
A. Yes.
Q. Will it rise again from the dead?
A. Yes.
Q. After the resurrection will it be able to die again?
A. No.
Q. Then can one say that it *is* mortal and that it *will be* immortal?

[1] *Le système des sciences* (Paris, A. Colin, 1922), p. 153.

A. Yes.
Q. Will the soul of man die?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because it is immortal.
Q. Will it rise from the dead?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because it will not die.
Q. Then can one say both that man will rise from the dead and that he is immortal?
A. Yes.

All these answers—having no relation to the subject which we are at present studying—were given with a magnificent unanimity by these little ones, who did not know what I was aiming at."

He had succeeded in making children, who knew their catechism, solve an objection which had embarrassed a serious philosopher.

When, therefore, men wish to point out a contradiction in Catholicism, let them begin by knowing what it teaches; let them take it as it is and as it defines itself; and let them then prove, if they can, its incoherence and its internal contradictions. Let them also take reason as it is, with its clear principles and sure conclusions, and furthermore, let them take true history and true science, and then attempt to prove that between a positive pronouncement of reason, history or science, on the one hand, and a positive pronouncement of Catholicism on the other, there is an evident contradiction.

This has been attempted countless times, in a colossal effort made through nineteen centuries, but it has never been successful. Yet, if the facts had justified it, it ought to have succeeded, and without so many efforts.

If Catholicism is merely the work of man, contradictions ought to abound in it and be at once discernible, as they are in Protestantism. Moreover, it is older than Protestantism by fifteen hundred years and has had, and still has, enemies enough to scrutinise it carefully, who would ask for nothing better than to be able to shout to the world: "There they are!"

Logically, after the demonstration given in our first chapters, it would now be sufficient for us to wait till our opponents had revealed to us these alleged masses of startling contradictions. "It is for the one who asserts to prove his assertion," says the old proverb. Nevertheless, we will not wait for that; we are ourselves going to show that no such proof has been given.

I

NO MANIFEST CONTRADICTION IN THE DOGMAS

The "heretics" have seen in the contrasts of the doctrine transmitted to us by the apostles, a danger which they have wished to eliminate by their own cleverness. The word heresy, Αἵρεσις, means an independently selected opinion. The heretics are those who have made a choice among the dogmas, accepting some, rejecting others, in order to arrange all for the best. But, by suppressing the contrasts, they have destroyed the equilibrium and let loose contradiction. The Unitarians, by denying the Trinity, have mutilated the divine psychology and rendered the work of Redemption inconceivable. In the opinion of Arius, Christ was only a man, and that was comprehensible; but then, how was He able to pay the total ransom for sin? To Eutyches Christ was only a God, and that also was comprehensible; but then, how could He have

suffered? To Nestorius Christ was made up of a man and a God, each having his own personality, and that was still an easy matter; but then, how could the acts of the human person acquire a divine value? Some wished to see in religion only the external part, the rite; but they made it into such things as Mohammedanism, Rabbinism, Pharisaism, and their followers were nothing more than "whited sepulchres," capable of sheltering the greatest foulness. Others, setting no value on rites and the hierarchy, extolled the religion of the spirit; but they forgot that man is not a pure spirit, and if nothing external holds him fast, if nothing incorporates him into a social body, he slips away into all sorts of mysticism, superstition and fanaticism. Pelagius, by excluding grace from the work of salvation, simplified many problems; but he made of man a kind of God, and of God a simple registering apparatus, without rectitude and without power. Luther, by ascribing everything to grace, also simplified; but he made of man a machine, and of God a monster.

And so in everything. The Fathers of the Church, that magnificent line of Augustines, Jeromes, Gregories and Chrysostoms; and then the theologians, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, Bellarmine and so many others, bent over the Biblical texts, digging and delving for the ideas contained in them, that they might answer the heretics, and make it clear that, in order to preserve the doctrine's coherence, to make of it a well-united whole, and to exclude from it all contradictions, it was necessary, upon all points and always, to hold firmly to the statements given to the world by the twelve fishermen of Galilee, who were wiser than the philosophers; and that it was necessary only to understand them better and to think them out to the very

end, in order to see all the objections fall and the contrasts resolve themselves, under the power of thought, into a magnificent harmony.

Here, indeed, is the proof that these contrasts are not contradictions, since we see that it is precisely in the act of mutilating them that the contradiction shows itself, and that it is sufficient to study them profoundly to establish their harmony.

Here is also the proof that the doctrine is coherent, since, by taking away from it the tiniest piece, its equilibrium is destroyed. Luther, for example, wished at first to attack only indulgences. But, one after another, carried away by the force of logic, purgatory, the communion of saints, the Pope, the Councils, the Church as a society of the faithful, the Sacraments, the need of good works, the justice of God and the liberty of man—all had to pass away. The Catholic doctrine is, therefore, one solid piece. Everything in it stands steadfast. In other words, within its fold there is no contradiction.

This cohesion and internal logic are admired not only by specialists and theologians, but also by the uninitiated, in proportion as they give themselves the trouble to examine the subject closely. Brunetière, speaking of the "force of attraction" which Catholicism exercises on men's minds, could say: "I think the reason of this lies . . . in the mass, cohesion and solidity of the doctrine."[1]

It is notably this which has charmed G. K. Chesterton, one of the most famous and popular of English writers, and one of the brightest and most original minds of our time. He was, he tells us, "a Pagan at the age of twelve, and a complete Agnostic by the age of

[1] *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, Nov. 1, 1898, p. 176.

sixteen." Like most free-thinkers, he had a hatred for Catholicism; but gradually he was surprised to find that "it was attacked on all sides and for all contradictory reasons." One critic found it too much to the right, another too much to the left; a third too angular in its lines, a fourth too round; it was too selfish, it was too altruistic; by some it was accused of black pessimism, by others of a pious optimism; it was pictured as a bugbear that prohibited round dancing; it was portrayed as a nursery for children and a fool's paradise; it was condemned for teaching a degrading humility, it was blamed for teaching a foolish pride; it taught a sickly timidity, it taught a war-like spirit; it destroyed the family by its convents, and it made it indestructible by forbidding divorce.[1]

"This puzzled me," says Chesterton; "the charges seemed inconsistent. The only explanation which immediately occurred to my mind was that Christianity did not come from heaven, but from hell. Really, if Jesus of Nazareth was not Christ, he must have been Antichrist."

Then a strange thought struck him like a thunderbolt. There came into his mind another explanation. It was this: There is never but one true key. "If a key fits a lock, you know it is the right key . . . but any stick is good enough to beat Christianity with." Hence, if all kinds of objections are good enough against Catholicism, may it not be that men wish to cudgel it? But, in that case, may it not also be that Catholicism is the truth, and that every objector is reproaching it for not being the particular error which he

[1] G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, London, John Lane, 4th edit. (without date). In these pages we analyse chap. vi on "*The Paradoxes of Christianity*." By "Orthodoxy" Chesterton understands Christianity in general, as he observes in his *Introduction*. But he has finally seen that the Catholic Church is the only true Christianity, and he became a member of it in July, 1922.

wishes to enjoy? Chesterton investigated this. The key fitted.

After this achievement he examines attentively the astonishing doctrine, and exclaims that the Church is "a lion-tamer," that she has adopted a multitude of dangerous ideas which could, as easily as not, become monsters, and which it seemed impossible to harness together; yet she has united them, by balancing some against others, not by breaking them in or weakening them, but by urging them on to "the top of their energy." In theology, for example, it makes of Jesus Christ, not a compromise, an amalgam, a dilution, "a being apart from God and man, like an elf, or a being half human and half not, like a centaur; but both things at once and both things thoroughly, very man and very God."

It is thus that she finds the necessary equilibrium, thus that the task of Christ is made harmonious and that the whole structure of her dogmas is kept intact. In morals the Church liberates together "love and wrath, both burning with zeal" (love for the individual, hate of evil itself); also humility and pride, both straining at the leash; and optimism and pessimism, "both loosened like cataracts"; and prudence and courage—prudence rushing headlong forwards, if it can save a soul; and courage, that is to say, the real sort of courage, which is love of life and at the same time contempt of death Pure gentleness and pure prowess, sometimes harnessed together and led by a single soul, like that of St. Louis, or Joan of Arc. The Church "gives room for all good things to run wild," says Chesterton. She certainly exhibits the drama of virtue with a vengeance. And here again, in morals as in theology, she has found "that combination between two almost insane positions which yet somehow amounted to sanity."

In short, the "heresies" which Chesterton had embraced one after the other, gave him only a partial explanation of the universe, and did not succeed in reconciling the contradictions which he discovered at every step. But it was precisely the Christian dogmas that united those contradictions in one group and explained them. Hence, they were true.[1]

The fact that, the more closely an intelligent man—either an artist like Chesterton, a thinker like Brunetière or a specialist like the theologians—studies this colossal doctrine, the more he is amazed at its coherence and its harmony; and the additional fact that whoever attempts to correct it or to suppress one of its details, overturns it or makes of it a chaos; these two facts indicate truly that its equilibrium was difficult, and also that it has been successfully maintained, or, at least, that one cannot see in it innumerable and manifest contradictions.

II

NO MANIFEST CONTRADICTION BETWEEN DOGMA AND REASON

But, whatever may be the internal coherence of the Catholic doctrine, the doctrine itself remains full of mysteries. Will not contradictions, therefore, show themselves at once between these mysteries and reason?

According to Catholic theology, a mystery is a truth unattainable by human reason; a truth which man must believe on the testimony of God. It is for reason

[1] V.L., *Nouvelle revue française*, Aug. 1, 1910. For the contrasts in Catholicism see the book of the convert R. H. Benson, *The Paradoxes of Catholicism*, and C. S. Devas, *The Key to the World's Progress*.

to determine the existence and the value of this testimony. Reason can reconnoitre all the approaches to the mystery; but, when it has once come face to face with it, and when its gaze plunges into its profundity, it cannot see the bottom of it. A mystery, it has been said, is an abyss, the depth of which renders it obscure. Reason can believe only some one who does see to its remotest limit, who testifies of it and *reveals* it to the mind of man.

A religion calling itself divine, which should offer for faith no mystery, would be for that very reason suspect. A father who, in his conversations with his little child, should never have anything to say that surpassed that child's experience, would be a singular educator. If God has wished to make some disclosures to us, it cannot be solely for the purpose of teaching us what we knew already or what we could find out by our own efforts. It is, therefore, to be expected that a revealed religion will, at certain points, go beyond the reach of reason and plunge into mystery.

Every mystery, from the very fact that it exceeds the limit of reason, at first astonishes it, disturbs it and seems to it an absurdity; and it really is one, if it contradicts reason. Moreover, the absurdity is manifest, if the pretended mystery, as it were, hurls its defiance at reason in broad daylight, on the surface, and in the clear realm where the gaze of human reason embraces the entire horizon. To say, for example, that $3=1$; or to say, with Luther, that man is responsible without being free, and that he is just while not being just, and remaining a sinner—is not a mystery, but an absurdity.

But here is the astonishing good fortune of Catholicism: if in its doctrine there are many mysteries to be believed, they are all well placed; never on the surface, always in the depths; never in the clear and cloudless region, nor even in the penumbra of reason, but beyond

that realm of shadows, in inaccessible profundity. One single nature and three Persons in God—that is the mystery of the divine psychology. But the psychology of man is itself in part inaccessible to us, and wholly so is the profound mystery of the least of created beings ; why then should we be astonished at not being able to penetrate into the mysteries of the uncreated Being in the outpourings of His infinite love ?

Jesus Christ, a human nature and a divine nature united in one Person ; we have shown[1] that this is, in a limiting instance, the pure and simple application of the universal law of life. But there remains a mystery : how is the mastery of the higher energy over the elements which it subordinates to itself accomplished ? But we are incapable of unravelling this mystery in the smallest living cell ; is it not perfectly comprehensible, therefore, that it surpasses our powers in the God-Man ? The providential distribution of the graces necessary for salvation ? A mystery! Yes, it is the mystery of God's free decisions. But who can flatter himself that he is able always to unravel human free decisions ?

We sum up in these three examples all the categories of the revealed mysteries. Transported to a divine plane, they are the mystery of liberty, the mystery of life, and the mystery of being.

We have said that they are well placed and that, if there are mysteries anywhere, they ought to be there. There they transcend reason, as reason transcends the senses. And if reason cannot demonstrate them, neither can she refute them She does not attain to them. She has, therefore, no chance to see in them a manifest contradiction, and having nothing to say, cannot be contradicted. And that is sufficient for our thesis.

But there is something still better. Not only are the

[1] *Le Gouvernement de soi-même.* Last series : *La loi de la vie.* Paris, Perrin, 1921, Book III.

Catholic mysteries not in manifest conflict with reason, but they adapt themselves to it by transcending it.

In recent years, science has formulated a theory of matter, which, at first sight, seems terrifying. The conclusions thus reached are not beyond, but at the very antipodes of the testimony of our senses. Our eyes and our fingers tell us, for example, that this piece of marble is continuous.[1] That is an error, says science. The atoms which compose it are those tiny things, sextillions of which are necessary to fill a cubic millimetre—*sextillions*! That is to say that seven million men, employed in counting them at the rate of two atoms a second, and working twelve hours a day, would be kept busy thus for more than a hundred years![2]

Well, each one of these tiny things is, we are told, a sort of solar system having in the centre its sun, called an ion, and also, at relatively enormous distances, its planets, called electrons. The latter revolve around their sun with various velocities capable of reaching more than 150,000 miles per second, and thus, every second, make five hundred trillions of revolutions, that is, many more revolutions in one second than there have been seconds since the beginning of the Christian era. Now, if the whole system were enlarged to the point where each electron had a diameter of one millimetre, the electrons would find themselves at a distance of more than sixty feet from one another. Therefore, far from presenting to us the continuous material which our senses perceive, these tiny objects, which constitute the whole reality of matter, are, in proportion to their

[1] More exactly, they give us the sensation of a continuous contact or colour. Our reason hastens to infer the reality, not merely of the sensation, but of the continuity of the object which occasions it; but modern science shows that it is too hasty in its inference.

[2] Cf. Tilleux, *La constitution de la matière*, in *Rev. Quest. Scient.*, July 20, 1920, p. 31.

masses, as remote one from another as are the hosts of suns and planets moving through space.[1]

Terrifying! That is not saying too much. Some specialists, as the result of very curious, varied and concordant experiments and very subtle calculations, assure us that all this is demonstrated. The other scientists and the uninitiated make of it an act of faith.[2] But their faith is made easier for them, when they learn that this theory makes some known laws better understood, and causes the discovery of new ones; in a word, that it is productive.

Absurdity is not productive.

Well, our Catholic mysteries *are* productive; they have an inexhaustible fruitfulness; not only in the Catholicism which lives from them and has for nineteen centuries drawn all its nourishment from them, and which makes of them the centre of its faith, the inspiration of its virtues, its worship, its institutions and its arts; they are, by reflex action, fruitful also outside of Catholicism itself, in the social and intellectual life of humanity.

The mysteries of the divine fatherhood, of redemption, of grace, of man's supernatural destiny, have not merely implanted in the hearts of believers the joy of an infinite hope; they have also given those believers new and very powerful motives for hating sin, which has been atoned for by the blood of a God, and for finding consolation for their sufferings in their union with the Crucified. They have not only elevated men's moral standard by offering them an ideal higher than a sense of duty, namely the love of Christ; they have also, by

[1] As remote, or more remote. For example, the distance from the sun to the earth is not 20,000 times its diameter, but ten and seven-tenths times.

[2] "It is difficult to make comprehensible," says J. Becquerel (in *La Science et la vie*, 11 Feb., 1914, p. 150). "So I must beg the reader to admit the results which I merely mention here. . . ."

acclimatising in the world the hitherto unknown idea of human brotherhood, sounded the knell of human slavery. By revealing to us Christ the Workman, they have ennobled labour, formerly considered unworthy of a free man. By declaring that Christ regards what is done for the least of his brethren as done for Himself, they have called into being that magnificent and unheard-of thing, for which not even a name existed in the ancient tongue, which we call charity. By proclaiming that all men are created and redeemed by the same God and destined for the same heaven, they have conferred upon all men, even upon the weakest, *rights*, and even upon the strongest, *duties*. By claiming to belong to one Church, spread throughout the entire world, they have wrested the hegemony of souls from the civil powers and have liberated the human conscience.

In short, they are the leaven—whose savour nineteen centuries have not destroyed—of all the social transformations capable of making human misery less hard and man's ideal nobler. And all this is life—harmonious, enlarged and organised life.

But such life is not created by chimeras.

But the mark of truth is no less apparent in the reaction of these mysteries on the intellectual life of past centuries. They have confirmed the hitherto wavering dogmas of natural religion, and have called forth an immense effort on the part of argumentative reason, out of which has emerged the most solid and at the same time the most supple, most accessible and richest philosophy ever known.

The unity of God, His principal attributes, wisdom, power, justice, goodness, the creation, providence, the spirituality and immortality of the soul—these are the

foundations of natural religion. Now even if, theoretically, reason is capable of establishing these foundations with absolute certainty, it is a fact that, historically, it had failed in the attempt. Everywhere, in all parts of the world, and always, in all periods of history which have not felt the reaction of the Christian mysteries on their intellectual efforts, philosophy has let the dogmas of reason sink into obscurity, oscillating between polytheism and pantheism, and dishonouring, by a mixture of monstrous errors, the fragments of religious truth which it could offer to mankind.

In contrast to this, making of the revealed mysteries a beacon-light to guide its course and a parapet to shield it from the abyss, a philosophy was gradually formed, which called itself *ancilla theologiae*, the handmaid of theology. This philosophy assumed the task of embracing all the data of Christian revelation and of harmonising them with the principles of reason. And, from having thus gone to school, and put itself at the service of the theological dogmas, it turns out that this philosophy has freed the dogmas of reason from their old shells and has verified and cemented, in their robust mass, all the constructed masonry of natural religion.

It turns out also that this philosophy, in its essential elements, resists all the efforts of criticism and modern discoveries to destroy it ; that all the new systems by which men wish to replace it, crumble and fall one upon another, while *it* endures. And it comes to pass that the strongest minds now proclaim this " handmaid of theology " as " the eternal philosophy," *philosophia perennis*, or " the natural philosophy of the human mind," or " the philosophy of common sense."

During the last two centuries, it was the fashion to smile at it derisively, and this was done because it was the fashion, and no one gave himself the trouble to

examine it. One of our modern learned men, indeed one of the most modern and most learned of them, and the one who perhaps, with Henri Poincaré, has most contributed to establishing the ideas now prevailing concerning the philosophy of science, Pierre Duhem, did wish to examine it and brought back from his research, together with amazement at all that he has seen, a conclusion which the latest volumes printed during his life and the posthumous works now in process of publication develop at length.

It is a conclusion which astonished first of all the author himself : namely, that we owe to this philosophy, not only the synthesis of the mysteries and of reason ; and not only in great part our French language, with that logic, that suppleness, that clearness and that precision which makes of it, par excellence, the language of diplomacy, but also—and this is the unexpected conclusion—that we also owe to this philosophy all the principles of solid good sense, from which modern science has come to us in a direct line.[1]

Thus the Christian mysteries, at the same time that they were elevating the ideal of men, have allowed them to find out and to elucidate rational truths ; and they have also been of use in directing the researches of thought. They have been productive in the intellectual as well as in the social order, and therefore fit perfectly into the reality of things. Not only is there no manifest contradiction with human reason visible in them, but they are seen to adapt themselves mar-

[1] See Pierre Duhem, *Études sur Léonard de Vinci*, Paris, Hermann, 1st series, 1904 ; 2nd series, 1906 ; 3rd series, 1913 ; *Le système du Monde*, Paris, Hermann (5 vols. now published). An unbeliever, Gonzague Truc, in *Le retour à la Scolastique* (Paris, Renaissance du Livre) has also made a curious plea (in spite of notable errors of fact and doctrine) in favour of scholasticism, in which he sees an admirable instrument for forging minds. Cf. Étienne Gilson, *La philosophie au Moyen âge*, 2 vols. (Payot, 1922).

vellously to it and while transcending it to continue and perfect it.[1]

III

NO MANIFEST CONTRADICTION BETWEEN DOGMA AND SCIENCE OR HISTORY

Since these are truths, we might conclude from them that neither the facts of science nor those of history will contradict them. But let us, if it be desired, ignore this conclusion for the moment and turn our attention to history and science.

History? Let us observe that there have always been avowed Catholics among the greatest historians. Without going back to the long dynasties of the Bollandists and Benedictines, there have been and there are still among us great historians, who have believed and who still believe in our mysteries. There have been among them Catholics by birth, whom their studies have not prevented from believing, such as Léopold Delisle (1826-1910) in France, Giovanni Battista di Rossi (1822-1894) in Italy, Godefroid Kurth (1847-1918) in Belgium, John Lingard (1771-1851) in England, and Hans Janssen (1829-1891) in Germany. There have been also some whose conversion all their knowledge of history has not hindered, like the Swiss scholars Friedrich von Schlegel (born in 1772, converted in 1808, and died in 1829) and Karl von Haller (born in 1768, converted

[1] These reflections would gain additional force, if one took the time (for the material would not be lacking) to show that, in all other religious systems, the only fruitful doctrines, from the intellectual and social point of view, have been those which they have in common with Catholicism; while those by which they are opposed to Catholicism have had only the fecundity of error and disorder. This last consideration is well illustrated in the masterly and terrible work of Janssen.

in 1820, died in 1854), or the German Albrecht von Ruville, Professor at the University of Halle. There are others still whose historical studies have themselves brought them back to the faith of their fathers, like François Lenormand (1837-1883) in France. Finally, there are others, more particularly devoted to ecclesiastical history, but born and brought up in schism or heresy and in hatred of the Papacy, whom their studies nevertheless have in some way led to Rome in spite of themselves, in spite of tenacious prejudices, and in spite of the necessity of giving up their public functions, social environment, friends and families, and finally, in spite of all the anguish of heart[1] involved in their conversion, all of which were perfectly foreseen. Such were, in Russia, Vladimir Soloviev (born in 1853, converted in 1896, died in 1900) ; in Switzerland, Frédéric Hurter (born in 1787, converted in 1844, died in 1869) ; in England, William Palmer (born in 1811, converted in 1855, died in 1879), John Henry Newman (born in 1801, converted in 1845, died in 1890), and so many others, the noble list of whose names still increases in our time.

Of course, there are also unbelieving and Protestant historians ; but unbelievers and Protestants have only to deny, and one negation more imposed by their studies does not trouble their unbelief. But in order

[1] Newman, some months before his abjuration, wrote, on April 3, 1845 : " My eyes are wet with tears at the thought of all the loved things I must abandon." And on March 15 : " I have among some a good reputation and this I deliberately sacrifice ; I have among many a bad one, and I am fulfilling their worst desires and am giving them the triumph they most long for. I am making all those I love unhappy and I am bewildering all those whom I have instructed or aided. I am going to those whom I do not know, and from whom I expect very little. I am going to make an exile of myself, and that at my age. Oh! what can determine me to do this, except a powerful necessity ? " (Quoted by Paul Thureau-Dangin, *La Renaissance Catholique en Angleterre*, Paris, Plon, 7th ed., 1908, I, p. 310.)

to be a Catholic, it is necessary to believe and to believe without any exceptions in a body of doctrines; and the great historians who are believers, especially those whom history itself has brought to the Catholic faith, are sufficient to prove to us that between that faith and history there is not a mass of manifest contradictions, since these specialists have not discovered any, but have, on the contrary, seen in that fact a reason for believing.

There remains to be considered Science. But on this point we do not need to linger long, since we have already spoken of it elsewhere,[1] as many others have done before us. We can, moreover, treat it briefly here for another reason, namely, that this conflict, at least so far as it concerns true science in the correct meaning of the word—exact sciences and natural sciences—is to-day settled. Among serious thinkers no one would any longer dare to maintain that science has condemned faith.

Already, in 1895, even before his conversion, Brunetière could say: "If it be true, that for the last hundred years science has pretended to replace *religion*, science for the moment, and for a long time to come, has lost the game."[2]

He pointed out at the same time that "the most dangerous adversaries of Christianity" were to be found in the ranks of the Orientalists and the exegetes, confessing, however, that up to that time they had brought, instead of proofs, "only an element of confusion into the discussion."[3] But, five years later, he

[1] Notably in *Le Naturalisme devant la Science* (Paris, Perrin, 1911) and in *La part des croyants dans les progrès de la Science*, 2 vols. (same publisher, 1919 and 1920).

[2] Brunetière, *La science et la réligion* (Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1895), p. 37.

[3] *Ibid.* 33.

no longer hesitated to say: "We will recognise the fact—and we can do so from now on—that in so far as the aim of exegesis and criticism has been to cast doubt upon the truths of religion, they have positively and for ever failed.[1]

About the same time, one of our great Orientalists boasted of having caused his pupils to lose their faith, and I believe he did succeed in doing so, at least in the case of one of them. Some years later, however, in 1908, another Orientalist, no longer a pupil but himself a master, Barbier de Meynard, after long consideration, returned to the faith.[2] For a pupil who goes away, therefore, we have a master who comes back.

As we have shown in the case of the natural sciences,[3] so also in the liberal sciences which are subject to the force of criticism and are dependent upon history as well as science, pupils are usually more aggressive than their masters, and the partly educated more than the wholly educated. In the same way young sciences, which cannot yet properly express their thoughts, are much more hostile than the older sciences, which are in full possession of their methods and laws. Like children who strike their nurses, they shake their slender fists in the face of the dogmas; but, as they grow in stature, they become wiser and perceive that they have spoken too quickly and too loud, that they are less sure of their oracles, and that the dogmas are more solid than they thought. So, like Balaam, they end by blessing where they had wished to blaspheme. Already, toward the middle of the last century, Cardinal Wiseman[4] under-

[1] Brunetière, Speech of Nov. 18, 1900, on *The Reasons for Believing*. Cf. *Discours de combat*, last series (Paris, Perrin, 1907), pp. 173, 220.

[2] See the *Notice* signed by Paul Girard, his successor, in the *Bulletin de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, Oct., 1909; epitomised in *Rev. pr. d'Ap.*, April 15, 1909, pp. 133 *seq.*

[3] Cf. *La part des croyants*, Vol. II, pp. 285-290.

[4] Wiseman, *Discours sur les rapports entre la science et la religion révélée*. De Genoude, Paris, Sapia, 1841.

took to demonstrate that ethnology, comparative philosophy, geology, primitive history and archæology —formerly the ramparts behind which unbelief entrenched itself—had become the arsenals where Christian apologetics found powerful weapons for the defence of revealed facts. This demonstration, which should always be repeated in face of the new facts that continually arise and the objections which often reappear, has since that time always been resorted to, and with ever-increasing success.

And here is another marvel, added to so many others. All the sciences have at first been used as a bastion against the faith. Men have picked up some objections there and have come in great haste and with a blare of trumpets to brandish these before the Church, summoning it to reply or to acknowledge its defeat. And the Church has answered: "I do not yet know how this objection is to be explained; but it can be explained and the difficulty is only apparent. I will meditate once more upon the doctrine of which I have the custody. Perhaps this will be an opportunity for us to understand its contents better and, without denying anything in them, to present them to you in more exact terms. But meanwhile, please make a thorough investigation of your own archives; examine carefully your fossils, decipher your hieroglyphics, sift your facts and bring your science still further forward. I promise you, it will end by agreeing with my doctrine; or if it cannot rise to this, sooner or later it will reconsider its own conclusions and perceive that they are not certain." And science, even when it has not proclaimed its agreement, has always ended by acknowledging its uncertainty. What assurance on the part of the Church, and what good fortune! "What a whirling adventure!" as Chesterton says.[1]

[1] *Orthodoxy*, end of chap. vi.

Above all, what a doctrine this is! The most complex, the most vulnerable of all, full of violent contrasts which threaten its equilibrium on all sides; full of mysteries also, before which reason at first revolts, and full of duties, which cause the instincts to protest in rage!

Moreover, this doctrine is expressed in hastily uttered words, thrown to a world quite indisposed to receive them. It is a scandal to the Jews, who are looking for a Messiah of a wholly different sort; it is foolishness to the Gentiles, who are expecting nothing from the Jews and wish for nothing from them; it is preached simultaneously everywhere and in the most different and incongruous places by a dozen ordinary fishermen, ignorant men, who deliver their message hundreds or thousands of miles from one another, and who have started out without taking the trouble to agree upon a programme.

Now if all this is merely human, if there is nothing behind these men, if there is not someone who knows and maintains everything, the present as well as the future, then the words uttered by these dozen ignorant and passionate speakers will inevitably fall into nothingness, and die away without an echo, buried amid bursts of laughter from the auditors; or if, by a first and inexplicable miracle, they survive, if they resound to all the echoes of the universe, and if they pass, ever sonorous, through all the vortices of the current of history, it is inevitable that the doctrine they express should break up into a chaos of internal contradictions, and on all sides come into collision not only with the repeated and manifest denials made by a more enlightened reason, but by the unforeseen facts of history and by the no less unforeseen conclusions of so many sciences formerly known.

Well, where are these manifest contradictions? We discovered them at the first glance in the other religious

systems, but where are they here? Objections are met with, of course. We can find objections to everything, even to the existence of matter and to geometry itself. There will always be objections to the Catholic doctrine, for it is complex and sometimes embarrassing. But where are there any contradictions which disqualify it, or convict it of error? If this doctrine is of human origin, such contradictions ought to burst into view everywhere, rising from every side, numberless, evident, overwhelming, impossible to conceal. Where are they? We have looked for them a long time, we have sought for them diligently, but we have not seen them.

What then? . . Then this doctrine is not of human origin. The twelve plain men who preached it, did not make it. They were merely mouthpieces. But the voice itself came from a great distance, it came from above, it came from God. It came from Him who alone could say: "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life."

PART II

THE STABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE

Chapter I

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ARGUMENT

Summary. A religion, calling itself revealed, must be at the same time progressive and unchangeable. I.—*Impossibility*, if it is merely human, to succeed in this; (*a*) by attempting to progress, it changes and ends in rationalism; (*b*) by remaining unchangeable, it gives up progress, is shut up in ignorance, sheltered from discussion, or mummified in the past. II.—*This impossibility reaches its climax* in the case of Catholicism; (*a*) it has not had the safeguard of ignorance; (*b*) it has had many discussions with friends and enemies; (*c*) it has met the attack of all forces, those of passion and those of politics; (*d*) and it has two particularly vulnerable points: the ecumenical councils and the Popes.—*Conclusion.*

A REVEALED religion must either follow or lead the progress of civilisation, must adapt itself to new requirements, must represent all ages and all countries, and must be always in a condition to fulfil its task, which is that of being the educator and remaining the counsellor of humanity. When confronted by unforeseen difficulties, it has no right to confess its impotence, to remain behind or to abdicate. It cannot abdicate without abjuring itself,[1] nor remain behind without making itself useless. It must be of service and go on. It must progress.

But, while progressing, it is essential also that it should not change, because it must remain the truth. In our moments of uncertainty we ask of it, not expedients, but oracles; in our sufferings we crave from

[1] The Jewish religion had the right to do this, precisely because it professed to be a provisional religion, which was to be, not contradicted, but continued, completed and replaced by another which would be final.

it not illusory consolations, but hopes to which realities correspond; in our acts of repentance, we want, not rites which deaden remorse, but efficacious pardons which renew our souls. Above all, we have need of truth. For a religion which seems to us false, even if it remains sweet and beautiful, we have no desire.

Now the truth does not change. Precepts indeed may change, on certain subordinate points, according to circumstances. The precepts which a father gives to his children and those which he imparts to a young man are not the same; similarly, one's country, in a period of peace, can modify the laws prevailing in time of war. The manner of life can change. The man who is seated can subsequently stand erect. But beings themselves do not change in their nature, nor do the fundamental relations which religion expresses between the natures of beings change. If God, by his rights as Creator, formerly had authority over man, and if He was able then to require from him the homage of obedience and faith, He can do so still. If the divine nature formerly admitted of three distinct persons, and if this was true 1900 years ago, it is true to-day.

Nor do facts change; once true, they are always true. They enter, forever unchangeable, into the domain of the past. If it was a fact that God spoke of old to men, that the Word became incarnate in Jesus Christ, that Jesus Christ founded a Church, that He instituted sacraments, that He died on Calvary, that He rose from the dead, etc.; if this, I say, was true once, it is true now. It has not changed. It will never change. If a religion, after having affirmed this, wishes to-day to affirm the contrary, it is not the oracle of God, it is only a false witness; and into its face can be hurled the terrible words of Bossuet, with which a witness is rejected: "You vary; therefore, you are false."

In order to adapt itself to the requirements of all

ages, religion must be *progressive* ; but, unless it would be convinced of error, it must be unchangeable. If it does not progress, the world will pass it by and speedily forget it ; but if it changes, the world will no longer believe it and will turn its back upon it.

I

A RELIGION CALLING ITSELF REVEALED, CANNOT BE AT THE SAME TIME UNCHANGEABLE AND PROGRESSIVE

Progressive and unchangeable ; evolution in identity : how can we reconcile these ? How can we realise this miracle ?

But how have I, while remaining myself, made progress and grown up ? By living. How does a little shrub become a great tree ? How does the bud become a branch ? By living. The branch was in the bud, the tree in the shrub, the man in the child ; but hidden and potential. The movement of life has given to them, little by little, their normal stature. Circumstances—the air, the sun, change of seasons—have assisted in this ; but circumstances act at random and in different ways and render assistance only to *life*. Under their action a block of marble neither changes nor evolves ; it remains *inert*. A corpse *decomposes*. That is change, but not progress. Life alone *progresses*, while yet remaining identical with itself. It bears within itself a " directing idea," which is at the same time a power of action and of organisation, which responds to circumstances and chooses among them, bending them to its purpose, assimilating that which is advantageous to it, defending itself against that which is harmful to it, and thereby continues and adapts, developing organs without dissociating them, depending on the past, the present and

the future, but all the time, while evolving, remaining itself; or rather becoming more and more itself in proportion as it grows, evolves and renders evident its potentialities.

The rosebush is still more a rosebush when it is all in bloom, as the adult is still more a man than was the child. Life and life only is capable of harmonising in the same being the identity which excludes change and the progress which excludes inertia.

And since religion must exclude both inertia and change, and since it must be both unchangeable and progressive, it must therefore live.

Henceforth, then, it confronts a terrible problem which, adding itself to the first one, includes it and transcends it. We have said that it is already very difficult for it in the immense complexity of doctrines which it must offer to the world, not to dissolve, if it be human, into *manifest* contradictions. But that is no longer enough. It is further necessary—and here is the insurmountable difficulty—that there should be in it no *hidden* contradiction. For it must live, and, however little it lives, the movement of life will bring to full light its secret blemishes and will oblige it, if it is to remain coherent and believable and not display its internal contradictions, to change and to deny today what it affirmed yesterday.

But it has no more right to contradict itself in the course of its history, than in the composition of its doctrine; and whoever shall unmask it under its disguise of circumstance, will have the right to cast into its face the irrefutable verdict: "You vary; therefore you are false."

Soon it will have only one resource left; to confess its imposture and to appear before mankind, no longer as a messenger from God, but as a doctrine devised by men. It requires very little reflection to see that,

passing from one change to another, every religion, which calls itself revealed, yet is not so, cannot do otherwise than end in rationalism.

There is only one way to check its descent towards rationalism and to save it from change, disintegration and dispersion ; and that is, not to give it a chance for reflection and to prohibit progress ; which means to keep it from living.

It can be put under the guardianship of ignorance, as in the case of fetishism, polytheism and the religions of backward peoples.[1] It is then looked upon by people as the heritage of their ancestors, and they say to themselves : " Our fathers received it from the gods. It is divine, it lives." But no one investigates it closely ; otherwise it would be seen to be a lifeless thing, a mannequin having nothing to say and with no gesture appropriate to its surroundings, like the figures in a waxwork. Whoever crosses the threshold perceives a pleasant-looking man, bowing low in welcome and greeting the visitor with an affable smile. The uninitiated is deceived by this and returns the salutation ; but if he looks back, he perceives that the figure's gesture is always the same and his faith is dispelled together with his ignorance.

Ignorance can be imposed also by protecting the religious system from all discussion. Mohammedanism does this. It did not do so at the start, but it soon

[1] Even in Rome and Athens, ignorance of religion was the rule. The worship appealed to the eyes and to the heart, but did not enlighten the intelligence. There was no pulpit and no school of religion, except for those who were initiated into the " Mysteries." It was Julian the Apostate who first thought of creating finally a system of instruction in the polytheistic religion. (Cf. P. Allard, *Julien l'Apostat*, II, Paris, Lecoffre, 1903, Book VI, chap. i, especially pp. 186, 190.)

repented of it; for sects immediately began to be numerous.[1] About the year A.D. 1000, under the pressure of authority, all the schools were closed and silence reigned. Philosophy and theology were banished from Islam. Only law was allowed to function, based, however, on the Koran. The Koran was sufficient for everything. The priests learned it by heart, the faithful recited it or heard it recited. It was not discussed. God is God and Mohammed is His prophet. The Koran is the Word of God given to Mohammed for the Believers. Everything is there. Accordingly, the followers of Islam have not to comprehend it or to verify its foundations, to know why or to give a reason to others or to themselves. Let them believe and all is well.

Nevertheless, it was impossible that there should not be within this doctrine some co-ordinated movements and some vague signs of life; for it contains in its essential foundation some dogmas of natural religion; few in number, very simple and very clear, from which, by a sure method of deduction, it was easy to draw the most immediate consequences.

Carrel has shown that, by taking certain precautions, one can isolate an entire system of organs, which continues, for a certain time, to pulsate rhythmically with life. But that does not go very far; and in fact, in Mohammedanism, it did not take place. It has remained changeless only in the places where it has not tried to live. Wherever serious thought has been given to its doctrine, it has decomposed it.

There is another means of protecting a religious system from decomposition, and that is to mummify it.

[1] The first three centuries of Islam present "a very interesting picture of variety, and this spectacle contrasts strangely with the image of fixity and apparent immutability which the subsequent centuries give us." (Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Manuel d'histoire des religions*, trans. by H. Hubert and Isid, Lévy, Paris, A. Colin, 1904, p. 285). *Apparent* immutability. See *op. cit.*, 297-312.

Mummies do not decompose. Such is the case with the Greek schism, the "Orthodox Church." It preserves the physiognomy and attitude which it had a thousand years ago, kept, as it were, in leading-strings by means of ancient formulas; but it has nothing more to do with the movement of the world and the impact of ideas. It is no longer a living thing. First Photius and then Michael Cerularius imprisoned it in the past, like a mummy in a tomb.

This mummy must be protected from every shock and from the slightest contact with the air. When in this Church the theologians allow a little fresh air to enter, when they wish to get out of the rut of mere formalism, to reconsider their dogmas, to shake it out, to loosen the ancient leading-strings, and to give some appearance of vital warmth to their venerable mummy, they let us see a decomposing corpse.

And it is absolutely necessary, willingly or unwillingly, here or there, to let in the air. As the centuries pass, new questions are presented, which come to the forefront, and which the ancient Councils did not solve. Who will solve them? Orthodoxy is dumb. It has no longer an official voice. Some of the Orthodox speak, but those who wish and as they like. But the answers differ. Fragments of these incongruous replies become incrusted some way or other in the traditions of local churches and in one after another divergencies break out.

In Russia, in spite of the rough hand of the Tsar, who "by means of the lash" tried to restore "the lost sheep to the fold,"[1] there were thirty millions of dissenters estimated by careful computation.[2]

[1] The Orthodox Russian, Aksakov, quoted by Soloviev, *La Russie et l'Église universelle* (Paris, Stock, 5th edit., 1922). p. 56.

[2] Michel d'Herbigny, *La tyrannie soviétique et le malheur russe* (Paris, Ed. Spes., 1923), p. 158.

In Turkey, where several autocephalous churches rubbed elbows with one another, if there was an understanding between them, it was through the good offices of the Grand Turk; and a synodal letter, signed by four patriarchs and twenty-nine bishops, made this known to Pius IX in reply to his letter of January 6th, 1848. The synodal letter said (May, 1848): "The patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, in extraordinary and difficult cases, write to the patriarch of Constantinople, because this city is the seat of the empire and because of the precedency of this see in the synods. If this brotherly co-operation relieves the perplexity, the affair stops there; if not, it is referred to the *temporal power* according to law."[1]

And it is not always questions of right or discipline that are in discussion. It happens sometimes that dogmas are at stake and even fidelity to the ancient Councils. Ten or fifteen years ago, it was modernism which for some time sent a chill through all thinking members of the Orthodox Churches and gave rise to many different doctrines, which nothing can any more appease. It found, moreover, that the soil had been prepared for it for half a century by rationalistic Protestantism, imported from the German universities. It made victims among the Russian intellectuals and theologians,[2] but it impregnated the Serbs much more than the Russians, and the Greeks of the Kingdom much more than the Serbs.[3] The Church of the Phanar (Constantinople) itself, even if it was, perhaps, more spared than the others, has just encountered another peril.

Fascinated by the perspectives which the presence

[1] Mansi-Martin-Petit. *Conciliorum amplissima collectio*, Vol. XL (Paris and Leipzig, Welter, 1909), col. 402.

[2] Cf. Anselme Tilloy, *Les Églises orientales dissidentes et l'Église romaine* (Paris, Téqui, 1889), pp. 12-17.

[3] Cf. d'Herbigny, *Angl. et Orth.*, passim.

of the English has opened to it for the future, it can no longer remain faithful to the past. Only lately, in opposition to the Russians and in agreement with the Greeks, it admitted as valid only baptism by immersion, and rebaptised the Catholics and Protestants who entered its fold: it declared Anglican ordinations null and void, not only for the reason of fact which Leo XIII invoked,[1] but also for a legal reason peculiarly its own, namely, that heresy effaces the sacerdotal character, even when validly received. Moreover, by its fundamental principle, which proclaims the infallibility of the ecumenical Councils, Orthodoxy is at the antipodes of Anglicanism, the 31st of the 39 articles affirming that "the ecumenical Councils can err and in fact have erred."

It seemed difficult to pass over such obstacles, but they were surmounted. In 1921, in spite of history, in spite of tradition, in spite of the fundamental principles which are opposed to it, Professor Comnenos (a layman, but a teacher of theology in the Patriarchal College of Holki) proposed to recognise the validity of Anglican ordinations and reciprocally to admit the members of both Churches to the sacraments. He did even more: he demanded the union, at least of certain fractions of both Churches. The Phanar at first gave to these declarations an approving silence. Then it, too, went further: through the mouth of its new patriarch, Meletios, it proclaimed, in June 1922, his "ardent desire" to work for the fusion of Orthodoxy and Anglicanism;[2] and, a few weeks later, in August 1922, it officially recognised the validity of Anglican ordinations.[3] In consequence of which, the "heretics"

[1] The ordinal followed by the first consecrators being evidently opposed to the transmission of the sacerdotal character.

[2] Cf. d'Herbigny, *Angl. et. Orth.*, 139-46.

[3] See *Echos d'Orient*, July-Dec., 1922, pp. 478 *seq.* The Orthodox

of yesterday will now be "orthodox" and the "non-baptised" will be regarded as genuine bishops. This is indeed a change.

The Orthodox Church has only one way to remain intact, and that is not to stir and to keep its eyes, ears and mouth closed like a mummy.[1] But if it does wish to try to live, it addresses itself to "the temporal power," even to that of the Grand Turk, in order to establish harmony between its patriarchs; and to international politics in order to determine the form of baptism and the validity of ordinations;[2] and

theologians have been lately much divided on this question, about which the first Councils naturally said nothing. Ambraze as well as Comnenos favour validity; Rhôsse and Mesolora say no; Dyobouniotes hesitates; Androutsos says that it can be admitted on "economic" grounds. (Cf. Rev. Frank Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought*, London, Mowbray, 1923, pp. 302 *seq.*) *Economy* is a principle according to which the Orthodox Church has the right, "as the sovereign dispenser of the sacraments, to change invalid rites into valid sacraments, according to circumstances." Cf. *Ibid.* 262. Here is a divine power which the Pope himself does not dream of assuming. This strange principle allows a certain number of Orthodox theologians to explain the innumerable variations in their Churches in regard to the conditions of the validity of baptism, but not to furnish an official justification of them. And it is a question of the very conditions of salvation! Cf. Gavin, *ibid.*, pp. 263-67; William Palmer, *Dissertations on subjects relating to the Orthodox or Eastern Catholic Communion*, 1853, chap. xii; Palmieri, *La rebaptisation des Latins chez les Grecs*, in *Revue de l'Orient chrétien*, VII, 1902, pp. 618-46; VIII, 1903, pp. 111-43, and in *Revue Benedictine*, 1906, pp. 215-31.

[1] Indeed it was intact, or nearly so, for centuries and precisely by this means. The Russian empire was very much isolated and the Tsar kept it well guarded. The other Orthodox Churches were surrounded by Mohammedans, with whom there was scarcely any affinity. J. de Maistre (*Du Pape*, 409) observed that Orthodoxy was thus preserved, "like an insect in amber," but he predicted that its decomposition would be inevitable from the day when it should come in contact with Protestantism. That day has arrived.

[2] For the last two centuries through reasons of "economy" and courtesy in regard to the Russians, whom it was necessary to flatter, the Greek Church, while admitting the invalidity of their baptism, received into its fold the Occidentals who had at first formed part of the Russian Church, which considered their baptism valid. It is

finally to the currents of public opinion for the orientation of religious thought. The mummy, worked upon by all these divergent ideas, is nothing more than a corpse abandoned to the worms.

"Only fools never change their opinions," said Bismarck in his usual brusque style. For, in fact, men are not infallible, and only "fools" fail to perceive it. In order that a religion formed by men should remain indefinitely identical with itself, it is necessary never to reflect upon it, and to make of it an inert thing, a mannequin anatomically constructed once for all, or a mummy embalmed in formulas which can never more be touched.

Facts confirm, therefore, in a marvellous way, the previsions of logic. A religious doctrine, especially if it professess to be revealed, is a thing too complex, and comes in contact with too many unforeseen events, with too many passions impelling it in different directions, and with too many inevitable and inextricable difficulties, for it to be within the power of men, not only to exclude every flagrant contradiction, but also to keep it coherent yet adaptable, and identical yet progressive through the lapse of time. Men can achieve at most only one of two results; either identity at the expense of progress, or change at the expense of identity. Logic, in demanding identity in progress, lays down a condition impossible for any man-made religion to fulfil.

likewise through courtesy to England and in order to favour certain political dreams, which agree admirably with the projects of an Anglican-Orthodox union, that the Phanar has recognised the validity of Anglican ordinations.

II

THIS IMPOSSIBILITY REACHES ITS CLIMAX IN THE CASE OF CATHOLICISM

Among all religions, the one most liable to pay this inevitable penalty to human weakness is evidently the Catholic.

It has not been put into the custody of ignorance, like fetishism. It was given to the world by ignorant men; in fact, it found its first recruits among the unlearned, the people, the poor, the slaves. But it soon came to be believed in by the intellectual *élite*, who had the very human temptation of mentally sifting and revising its claims and contents. And since then it has always existed among the most civilised peoples of the world. Moreover, it is this religion which has bent lovingly over their cradles, has been their teacher, and has given them impulse and enthusiasm. To-day the great mass of its followers is concentrated in the countries of high culture, more than two hundred millions being in Europe or America. Among these it has counted men of all conditions, but almost all the great men, all the geniuses, all the theologians and all the scholars of the first fifteen centuries; and since that time it has also kept within that glorious phalanx a magnificent share. Under these historical circumstances, it was not possible for Catholicism to remain protected by ignorance through the nineteen centuries of its history.

But, if it has not had the advantage of ignorance, it has had its perils. If it be true that the great mass of its members have always dwelt in countries of high culture, it has also possessed, at first here and there, and soon everywhere, even in the most backward

lands, scattered minorities, grouped together amid all sorts of diverse languages, mentalities, customs, traditions, national prejudices and religious superstitions. And these isolated groups, having only difficult and infrequent communication with its directing centre, and not being maintained and upheld in their faith by the beliefs of the great mass, would have been forced inevitably, under the continuous pressure of their surroundings, to let their doctrine little by little crumble away, and to amalgamate what remained of it with the infiltrations of all those different elements. Thus, the ignorance of the backward forces, acting in opposition to the high culture which the majority enjoyed, would have aroused a double tendency which, improving here and retarding there, could not have failed, according to all the laws of human psychology, to disturb the doctrine's equilibrium, and to render impossible, through so many peoples and centuries, its coherence and integrity.[1]

Still better is the fact that the Catholic religion has never been shut off from free discussion, like Mohammedanism, or embalmed apart from life, like a mummy in a mausoleum, as was the case with the Greek schism. Ever since its birth, Catholicism has been always in motion. It is alive ; and if it is very active, if it multiplies its labours for the relief of all misfortunes, if it teaches morality again to a world which had forgotten it, if it excites heroism to the point of martyrdom and virtue to the height of holiness, it also at the same time thinks ; it reveres and honours thought, and

[1] C. S. Devas, *The Key to the World's Progress*, chap. iv, points out another grave danger in the spirit of nationalism, which is opposed to the Catholic Church.

saves from the cataclysm of barbaric invasions the treasures of ancient literature; but, above all, it does its own thinking and is always careful to offer to its God that reasonable service—*rationabile obsequium*—which St. Paul already required.[1] It is not Catholicism that extols the "faith of the charcoal-burner." It is *the lazy* who do so. Catholicism had scarcely freed itself from the blood-stained cerements of Calvary, and was still draped in the purple of its martyrs, when already the first successors of the Apostles, Clement of Alexandria, Ignatius of Antioch, Polycarp, Irenaeus, and after them the innumerable host of its Fathers and Doctors, bent over the study of the dogmas, commentated them, sought for them clear and concise formulas, compared them with one another, with the philosophy of their time and with the aspirations of the human soul, fathomed their depths, showed their refulgence, deduced their consequences, and thereby inaugurated that science of dogma called theology, which the great Middle Ages were to bring to its full splendour with scholasticism.

We have said that scholasticism is the alliance of reason and faith. It is the basic worship of facts and of common sense, together with the most exalted flights of the human intellect heavenward. It went to some excesses, it was made by men. But the excesses of these men consisted in reasoning about things beyond the limits of human vision,[2] *de omni re scibili et de quibusdam aliis*, to raise objections constantly, to subject

[1] Rom. xiii, 1.—The immediate meaning expresses a *spiritual* homage. *Reasonable* is only the derived meaning, but tradition has always held particularly to this interpretation. (See Bainvel, *Les contresens bibliques des prédicateurs*, Lethielleux, 1895, pp. 129 *seq.*)

[2] "Probably the greatest service which the Church has rendered to human thought"—wrote G. Sorel in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Sept. 1902, p. 542—"was to adopt in the thirteenth century the peripatetic (Aristotelian) doctrine and thereby to impose upon men the obligation to apply their reason to everything."

everything to the closest scrutiny, to split hairs, to be passionately devoted to ideas, to live only for verbal or literary conflicts, like their contemporaries the knights for their battles with the sword. Now they hardly had more than one field of contest : theology, *fides quaerens intellectum*, as they loved to call it, not the faith of the charcoal-burner, but " the faith which seeks to comprehend." They have not always had for their successors men of the same mental breadth and passionate enthusiasm as themselves, but their race has never become extinct, and it can be truly said that during the last half-century it has found again in thinking out its faith the old-time love and ardour. During the last four centuries, the printing-press has gathered up a portion of the result of this immense effort into volumes of all sizes, especially tall ones, which occupy in the Bibliothèque Nationale four or five kilometres of shelves.

This mighty exhibition of energy was a vital outburst, a continual crisis of development. And, in fact, the little organism transmitted by the apostles has increased ; the grain of mustard seed has become a great tree. If it has had dead seasons, they have been rare and brief, It has grown sunward, developing its potentialities, causing its dogmas to blossom like its institutions, and making out of what was once a simple bud branches, fruits and flowers.

If, against all probability, all this luxurious vegetation is impregnated with the same sap, goes down into the same roots, and emerges from the same original humble germ ; and if this doctrine, always rich and quivering with life, has remained coherent and identical with itself for nineteen centuries, it cannot be explained by saying that it has been shielded from every shock, that it has been embalmed in death, or that it has been carefully guarded from discussion.

For it has been discussed, and not only by its theologians but by its enemies. Christ had warned his disciples in advance that they must expect both the conflict of ideas and the conflict of the sword.[1] And St. Peter had admonished them to be " always ready to satisfy everyone that asketh a reason of that hope which is in you."[2] They have given the reason.

Catholicism encountered already at its cradle the hostility of the rabbinical ideas and the hatred of the Sanhedrin ; and in the very first generation of Christians it disputed with the Jews about the Bible and the fulfilment of the prophecies. From its earliest beginnings also it met with pagan ideas, that is, outside the circle of the Jews, the ideas of humanity itself, which had left the imprint of their thousand years of existence upon all modes of thinking, feeling and acting. It could not proclaim one of its dogmas, precepts or counsels without coming into collision with a mass of unanimous opposition. And this opposition did not lack in its ranks men of great talent, experts in oratory and in writing. In turn they used these powers with a superb disdain, like Pliny and Tacitus ; or with subtle reasoning and consummate art, like Seneca and Porphyry ; or with facetious railleries, full of sneering mockery, like Celsus ; and with much cold and treacherous hatred, like Julian the Apostate. And from the first centuries onward, in order to defend themselves, the Christians had to multiply their apologies, with the aid of Aristides, Athenagoras, St. Justin, Minucius Felix, Tertullian, Theophilus of Antioch, Tatian, Hermas, etc.

But the new religion was still contending with the Pagans, when already another more dangerous struggle

[1] Matt. vii, x, xxiv, etc.

[2] *Parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est spe* (1 Pet. iii, 15).

began—that of the heresies. These were numberless. They began already in the time of the Apostles, with Simon Magus, who wanted to amalgamate Christianity with the impure dreams of the Gnostics. Little by little they went on multiplying, dragging the body of doctrine in all directions, and attacking everything, some flattering the passions, others the intellect, now coquetting with the maddest forms of mysticism and soaring high into the clouds, now wholly on the earth and lowering to the level of human conceptions the dogmas left to his Church by Christ.

The heretical leaders heaped up texts and arguments, multiplied disputes and intrigues, stirred up public opinion and aroused tempests of controversy. And thus constantly, before one heresy was dead, another appeared; down to the coming of Luther who, with his doctrine of the liberty of private judgement, let them all loose in a torrent through the world.

This torrent of modern heresies, proceeding from one negation to another, like a series of cascades, rolled on towards unadulterated rationalism and ended by joining the great stream of unbelief, which was already beginning to beat against the very bulwarks of Catholicism. It was the age of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Encyclopædists. Then, as negations followed negations and the torrent flowed on downward in its steep descent, after the impulse given it by rationalism, came the turn of atheism, idealism, materialism, and the whole influence of free thought, that last impersonation of private judgement, leagued against the doctrine inherited from Jesus Christ; and all this in order to tear it from the thought and heart of men and to give it over to the contempt and derision of modern civilisation, in the name of reason and of history.

But suddenly, in the middle of the last century, it was perceived that a certain name was receiving more

acclaim than that of history or of reason, and that a new divinity was revealing itself to the world, before which every head was bowed and whose oracular utterances no one disputed. This divinity was called *Science.* Since then the entire effort of the free-thinkers has been to gain possession of Science, to make people believe that it has taken over to itself all their negations, all their contempt and all their hatred; and finally to oblige science to excommunicate faith. The Press—to-day the only educator of the masses—has been mobilised to support this suggestion and to repeat it every day with millions of voices, in order to drown human intelligence in floods of calumny.

And, as if it were not enough to have all these external perils continually accumulated against Catholicism, lo! within its very fold, among its members, its theologians and its ascetics, tendencies appear from time to time which threaten its equilibrium. Discussions also, such as the theological quarrel in the sixteenth century concerning grace, become exceedingly bitter and run the risk of rending Christ's seamless robe.

Then, one after another or simultaneously, have come Quietism and Jansenism, which are at the opposite poles of thought; and Ontologism, Fideism, Traditionalism, Liberalism, Americanism, and, only yesterday, also Modernism. All these passing currents of thought are formed of a true few ideas mingled with infiltrations of surrounding and contradictory heresies; some of them willing to go slowly, while others, in a state of violent reaction, hold the ephemeral opinions which constitute the spirit of the age.

What a miracle it would be, if the doctrine given to the world by the twelve fishermen of Galilee, confronted one after another, in a constant, desperate, hand-to-hand struggle, with Judaism, Paganism, Heresy,

Rationalism, Free-thought, Science, and indeed all the sciences ; confronted also with the aspirations, tendencies and contradictory views of its own members ; what an unlikely miracle, I repeat, it would be, if this doctrine, having such an unstable equilibrium, subjected throughout the whole vast world for nineteen centuries to such shocks from within and from without, and perpetually dragged in so many different directions, had kept its equilibrium! If, through so many agitations, not an iota had fallen from its dogmas ; nay, if it had actually developed them harmoniously, instead of lessening their number ; and if it still to-day appeared to us, mature indeed, but identical with what it was at the beginning!

And still we have not told all. It has had to defend itself, not only against ideas, but also against force.

Against the force of human passions. Man is a reasonable animal. Reasonable he ought to be ; but an animal he is and is so always. Hence there is always in man a sleeping pagan, ready to awake and to roar, as in the first centuries, as soon as one tries to muzzle his passions. But that is what Catholicism does. It corresponds to all the aspirations of man, but it makes war on all his lusts, and these never forgive it.

Ah! if it only allowed us to take the property of others on the sole condition of hunting up the policeman, and to enjoy the pleasures of the flesh to suit our fancy, even if it were at our own risk ! If it granted these concessions, we would agree to others on our side ; if it would be willing, like Mohammed, to strike out two or three commandments, how ready we should be to obey the others, all the others, and to believe all the mysteries it would like to present!

Henry VIII of England had confuted Luther in a

scholarly theological work, and had obtained from the Pope the title of "Defender of the Faith"; and he would gladly have remained defender of the faith if the Pope had permitted him, in return, to change his wife. But the Pope refused, and Henry VIII, in order to do as he liked and to give himself the right which he in vain requested from the Pope, introduced schism into England.

How many others—whether kings or subjects—have been, like Henry VIII, confronted by that terrible *Non licet!* And in consequence, how many mental sophisms, how many violent hatreds against the doctrine have found, and still find, their origin in that unyielding answer! Humanly considered, what a temptation it must be for the men who have this doctrine in their keeping, to concede some slight attenuations, at least when it is a question of keeping in the Church a king, who has an entire people behind him?[1]

Simultaneously with the force of the passions, the Catholic doctrine has had against it the force of politics. When its enemies have lost their hope of suffocating it in blood, they have relentlessly pursued it in order to compel it to modify its dogmas. The persecutions of the first three centuries were not the greatest danger that it has had to face. It might have adopted for itself the well-known formula: "Deliver me from my friends and I will take care of my enemies." When Cæsar sent

[1] It is known that in order to attract Henry VIII to Protestantism, Melanchthon, in a *Consultation*, dated Aug. 27, 1531, declared that the King, "in order to be able to provide himself with an heir, has not to break his first marriage; but can, in all security for his conscience and reputation, provide for it by polygamy." (*Corp. Reform., Ph. Melanchtonis opera*, edit. C. G. Bretschinder, Vol. II, Halis Saxonum, 1835, column 526.) In connivance with Luther, he repeated this offence in favour of the Landgrave Philip of Hesse and was present at the marriage with the second wife. Cf. Denifle, I, 206-16. On Luther's opinion as to divorce, see Denifle, II, 9700,1-114, etc.; and Janssen, III, 448-90.

its faithful disciples to martyrdom, it " took care " of Cæsar ; but when he declared himself its protector, he became for it still more dangerous. Cæsar has always liked to take, not only what belongs to Cæsar, but at the same time what belongs to God. Ever since the world became Christian, he has always cherished the old dream of holding in his brutal hand men's souls as well as their bodies, and he has never forgiven Christ for having abolished his pontificate and founded a religion which looks beyond national frontiers.

Scarcely had Constantine—the first Christian Emperor—descended into his tomb, when his successors tried to assume again the rôle of pontiff, to convoke Councils and to alter dogmas. The Cæsars of Germany, in the matter of feudal investitures, wanted to arrogate to themselves the right to nominate and discharge the bishops. The kings of France with their Gallicanism and the emperors of Austria with their Josephism aimed at limiting for their advantage the power of the Pope. Napoleon I gave with one hand the Concordat, with the other the Organic Articles ; endeavouring thus to make of the clergy, as Taine well said, a sort of sacred police-force in the service of the emperor, while he was keeping the Pope a prisoner at Fontainebleau in order to make of him his lieutenant.

Others also, who had not themselves rendered any services, but who had the power, have cherished the same dream. Bismarck, for example, with the Kulturkampf, took upon himself the education of the clergy ; the Revolution, with the civil Constitution of the Clergy, undertook to give to the Church a new constitution ; and Freemasonry, which for a century has been the mistress of almost all the governments of Europe, engaged to watch over the destinies of Catholicism with the same solicitude and the same means which Julian the Apostate formerly employed.

First Isaiah, then St. Luke, St. Peter and St. Paul have all prophesied that Christ should rise upon the world as "a sign that shall be contradicted."[1] The prophecy has been magnificently fulfilled. During these nineteen centuries the great movements of history have all been dominated by love of or hatred for Christ, to rid the world of him, to catch him in error or to contradict him, or at the very least to improve upon his work and to adapt it a little more to the taste of the time.

And the world has witnessed the strange spectacle of men and groups of men, advocates of the most contradictory doctrines, yet uniting in hatred against Catholicism only. "The struggle is serious and to the death," declared Edgar Quinet; "It is a question not only of refuting the Papacy, but of destroying it; and not merely of destroying it, but of dishonouring it; not only of dishonouring it, but . . . of choking it in the mud."[2]

"National heresies, modern religions, sects, emancipated beliefs, schools of free thinkers, systems, philosophies, everything that lives and breathes ought to enter into this great and supreme struggle."[3] Everything indeed did enter into this struggle a long time ago, and everything still remains in it; or, when the effort seems to grow less, voices from behind the closed doors of the Lodges, or in the broad daylight of public opinion, never fail to issue the same old command, to form again the solid combination against Catholicism.

The long waves, breaking into foam, will wear away the stoutest cliffs. What man-made doctrine, beaten in all directions by such tempests through so many

[1] Is. viii, 14; Luke ii, 34; 1 Pet. ii, 7; Rom. ix, 33.

[2] *Le livre de l'exilé*, 1857, pp. 473. Quoted by Lecanuet, *L'Église de France sous la 3me République*, Paris, Poussielgue, 1907, p. 30.

[3] *Œuvres* of Ph. de Marnix, Brussels, Van Meenen, 1857-1860. *Introduction générale* by Edgar Quinet, at the head of Vol. I, p. lxii.

centuries, and evermore exposed to the corrosive action of all the ideas, passions and brute forces of mankind, would have been able to endure?

It is true, Catholicism has raised against the waves a great embankment, consisting of the ecumenical Councils and the Pope. Nothing prevails against its doctrine so long as this embankment holds. But, if it be the work of men only, can it hold? Yet, if it does not hold, if there be made in it one single breach, then all is lost. There is no means of filling up the opening. Catholicism professes to be revealed by God. It has no right to be mistaken or to correct itself in regard to doctrine. A single change, a single breach, no matter where, however small, and though it were to be repaired the following day, would be sufficient. It would be then too late, and it would hear, re-echoing like a sneering laugh or an irrevocable verdict, the words which give the death-blow to such doctrines: "You vary; therefore you are false."

Moreover, if Catholicism is a religion of human origin, its ecumenical Councils and its Popes are no longer a protection, they are the greatest danger it can face.

What are ecumenical Councils? A crowd that deliberates. We know what that is: the rendezvous of passionate disputes and also of inevitable compromises, the ambush where simple souls are caught, the intoxication of oratory, hasty improvisations, badly sketched plans, incoherent decisions.

Take, for example, in a single, highly civilised country like France, the orders of the day or the text of laws voted by the same men, in one and the same legislative body, in the space of four years. They have not dealt with dogmas and mysteries, but with material and often

very simple questions. Well, try to make them agree! What then would be your task, if you were comparing one legislature with another, that of to-day with that of ten, fifty or a hundred years ago! And remember that all the decisions of the ecumenical Councils, in spite of all the differences of men, countries and periods of time, through nineteen centuries, *must* agree!

It is true, they are valid only when they have been sanctioned by the Pope. But the Pope is for the Church, if it depends on men alone, the incomparable, inevitable peril, sufficient in itself to open wide the fatal breach through which will rush the flood that carries everything away.

The Pope is a man. He has the infirmities of a man. He is subject to human passions. He has had them. There have been mediocre Popes. There have even been bad ones. The chance of election has raised to this most exalted throne on earth, where vertigo is easy, men who were not commendable in respect of age, talents or virtue. There have been " bad Popes " who have installed their vices in the Holy See.

One must not take literally the history of the Popes, as it was related fifty years ago. That was written by enemies and was only " a conspiracy against the truth." And yet those enemies have not been able to lie as much as they would have liked to. " Davisson, a rampant Protestant, who made the most untrue and scandalous portrait of the Roman Pontiffs ever known, was able to accuse by name only twenty-eight of them," and he blamed the last seven only because they had been hard upon the Protestants.[1] Moreover, recent criticism has rehabilitated almost all of them. Still, in the last analysis, there was Alexander VI, who is inexcusable, and there were Sergius III, John XI, John XII and Benedict IX, who are still under sus-

[1] Tilloy, 363.

picion; let us also add four or five others, over whom floats a shadow of doubt. In all, then, ten at most, whom history cannot, at least as yet, exonerate.[1]

Ten out of 261! And of these seventy-six, more than a third, have been canonised! What dynasty, what family can be compared with them? Not four per cent. of sinners and thirty-four per cent. of saints—that is a percentage which there is little hope that mankind as a whole will ever attain.

But, you will say, these were *Popes*. Well, logically, how does that fact alter our arithmetic? If the Catholic religion is of human origin only, the Popes are merely men, more exposed than the rest to vertigo, because placed in a higher position. And even if Catholicism is divine, and even if Christ did promise assistance to the head of the Church—not inspiration, but only a grace that would preserve him from error, whenever he should announce to the universal Church a definition of doctrine—even if Christ invested him with this beautiful privilege, he certainly never said, and we have no reason to believe, but rather have every reason not to believe, that the Pope is in everything and always protected from the weaknesses of human nature. The promise of Christ and the teaching of the Church is that he is infallible in some rare moments, when he pronounces doctrinal definitions *ex cathedra*, and this privilege does not confer upon him any merit for his person, but a grace of state for his

[1] The almost unique source of our information about these scandals is Luitprand, a man wholly devoted to the German party and full of bitterness against the Romans. Moreover he does not pride himself on his impartiality. He entitles his book *Antapodosis* (*Revenge*). In the judgement of Godefroi Kurth, "if it did not deal with the Popes, it would long ago have ceased to be talked about." (Neyron, in *Dict.*, d'Alès, III, col. 1394.) *The Centuries of Magdeburg*, inaugurated by Flacius in the sixteenth century, do not deserve any more credence than the other work. They are "anticatholic polemics of the lowest kind." (Janssen, VII, 470.)

mission. That he must, in addition, be continually sinless, is something which only his enemies pretend, in order then to have the pleasure of refuting it.

But, with their stories of the moral weaknesses of the Popes, they actually furnish us with a formidable argument for our thesis; for, in fact, whatever may be the number of saints in the line of Pontiffs, there was, in addition to those who remain under suspicion, Alexander VI, who cannot be defended. There were also some with little talent and small capacity; and there have been some of great ambition. And it was to the hands of these men—to the mediocre and the unworthy, to the timid and the ambitious, as well as to the saints and the skilful—that the helm of Peter's bark was intrusted. These men of such different characters were, in turn, the instruments of the Church's unity, and the organ in which were incorporated, at the same time, the directive idea of the doctrinal organism and the regulating centre of the functions of defence.

Now, these men, bearing this formidable burden, have passed through epochs, when the first syllable of many of our modern sciences was unknown, and when a multitude of fantastic ideas were regarded as the latest utterance of science. There was great danger of their linking their decisions with the science of that day, and of thus causing them to be rejected by the science of the future. They also passed through periods when the philosophic reason of man was sluggish and seemed stupid; and through others when the passion for syllogisms dominated men's minds, when they built with feverish haste the most audacious metaphysical systems; and when they, like champions in the lists, passionately attacked or defended an idea. Sometimes the Popes themselves, on their own account, took part in these violent contests. Being men, they must have

felt a longing to cast into the scale in which they had placed their syllogisms, the decisive weight of a Papal definition. So that if, in times of intellectual atrophy and influenced strongly by their entourage, they ran the risk of doubting nothing and seeing no objection, in times of intellectual activity they were in danger of letting themselves be fascinated by their personal conceptions, and, in both cases, of concluding too hastily and hazarding rash decisions.

Rash or not, however, decisions were proclaimed by hundreds, as the Popes selected from the divergent ideas of the time ; incorporating some in the Catholic doctrine and rejecting others, thus binding the future for ever.

And with what tranquil audacity they did this, with what inexplicable certainty that the future would never discover in them anything to find fault with! For example, quite recently, when rationalism was in full swing, and the wave of pride seemed about to carry everything away with it, Gregory XVI and Pius IX pronounced anathema on its excesses. But when the audacity was still greater, it was then that they also reproved the excessive zeal of their friends and condemned the partisans of traditionalism and fideism who, while wishing to defend the faith, humiliated reason too much and did not give to it its just and magnificent share.

What is still more perilous is the danger that, as the centuries follow one another, men's ideas will diverge and that the Pope temporarily in office, if he rejects error with too violent a gesture, will crush the coming Pope beneath the opposite error.

Carried away, indeed, by human passions and fascinated also by one particular idea, the heretics have, in turn, exaggerated the dogma which they originally took for their point of departure, at the expense of the

equilibrium of the whole.[1] Sabellius, a century after Christ, in order to maintain the idea of God, saw in the three Persons only modes or aspects without real distinction. Others succeeded him who, in order to establish firmly the distinction of the Persons, made of them three Gods. The Gnostics in the first century indulged their worst passions; the Montanists, in the next century, preached a cruel code of morals and imposed inhuman austerities. The Albigenses, in the twelfth century, took up again, though with other formulas, the tendencies of the Gnostics; and the Jansenists, in the seventeenth, adopted that of the Montanists. The Iconoclasts, thinking that they were thereby strengthening the worship of God, forbade the veneration of Saints. Others, especially in the East, honoured the Saints to the point of superstition and to that of forgetting God. Pelagius, about the year A.D. 400, in order to magnify man's freedom, denied original sin and the intervention of grace; and a thousand years later, Luther, amplifying excessively the consequences of original sin and the part which the race has played, denied the freedom of the will.

Yet the Popes, pulling in different directions—sometimes centuries removed from one another—must always restore the equilibrium, without which some future pressure in the opposite direction will cause the doctrine itself to crumble into ruin under the force of contradiction.

In other words, in order to save the doctrine, it is necessary that the Popes should never be mistaken

[1] "Heresy could almost be defined as the erection of a part of the truth into a total and exclusive truth and the foundation of a new faith" (Newman, *Oxford Univ. Sermons*, London, Rivington, ed. of 1843, pp. 338 *seq*).

in matters about which men are so often in error. And it is also necessary that they should be in agreement with one another all through the centuries, while a man is rarely in agreement with himself for the course of a single life.

Moreover they must be right, in advance, in opposition to ideas which do not yet exist, and to objections hidden in the mystery of the future. They have also associated with their task Councils, that is to say, deliberative assemblies, coming from all the countries of the world and from all periods of history. It was also necessary to keep identical with itself, throughout its progress, the most complex and formidable doctrine which men have ever had to consider. And this doctrine has not been placed under the protection of ignorance, nor kept apart from discussion, or embalmed motionless in the dead past. On the contrary, it has been put in touch with all the movements of the world, it has been the great leaven of history, it has been given over, among the most civilised peoples of the earth, to all the revolutions of ideas, to all the furies of passion, to all the assaults of brute force.

"No man," it has been said, "is right for fifty years consecutively."[1] Well, then, the 261 Popes cannot have been right for nineteen hundred consecutive years, and the ideas which they have transmitted to the future in successive formulas must have collided with one another in a chaos of contradictions, and in the running cross-fire of numberless and manifest variations.

If not, and if a manifest contradiction has not burst forth either in Catholicism itself during its existence, or in the body of its doctrine; if time, instead of wearing it away, has enriched it; if, among so many causes of death, it has been able to live, that is, to

[1] Lysis, *Vers la démocratie nouvelle*, Paris, Payot, 1917, p. 50.

remain changeless without becoming mummified, and to pass through a series of evolutions without dissolving; then if I do not wish to introduce contradiction into my own mind, if I wish to put logic into my ideas and to harmonise the most evident principles of reason with the most incontestable facts which I can lay my finger on; I must bow before this miracle made up of many miracles, and say: Catholicism is not entirely the work of men; there is behind it this promise of a God: "Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."[1]

[1] Matt. xvi, 18.

Chapter II

CONFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE

VARIATIONS OF PROTESTANTISM

Summary. I.—*General survey of the variations of Protestantism :* (*a*) Luther and the Lutherans ; (*b*) Calvin and the Calvinists ; (*c*) Anglicanism: its founders and their successors ; (*d*) the common idea at the beginning—the authority of Scripture. II.—*The principles and signification of the variations* : (*a*) The principle : the right of private judgement ; (*b*) the signification : the disintegration of religious society, the crumbling of the doctrine into fragments. III.—*The Outcome :* (*a*) There no longer remains in Protestantism a single positive affirmation on which to unite, in order to constitute a religious society ; (*b*) the individual religions cannot formulate one single affirmation possessing a clear, authoritative title ; (*c*) everything is reduced to negation and hatred.—*Conclusions.*

Among the religions which profess to be derived from Christ, we have already eliminated the "Orthodox Church." But there remain confronting each other Catholicism and Protestantism. Which of these is the heir to the divine promise ?

Which ? We shall recognise it by the following miraculous sign : it is the one which has come down through the centuries of its existence intact.

In fact, as we have said, without divine aid, a religion can escape changes and doctrinal variations which convict it of error, only on condition that it is forbidden to think, and even to live, that it be an inert thing, a manikin never to be touched, or an embalmed mummy in a tomb. We have seen that this is not the case with Catholicism.

Nor is it the case with Protestantism either. It was given to the world by men of high culture, Luther and Calvin. It took root among peoples which were very much alive. It has developed in constant contact with the movement of ideas. It has studied, it has debated its doctrines, it has itself been active. It has never been either an inert thing, a manikin, or a mummy. Of course, it has not experienced all the difficulties of Catholicism: it has had no Popes, it has not linked its destiny to the infallibility of a man, it has not encountered the same resistance of passions or the same hatreds, and it has had fifteen centuries less of disputation than has Catholicism. But it has also had its share of insurmountable difficulties; and if it is nothing but a man-made religion, I am sure, in advance, that its four centuries of disputation will have disjointed it, that it will have changed, that it will have left upon the road the scraps and fragments of its doctrine, and, finally, that it will have slid down the path to rationalism and free thought. It is not evolution in identity that its history will show us, but change, dispersion, and decomposition. It is not the progress of a great living organism, but the crawling about of many fragmentary lives contending for the possession of a corpse.

Let us investigate its history. Has it come through the centuries of its existence intact? Has it kept the unity of a living organism? Has it the sign of God?

No, it has the sign of error. It varies; hence it is false.

I

GENERAL SURVEY

It has varied since the beginning, with its founder. Merely to establish his mission, his right to give to men

a new religion, or, if preferred, to "reform," as God's agent, the religion of that time, Luther altered his system fourteen times. They have been counted.[1] Fourteen times in twenty-four years!

Nor was he any more faithful to himself regarding the contents of his doctrine. In a passage written in 1520, he admitted the seven sacraments. Some months later, he denied four of them and declared that it was necessary, "at least for the moment," to regard as revealed baptism, penance and the Eucharist. In 1523, he suppressed penance.[2]

But if he retained baptism, he gradually eliminated its significance, by declaring that it does not efface original sin;[3] and if he retains the Eucharist, he makes it undergo many transformations. Does the substance of the bread remain in the consecrated host or not? Consubstantiation or transubstantiation? His disciples were disputing the question fiercely. For his part, he declared at first that both opinions could be held, that it was not "an article of faith." "But now," he said soon after, "I transubstantiate my opinion." And this was in order to anathematise transubstantiation. "Although this error hitherto had seemed to me of little importance," he writes, "at present,

[1] Döllinger, III, 199-210. Cf. Denifle, *Supplement* to Vol IV, pp. 11-59; III, 489, note 1. Bossuet, *Œuvres*, IV, 424-6.

[2] See the indications of the sources in Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae*, Freiburg, Herder, 1896, Vol. VI, p. 24. This will not prevent Luther from saying that all the faithful, including women and children, can give absolution (Döllinger, III, p. 67. Cf. for the value of this fact, *ibid.* 64-69), just as, after having denied the sacrament of order, he, a simple priest, "consecrates" priests and a bishop (cf. Bossuet, IV, 424, and Janssen, III, 528 *seq*). Better still, the *Petit Catéchisme* of Luther, published in 1529, and revised by him in 1531 and 1542, declares confession to be obligatory for the *simple* (*pro rudioribus*, whom he contrasts with the *prudentioribus*). And the ecclesiastical law, sanctioned by the civil law, fixed at the same time the fees of the confessor. This law was first abolished in Prussia by the Elector Frederick. (See the references in M. d'Herbigny, *Theologica*, II, 205.)

[3] Denifle, III, 6, 11 *seq.*, 37-39 etc.

since we are urged so strongly to accept this error, without the authority of Scripture, I am willing to believe, in spite of the Papists, that the bread and the wine persist." Yet this does not prevent him, twelve years later, from authorising certain Protestant communities in Italy to believe the contrary.[1] And we end here the history of Luther's changes concerning the sacraments bequeathed to us by Christ, not for want of material, but for the sake of brevity.

In regard to the most essential dogmas he goes on in the same way. In 1520, on the subject of his theory of justification, which he presents as the basis of his reform, he wrote: "Hitherto I have looked upon this article as merely a conjecture, a supposition, not as a stable and certain doctrinal truth. But because" the Pope condemns it, and "because furthermore, in the meantime, I have reflected on it profoundly, I now declare that this thesis is a definitive affirmation of the truth."[2]

Not so definitive, however, but that, in regard to the very foundation of his doctrine and kindred questions—faith, original sin, free will, repentance, utility of good works, etc.—he gives in his later works, directly or indirectly, many denials to what he has previously affirmed.[3] This does not embarrass him, however. He changes his dogmas as he changes his humour, and most frequently in order to displease those who contradict him. "While they (the Papists) are exulting over a heresy which they think they have found in me, I want to invent another."[4] For a long time he maintained the elevation of the host in the mass: "It was," he tells us, "to spite Carlstadt"; and if finally he suppressed it, it was "to spite the Papacy."[5]

[1] Concerning all these facts see Bossuet, IV, 430.
[2] Denifle, III, 306.
[3] Denifle, III, 256-61 *et passim*.
[4] *Idem*, II, 156.
[5] Bossuet, IV, 208 *seq*.

In a sermon to his followers, he declared to them: "If you pretend to continue doing things through these deliberations in common, I shall without hesitation contradict myself in all that I have written and taught. I shall retract it all and leave you in the lurch."[1] To the reproach of having falsified a text of Scripture, he gave this peremptory answer: "Sic volo, sic jubeo; sit pro ratione voluntas."[2] (Thus I wish it, thus I order it; let my will serve as the reason.)

Of this superb indifference, with which he cut out his material and sewed it in again, to suit the needs of discussion or the caprices of the moment, both in his own doctrine and in the traditional dogmas, he would have liked to keep a monopoly; but before his very eyes and in spite of his reproofs and threats,[3] his disciples soon began to imitate him, and their successors have done the same so often and so successfully, passing from one variation to another, that to-day not a Lutheran any longer thinks of personally adopting, as a whole, the doctrine of Luther. They take as little interest in his dogmas as they do in his anathemas. All that he prohibited—free will, the necessity of good works, the notion of sin, purgatory, prayers for the dead, indulgences, the sacraments of marriage, of confirmation, of penance, of extreme unction, of order; the hierarchy, monastic institutions, the pomp of liturgical ceremonies, the veneration of images, relics, saints and of the Most Blessed Virgin, etc., etc.—has been brought back again into the faith of this or that Protestant group.

The tendency is less pronounced among the Calvinists, while it is very accentuated among the Anglicans,

[1] Bossuet, IV, 431.
[2] Döllinger, III, 138. Denifle, III, 190; Janssen, VII, 607-615, quote other examples.
[3] Cf. Döllinger, III, 208-30 and Janssen, III, *passim*.

where the ritualists try to revive all of the Catholic traditions, except that of the authority of the Pope.[1]

It is true the Calvinists and Anglicans are only the indirect heirs of Luther. But among his direct heirs, the Lutherans of Germany, a movement is now evident which reminds us of the "Oxford movement." In 1918 there was founded in Berlin the *High Church Union* (*Hochkirchliche Vereinigung*), which publishes its own periodical (*Die Hochkirche*) and holds annual congresses. That of 1921 was inaugurated by a service celebrated with great pomp in the church of the Reformation. The congress of 1922 heard Professor Hemerling affirm that the Catholic doctrine is an intellectual factor, the importance of which German Protestantism could not ignore. This "Union," it is true, hardly exists save in the name of the Association and in the desires of its members; but wishes are expressed, even though diversely received, which demand the re-establishment of the liturgy, of the mass, of confession, of the cult of the Blessed Virgin, of the breviary for pastors, and a third order for the members, etc. . . .[2] all things which once excited the fury of Luther.

[1] Whoever reads the numbers of the *Messenger of the Catholic League Apostleship of Prayer* (London, 27 Finsbury Sq.), will have much difficulty in distinguishing them from similar reviews published by Catholics. The *Tablet* of July 14, 1923, giving an account of the "Anglo-Catholic" congress of London, says that this fraction of the Anglican Church "rejects publicly 99 out of 100 of the accusations formerly made against Rome."

[2] Cf. *Nouv. relig.*, 1922, p. 285; 1923, pp. 90, 184, 207. Adolf Harnack (*Essence of Christianity*) confesses that the Reformation, by suppressing the monastic orders, paid a "heavy ransom" to the needs of the cause, and warmly greets the "institutions of deaconesses" which "restore to the Protestant Churches the treasure which they had formerly rejected, because they could not accept it in the form which it then wore. But how much richer and more varied a development all that might receive!" Hence Harnack himself regrets the gloomy mutilations made by Luther in the body of religious tradition.

But the opposite phenomenon, which consists in denying what Luther affirmed, was from the beginning general, and the Lutherans have not escaped it any more than the others.

Let us, for example, take the essential dogma, justification by faith, the cornerstone of Luther's system, the point which alone, according to him, " constitutes and preserves Christianity " ; " the article " apart from which the Holy Spirit " will not and cannot any more be with us " ; an article " of which one cannot give up or abridge the slightest particle, even if heaven and earth were to fall into ruin " ; an article in regard to which " we must keep ourselves from the least doubt and uncertainty ; otherwise all is lost."[1] Well, have his followers kept themselves " from the least doubt and uncertainty " ?

Already, before the very eyes of Luther himself, among those who had signed the formula in the *Confession of Augsburg*, there were counted, according to Osiander, twenty different opinions. But of these twenty opinions and all those that followed not one was any more to be defended than the other ;[2] and one after another all have been abandoned, taken up again and worked over, so that here and there, where something of this dogma is still retained, men continue to debate it ; and wherever an agreement has been reached in regard to it, it is to deny it.

Here, beyond a doubt, are notable and manifest variations.

In Calvin the recantations of Luther are not found. He has a calmer temperament. Moreover, he has the advantage of writing about matters which have been

[1] Döllinger, III, 5 *seq.*
[2] See specimens of them in Döllinger, III, 265-534.

already stirred up by discussion, and, among which, guided by his logical mind, he can make a safer choice.

Nevertheless, " he changed his opinions for all that, not only in his private writings but also in the public documents which he drew up in the name of all his followers, or which he instilled into their minds."[1] Here is an example, which is sufficient for us: from 1554 to 1557, in three years, he drew up two confessions of faith and approved a third. In each case it was a question of coming to an agreement with different parties, the Swiss, the French and the Germans. The attempt was successful for a time, but the three confessions do not agree with one another.[2]

With his successors Calvin has been no more fortunate than Luther with his.

Besides the failure of the dogma of justification, which he has experienced together with Luther, he has others on his own account, which bear precisely on the very foundation of his ideas, on the dogmas which were peculiarly his own and on his conception of the Church to which he had entrusted their custody.

His essential dogmas were, in addition to his insistence on absolute predestination, based upon an arbitrary decree of God—the certitude of salvation in the elect, the impossibility of the loss of justice and the predestination of the children of Christians to salvation. Objections to these were not slow in making their appearance, especially in Holland. The States General invited the Calvinists of other countries to unite in a synod at Dordrecht (1618). Reinforced with a plentiful supply of anathemas and strong expressions, the synod maintained Calvin's doctrine in its entirety.[3] But the " remonstrants,"

[1] Bossuet, IV, 581. [2] Bossuet, IV, 581-83.

[3] See the text of these definitions and anathemas in E. F. Karl Müller, *Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche*, Leipzig,

whose mouths it was proposed to stop and who were already numerous, spoke only the more loudly. They recruited friends even among the signatories of the synod,[1] and more and more came to them as time went on. A Calvinist theologian of our time[2] has been able to write calmly : " No flower in the dogmatic collections of plants is more faded, withered and blackened " than this doctrine of predestination and the certainty of salvation which Calvin made the foundation of his religious conception.

But he had confided his religious conception to a Church, or rather to a theocracy. He had founded *a City of the Church*, " in order to display to the gaze of the Christian world the total, irremediable and profound corruption of human nature."[3] Then came Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who preached the original fundamental and total goodness of human nature. Geneva had already strewn its path with a good share of Calvin's dogmas, but, this time, it kicked over the traces and, in 1762, caused the *Contrat social* and *Emile* to be burned. Thirty years later, it repented, rehabilitated J. J. Rousseau by a solemn vote, erected a monument to him, and, according to Seippel, made of the *Contrat Social* " the Koran of Calvinistic democracy."[4]

Since then, " the spiritual reign of Jean-Jacques " has solidified itself at the expense of that of Calvin. " Calvin would not recognise his city," said Voltaire in his day. Less and less is it recognisable, as the years

Böhme, 1903, pp. 843-61. Bossuet in the *Variations*, Book XIV (*Œuvres*, IV, 687-703), sums up the history of the synod and comments on the decisions.

[1] Bossuet, *Ibid.* 703-705.

[2] E. Doumergue, *Vie de Calvin*, 1910, Vol. IV, p. 412. Quoted by Denifle, III, 429. See also the vigorous criticism of *La prédestination d'après Calvin* which Henri Bois, professor of Protestant theology, has made in the *Rev. métaph. et morale*, Sept.-Dec., 1918, pp. 669-705.

[3] G. Goyau, *Une Ville-Église*, I, 234. [4] *Ibid.*, I, 201-205, 282.

pass. In 1831, the Genevese Jacques-Caton Chenevière, in his *Essais de Protestante Théologie*, made many affirmations like the following: "Calvinism is in opposition to the Gospel"; it is, "of all the forms which religion has ever taken in man's conscience, the most repulsive, and in modern times the most hateful."[1] In 1909, another professor of theology in Geneva, M. Montet, wrote: "Of all the countries which were transformed by the reformation of Calvin, Geneva is to-day the least Calvinistic centre in the world."[2]

As to Rousseau, his star is always in the ascendant. In 1912, his centenary was celebrated with an almost unanimous enthusiasm, and "Pastor Genequand was officially deputed by his colleagues to compose a Church tract, which was to be a public homage to Rousseau."[3] It was so. In it, in spite of some reserves, was extolled the man who "spoke well of Christianity," and who, "according to his capacity and within his limits, in all sincerity *bore witness to the truth*." In his life was discovered "the accent of genuine piety," and there was quoted, with a tacit approval, apparent in the context, the following phrase of another Protestant: "Rousseau is truly the only great religious voice of the eighteenth century, the only great Christian words which that century heard were his."[4] In short, "if it were in the nature of the Protestant

[1] *Essais théologiques*, Geneva, 1831, Vol. II, 499-501, quoted by Goyau, II, 72.

[2] Cited *ibid.*, II, 212. The Pastor Chantre wrote in the *Alliance libérale* of Nov. 5, 1882: "By an irresistible movement the doctrines which were proclaimed in the sixteenth century as the truth, and the absolute and divine truth, are to-day rapidly disappearing. . . . We were recently told of the naïve astonishment of a Calvinistic pastor, who had come from the heart of Germany to Geneva for the purpose of enjoying himself with his colleagues, and who returned very sad, not having been able to find, even at Geneva, a single really Calvinistic Calvinist."

[3] Goyau, II, 213.

[4] Genequand, *J. J. Rousseau*, published by the National Church of Geneva, ed. Atar, pp. 25-28.

church to recognise Fathers of the Church, it might be said that in Geneva Calvin has almost fallen from this rôle and that Rousseau is in a fair way to assume it."[1]

From Calvin to Rousseau is again a variation made up of a multitude of others, sufficiently large to be immediately conspicuous.

Anglicanism, as we have seen, bears the same mark ; for it is impossible to define its substance without mentioning the successive contradictory contributions of which it is composed. From Henry VIII to William III, seven kings in turn modified its doctrine in its essential elements.[2]

We have said, in general, that the *Thirty-nine Articles* comprise to-day the official doctrine of Anglicanism, and the *Prayer Book* its liturgy. But the *Prayer Book* was presented by Edward VI under two successive and different forms ; [3] and the *Thirty-nine Articles* replaced the *Forty-two Articles* imposed ten years earlier and inspired by another doctrine.[4]

And even though the doctrine and the liturgy remain congealed in the texts of English laws, they change in the faith and practice of succeeding generations. For example, on July 1, 1920, a congress of ritualists was opened in London. It was inaugurated in the presence

[1] Goyau, II, 214.

[2] See previous remarks, p. 60, and for details Bossuet, *Hist. des variations*, Books VII and X.

[3] See *Diction.* of d'Alès., Vol. III, col. 1165-77.

[4] The Thirty-nine Articles are especially inspired by Calvinism. The Forty-two Articles drawn up by Cranmer were Lutheran in origin : " The Lutheran confession of faith, especially the confession of Augsburg, were the chief sources to which Cranmer was indebted for the Articles of 1552." (E. Harold Browne, Prof. of Theology at Cambridge, *An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, London, Parker, 2nd edit., 1854, pp. 6 *seq.*)

of several thousand people " by the celebration of mass, followed by a solemn procession. In this were seen several Anglican bishops with crozier and mitre, as well as abbots of ritualistic monasteries."[1]

In the preceding year (October 1919), in the congress of the Anglican Church, the Rev. Francis Underhill[2] avowed that the ritualists, while remaining " loyal members of the Church of England," had " added to or taken from the *Prayer Book*." In fact, in spite of the *Prayer Book*, to-day in thousands of Anglican churches, confessions are made, mass is celebrated, the host is reserved in the tabernacle and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament is given, for all of which things Elizabeth formerly sent people to death.

The twenty-second of the Thirty-nine Articles proscribes forever " purgatory, the veneration of images and the relics of saints, as a superstition . . . . in disagreement with the word of God." But this has not prevented important groups of the faithful from bringing back again these devotions of former times, nor has it even prevented the Anglican bishops, assembled at Lambeth Palace in 1920, from going in a body to Canterbury, there to venerate the relics of St. Thomas à Becket.[3]

And the Thirty-nine Articles themselves are still imposed in their entirety and the clergy are required to take an oath to keep them in force. But " in the month of May, 1840, there arose a debate in the House of Lords about the Thirty-nine Articles, in

[1] J. Boubée, *Messager du Cœur de Jésus*, Nov. 1920, p. 613.

[2] Quoted by G. Coolen, *La dispute du Saint-Sacrement dans l'Église anglicane, Rev. Apol.*, Dec. 1, 1920, p. 199.

[3] See the *Nouvelles religieuses*, Oct. 15, 1920, p. 480. Thomas à Becket was murdered because he refused to yield to Henry II the supremacy of the Pope in matters of religion. Now the Anglican bishops are the successors and heirs of those who, contrary to the martyr, accepted the royal supremacy. Their pilgrimage assuredly does more honour to their breadth of mind than to their logic.

which the question was asked whether the clergy themselves believed in the truth of these articles to which they subscribed. To this question one of the bishops replied that all the members of the clergy believed in them; another declared that no one believed in them; while a third stated that it was impossible to accept them; upon which a fourth added that all reasonable men subscribed to them *in general*, but reserved to themselves the right to believe of them only what seemed to them proper.[1]

In all these transformations we may well ask where the real Anglican doctrine is to be found. One may be sure, however, that a doctrine which, by reason of its variations, remains undiscernible, is not a true doctrine.

The idea common to all the founders of Protestantism was the exclusive authority of Scripture. That was for them the foundation of all religious doctrine and the only source of faith. But their successors have discarded this foundation in great numbers, and have dried up the source.

They have exhausted it, first, for their need of it in polemics. "The Bible, in fact, became the book

[1] J. Alzog. *Hist. Univers. de l'Église*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1855, Vol. III, p. 580 note. The official Church of Scotland has also had its variations. In 1560, it abolished the episcopate as an order, but left it to the government of the Church. In 1581, the Scottish Parliament modified the ecclesiastical constitution; in 1590, Presbyterianism was introduced; in 1610, the episcopate was re-established with all its former rights. After new interventions on the part of James VI and Charles I, which gave rise to violent disturbances, it came back to the Presbyterian form in 1646 by means of the "Westminster Confession of Faith." Charles II again compelled a return to the Episcopalian Church; but Presbyterianism finally triumphed by the treaty of union between England and Scotland in 1707, which obliges every new sovereign of the British Isles to swear to maintain the Church of Scotland in the form then established.

in which the Protestant sought a sanction for his favourite dogmas, and found it there because he wanted to find it there. . . . . In exegesis thus understood, Luther was a model which has never been surpassed."[1] But he had followers ; and, already at the end of the sixteenth century, a Lutheran could write : " For the Calvinists Holy Scripture is a bag-pipe which they tune to the right pitch, adapt music for it and sing to suit themselves." At the same time the Calvinists were saying as much of the Lutherans, only in other and harsher words.[2]

Both of them, and the Anglicans as well, from having seen the Bible texts distorted in order to make them harmonise with all sorts of caprices, have come to attach less and less importance to them. Modern Protestant theologians, for the most part, deny all divine authority to Scripture.[3] It is in their theological Faculties that the weapons against the Bible are almost exclusively furbished. Renan, who so scandalised Christian souls by his *Life of Jesus*, only popularised the theories of German theologians by a process of sweetening them.

Here, then, in a brief résumé, is what the Protestants have done with the heritage of their founders : The dogmas which those founders branded with anathemas, some of their disciples have made articles of faith ; and the dogmas bequeathed to them as articles of faith the great majority deny. Truly here are manifest variations in abundance.

[1] Janssen, VII, 478.

[2] See Janssen, V, 518.

[3] The most respectful of them, such as the Protestant professor of theology, Henri Bois (*Rev. Métaph. et Morale*, Luther Centenary number, Sept.-Dec., 1918, p. 704), consider it a " document of Christian experience and not an infallible code."

II

THE PRINCIPLE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIATIONS

Error, says Balmès, is "a wanderer." It travels constantly because it cannot remain in one place, feeling ill at ease amid the realities which jostle it about. It changes its position, escapes by tortuous paths and assumes different masks, in order to escape logic.

No system has travelled so much as Protestantism. It is the Wandering Jew of doctrine. Bossuet wrote the *History of the Variations of Protestant Churches*, a fantastic history, but nevertheless real history; and modern criticism, after having studied it with a magnifying glass, has had to conclude that, in spite of its great mass of facts and quotations, it is of "an almost irreproachable exactitude."[1] And in how many volumes would that history have to be prolonged, if it were continued down to our own time!

Yes, in respect to variations, Protestantism holds the record, and for the reason that it has had to confront the light and before the light it has never been able to cut a truthful figure.

But it has, besides, in order to construct its doctrine, adopted a principle, which has remained in its flesh and was fated gradually to devour it. This was the right of private judgement.

Luther did not come to this without much shuffling; but in the embarrassing necessity in which he found himself of justifying his mission, and his capricious commentaries on Scripture, his perpetual changes and his revolt against the Catholic Church, it was essential

[1] Alfred Rebelliau, *Bossuet historien du protestantisme. Étude sur l'Histoire des Variations.* Paris, Hachette, 1891, Preface, p. viii.

to find something, in order not to appeal continually to his *sic volo, sic jubeo*. . . . . Hence the right which he proclaimed for every one to interpret Scripture as he liked. " Every one," he said, " is a judge, with full power to judge those who wish to teach him."[1] He emphasised one fixed point: namely, the articles of faith, and above all faith in his doctrine of justification; " for," he said, " my faith is the judge, through which I must say: This doctrine is good and true and that is bad and false."[2] Consequently, he was not content with torturing and falsifying texts of Scripture,[3] but put aside the writings of those who annoyed him, like the Epistle of St. James (a " veritable epistle of straw ") and the Epistle to the Hebrews.[4]

" Every one is a judge having full power "! It was not forgotten. The success was prodigious. " God be praised! " cried Luther; " every one knows to-day that he must protect himself from the teaching of men, as from the devil in person."[5] But they protected themselves also from the teaching of Luther, and it was not always his dogma of justification by faith that served as a touchstone and criterion for the interpretation of Scripture. All sorts of whimsical fantasies

[1] Döllinger, III, 314.

[2] And he continues: " Also all those lie who say that judgement of Scripture is the prerogative of the Pope. Allow me, Sire Pope! I, for my part, say: Whoever has faith is a man of intelligence and he judges all things and is judged by no one. Even to a poor servant-girl in a mill or to a child nine years old, if they possess faith and judge according to the Gospel, the Pope owes obedience, and if he is a true Christian, he will put himself beneath their feet. And in the same way all the universities and learned men and sophists ought to act." (Döllinger, III, 216 *seq.*)

[3] Denifle, throughout his four Vols., cites many examples of this conduct.

[4] Cf. Janssen, II, 218 *seq*, VII, 494 *seq*. Another example: In reference to a text of St. Paul which bothered him, he wrote: Istam particulam intelligo esse *ironiam*. (*Comm. ad Galat*, II, 6.) With the same recklessness he gets rid of Deut. xxx, 11-14 (*Opera var. arg.*, VII, 224 *seq*).

[5] Döllinger, III, 218.

gave themselves full liberty. Luther then sang to another tune. He wanted to put on the brakes, he chided, he railed, he thundered anathemas, he threatened to have recourse to the civil power and to give over to it the policing of consciences.[1] Too late!

Calvin and the English kings had the same experience. Everywhere the disciples, despising the oracles of their founders, followed their example and surpassed it. Free interpretation extended itself at the same time not only to the Scriptures, but also to the " articles of faith " which were to inspire and to circumscribe it, and to all religious matters, and became *private judgement* only. So that this practice, which the founders of Protestantism had made use of in order to gain disciples, but which they would have liked subsequently to keep for their exclusive use, by a singular irony has turned out, as we shall see, to be the *only* part of their heritage which all Protestants have guarded jointly with jealous care. But it is precisely this part of their heritage which has served to injure the rest of it, and that rest was their religion.

Private judgement consists in rejecting all didactic authority and in admitting only what the individual reason teaches us. To apply it to revelation, is to say that it is the prerogative of man to accept, reject, correct and alter, as he likes, the testimony of God!

But private judgement is not a doctrine and implies none. It permits all doctrines and it threatens all. It is a principle and a method: an individualistic method: each one for himself!—and a principle of negation: Away with what displeases me! It does not conserve, it scatters. It does not unite, it disintegrates. There had inevitably to result from it what has resulted, namely, an endless multiplication

[1] Döllinger, III, 217-222. Cf. Janssen, III, 769 *seq.*; IV, 2-7; VII, 495 *seq.* etc.

of opposing sects and a precipitous descent from one negation to another, towards scepticism, rationalism and free thought.

The multiplication of sects! That was not the dream of the founders. They well knew that Christ had desired one single fold, and each of them asked for nothing better than to be the pastor of it. "We teach," declares the Augsburg Confession, "that there is one holy Church, which is to exist eternally."[1] The Calvinistic Confession of Faith declares, for its part, "that no one ought to withdraw within himself and be content with his own person; but that all together should strive to guard and to maintain the unity of the Church, submitting to a form of instruction common to all."[2] And during the first years of the Reformation, all the countless confessions of faith, which traverse in succession the "reformed" nations—Germany, Switzerland, France, England, Scotland, Belgium, and Norway—vie with one another in repeating the same phrases about the need of unity.[3]

But individualism opposes itself to unity. Private judgement disintegrates, separates and disperses. In Protestantism from the very beginning sects have multiplied. Many of them have disappeared, through want of adherents, or have vanished on account of their many transformations; but new ones have arisen from day to day, and there remain always

[1] *Corp. Reformat.*, XXVI, col. 276. It is Art. 7 of the *Confession*, and the text adds: *Est autem Ecclesia congregatio Sanctorum, in qua Evangelium recte docetur et recte administrantur sacramenta.* It is necessary, therefore, first, not to suppress the sacraments and to deny the Gospel.

[2] Art. 22 of the Confession of the French Churches (in *Corp. Reform.*, Calvini *opera*, IX, col. 748).

[3] See Bossuet, *Variat.*, Book XV (*Œuvres*, IV, 720-26).

enough of them to show how " the unity of the Church has been guarded and maintained."

The sects, or—to use the more respectful English term—the *denominations* of modern Protestantism defy all enumeration.

In France, the " Protestant Federation " comprises nine distinct groups, among which are distributed about 850 pastors[1] and 650,000 members.

In Germany there were, before the War, twenty-six " evangelical Churches."[2] But on the frontiers of or apart from the official Churches there abound the most incongruous " communities " : Moravian Brethren, Mennonites, Baptists, Methodists, Apostolics, etc.[3]

In England, the denominations are counted by hundreds.[4] The nine counties of Ulster alone, out of a total of 891,000 Protestants, possess to-day 316 " different religions." [5]

As for the United States, the *World Almanack* of 1921 enumerates 184.[6] Some of these are important, but are divided into different denominations : seventeen Methodist varieties, twelve Presbyterian, fifteen Baptist, twenty-five Lutheran, etc.[7] Some are very

[1] Cf. *Nouv. Relig.*, 1921, No. 2, p. 35 ; and 1922, No. 12, p. 279.

[2] G. Goyau, *L'Allemagne religieuse. Le Protestantisme*, Paris, Perrin, 6th edit., 1908, p. 298.

[3] Cf. *Ibid.*, 334-44.

[4] Cf. *Catholic Encyclop.*, Art. *Nonconformists. Whitaker's* no longer gives the list. It could be still seen in that of 1897, p. 253. The total was 293.

[5] According to the Review *America*, Feb. 12, 1921, a carefully documented article by A. Hilliard Atteridge, having for its title, *The Trouble about Ulster.*

[6] According to the same source, there are in the United States 41,926,853 Protestants affiliated to a religious denomination. About 46 millions escape this statistic, and among them a certain number no doubt are connected with other groups.

[7] According to the *World* for 1911. It is the same in England, with this difference, that the statistic is more difficult to determine because of the repeated regroupings which take place. Thus the " United Methodist Free Church " has recently grouped three different

small: the "General Six Principle Baptists," with six churches and 456 members; the "Two Seed in the Spirit Predestination Baptists," with thirty-six churches and 679 members; the "Church of Daniel's Band," with five churches and 392 members; the "Apostolic Church" with two churches and 112 members; the "Church Transcendent" with ninety-one members; the "Primitive Friends" with sixty,[1] and no doubt others so diminutive, or so little religious in appearance, as easily to escape observation and to have no record in the statistics.

But unity of "denomination" does not imply unity of doctrine. The name under which these churches group themselves has often only a social reason, covering the most diverse beliefs. This is the case with the Established Church of England, "the comprehensive Church," in which are sheltered, from High Church to Low Church, all sorts of most incongruous opinions. It is also the case with the national Church of Geneva, the "multitudinist Church," which regards as its members all the Genevese "who consider themselves as forming part of it."[2]

But these two churches retain at least social unity, even if they have not doctrinal unity, and each is subject to one administration only. It often happens that unity does not even go so far as that. Thus in England and the United States, the statistics

denominations, and in 1907 fused itself with two others to form the "United Methodist Church." *Whitaker's Almanack* for 1921 cites only "the most numerous and most influential." To those which we have just named it adds four others. In the case of the Presbyterians, it points out ten groups of dissenters outside of the official Church of Scotland.

[1] *World* for 1921. The Protestant *Missions* soon become as rich in denominations as are the civilised countries. A Catholic missionary in Madagascar counted there, he tells us, fifty-four denominations.

[2] Decision of the *Constituante*, June 10, 1908. Cf. Goyau, *Ville Église*, II, 196, 291-306.

include the "Congregationalists" under two denominations; but, as a matter of fact, the committees which direct them have for their sole task to coordinate their efforts, without enjoying any sort of jurisdiction, each local group forming an autonomous Church, which proclaims its inalienable right to self-government. On this account, in order to make a correct list of the separate churches, it would be necessary to increase considerably the figures furnished by the statistics.[1]

This dispersion, and the innumerable variations to which it bears witness, is a source of grief to many Protestants, as it was to the founders. In proof of this we see continual and unrestrained attempts at union; but a certain number resign themselves, and, bearing up bravely against the misfortune, congratulate themselves that it is so.

"In the Protestant Church," declares with satisfaction Pastor Fulliquet,[2] "dogma is subject to a perpetual revision." Adolf Harnack, the great Berlin theologian, is no less satisfied. "If the objection is made to us," he says: "You are divided; you have as many doctrines as members; we shall reply: That is true, but we do not wish that it should be

[1] For example, *Whitaker's Almanack* for 1921 classes all the English Congregationalists under two rubrics: "Congregational Union of England and Wales" and "Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion." Now the former denomination includes 4,701 communities, and the latter forty. That makes therefore two "denominations" for the statistics, but in reality 4,742 independent religious groups.

[2] Fulliquet, *Précis d'histoire des dogmes*, Geneva, 1913, p. 215. Quoted by Goyau, *Ville Église*, II, 199. We are far distant from Luther, who said in the eighteenth of the forty "Propositions against the whole synagogue of Satan and all the gates of hell" (*Werke*, Weimar, XXX, 421): "The articles of faith . . . cannot be modified." And elsewhere (*Werke*, XVIII, 606): "The Holy Spirit is not sceptical; He does not inscribe doubts or opinions in our hearts, but affirmations, more categorical and more immovable than all experience and all life."

otherwise. On the contrary, we desire still more liberty, still more individualism in faith or in its expression."[1] Auguste Sabatier finds a way to outdo him. " This revision," he says, " and this criticism of dogmatic traditions, begun in the sixteenth century, have never since then ceased and could never cease, without Protestantism itself ceasing to exist and without apologising to Catholicism, which it had wished to replace. . . . . To speak of an unchangeable and infallible dogma in Protestantism is nonsense. . . . . No Protestant Church claims, and none can claim, to be infallible, without denying its own character."[2] So be it! Moreover, it is very well said. Only, in that case, no Protestant Church should claim to be revealed, and to be the messenger commissioned to bring to men the word of God.[3] That, at least, must be " unchangeable," since it is " infallible."

The innumerable and manifest variations of Protestantism are, therefore, confessed or proclaimed today by the Protestants, as they are also established by history ; and private judgement is a guarantee to us that this history will continue. Protestantism has not ended its " travels."

But whither is it going ? What is the meaning of its transmigrations ? What then is this religion ?

[1] Harnack, *Essence of Christianity*, 328.

[2] Aug. Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion*, already quoted, pp. 286 and 251.

[3] Aug. Sabatier is one of those who admit this conclusion : cf. *ibid.* and 285 *et passim.* H. Mallock (in *Is Life Worth Living ?* p. 229) well remarks : " Any supernatural religion that renounces its claim to this (infallibility), it is clear, can profess to be a semi-revelation only. . . . " Protestantism " is at last beginning to exhibit to us the true result of the denial of infallibility to a religion that professes to be supernatural. We are at last beginning to see in it neither the purifier of a corrupted revelation, nor the corrupter of a pure revelation, but the practical denier of all revelation whatsoever."

Under so many different masks, what is its real face? Where is this traveller, after so many centuries of wandering, finally to pitch its tent? After all, what is it that Protestantism asks us to believe? What doctrine can the Protestants unite upon, to form a religion?

This question has tormented them from the beginning, but they have not yet been able to answer it.

It is not because they have not tried to. The number of Protestant *Credos*, which they call Confessions of faith, is formidable. In the first half-century of the Reformation, they have had the Augsburg Confession, declared, interpreted, retouched by the articles of Smalkalde, by those of Saxony, by the explanations of Wittenberg, by the "Abridgement of the articles," by the "Explanations repeated," etc., etc.[1] But at the same time, or soon after, and always contending among themselves, came the Confession of Strasbourg, that of Bâle, a second of Bâle, that of Frankfort, that of Naümburg, those of France, England, Scotland, the five Swiss Confessions, that of the Elector Palatine, that of Dordrecht, that of Worms, that of Poland, that of Czenger, that of Sandomir, that of the Bohemians, etc., etc.; for no one could tabulate them all.[2] And all these were commented on

[1] Vols., XXVI, XXVII and XXVIII of the *Corp. Reformat.* are almost exclusively devoted to the "Augsburg Confession" and only to what refers to the work of Melanchthon. In Vol. XXVI, col. 338, the editor observes that "scarcely was the first edition published, when Melanchthon (its author) retracted the aforesaid Confession." And, among the different formulas, it is a question of one called *Invariata*! Then, from the same pen, came the *Variata*, *Apologia prior*, *Apologia altera*, etc.

[2] Let us mention at least the "Formulary of Concord," signed June 25, 1580, for the fiftieth anniversary of the "Augsburg Confession." It was called "the last miracle before the last judgement" (See Janssen, IV, 536).

Alas! Already in the month of November, the Danish ambassador could write: "After its publication, everybody made fun of it."

anew, attacked, replied to, worked over, interlarded with anathemas, which are answered or, more cutting still, not answered; some judging others of the same faith who excommunicate them, and rejecting others who claim to have the same faith;[1] better still, the Calvinists admitting to their communion the Lutherans whom they consider heretics; and so on without end.[2]

Luther already complained that there were "almost as many systems as there were preachers."[3] "It is of great importance," wrote Calvin to Melanchthon, "that the coming centuries should have no suspicion of the divisions which exist among us; for it is ridiculous, beyond the power of the imagination to conceive, that after having broken with everyone else we should have had so little agreement among ourselves ever since the beginning of our Reformation."[4]

The sequel has been like the start. The Confessions of faith have continued to prevail. "The liking for Confessions of faith," wrote Pastor Athanase Coquerel, "has become among some of our co-religionists a veritable mania, and it has been wittily said that, if three of those Protestants should find themselves refugees on a desert island, the first would hasten to draw from his pocket a confession of faith and would try to come to an understanding with the second about it, in order to impose his Confession of faith

(*Ibid.*, 537.) But very soon, people became angry and, in 1607, the Calvinist, Rodolph Hospinian, gave an account of its history under the precise title of *Concordia discors*. In a word, "the new theology became a war of all against all" (Janssen, VII, 447).

[1] See the curious example cited by William Palmer, then Professor of Anglican theology at Oxford, *A Treatise on the Church of Christ*, London, Rivingtons, 1838, Vol. I, pp. 128 *seq.*

[2] Cf. Bossuet, III, 39; IV, 411 *seq.*, 448 *seq.*, 474-76, 553-58, 560, 581, 606, 666, 706, etc.

[3] Döllinger, III, 210.

[4] In Bossuet, *Variations*, Book II. (*Œuvres*, IV, 446.)

on the third."[1] Yes, but how long would the two confederates themselves remain in agreement?

What has been long certain is that the harmony will never be complete, and that two Protestants who think for themselves will never have the same faith in all respects.

Weary of excommunicating one another, they therefore conceived, about the middle of the seventeenth century, the brilliant idea of making a distinction between the dogmas. Thenceforth there were accessory dogmas, which every one could believe or deny, according to his liking; and necessary dogmas, "fundamental articles," which every Christian had to believe under penalty of losing his salvation.

This system had an enormous vogue.[2] It was convenient for softening down undeniable contradictions and for putting a stop, as it seemed, to the continual crumbling of the Church into new sects.

But, in practice, where were they to draw the line of demarcation? What are the "fundamental articles"? Which are the unimportant ones? Who shall decide? It is here that the difficulties, the disputes and the dispersion again began. Pierre Jurieu demanded all the truths clearly affirmed in Scripture.[3] But which were the texts that are so clear? Then, experience quickly showed that, if the various parties wished to come to an understanding, they must not ask too much, and it was a matter of who would offer the articles at

[1] A. Coquerel, Jr. *La conscience et la foi*, Paris, Germer-Baillère 1867, p. 156.

[2] But Luther would not have admitted it. He reproved Erasmus for distinguishing between dogmas, as if some were necessary and others not; and said to him disdainfully: "Either you are jesting or you are practising your rhetoric." (*Werke*, XVIII, 606.)

[3] Jurieu, moreover, was often changeable in regard to these, as well as in other things. See Bossuet, III, *Avertissement aux protestants*, especially XXI (*Œuvres*, V, 63); and Rebelliau, *Bossuet historien du protestantisme.*

the lowest price. Some, at that time, regarded the Apostles' Creed as fundamental ;[1] others, the Lord's Prayer ; others, both of them ; others still, neither one nor the other, replacing them, just as they fancied, with something else ; one with the first two verses of the Epistle to the Hebrews ;[2] another with Baptism and the Eucharist ; some with the principal dogmas of Luther and Calvin ; while others denied them ;[3] and so on ad infinitum. Amsdorf[4] demanded four : the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, the free remission of sins, and the identification of Antichrist with the Pope. Daillé, a Frenchman, proceeded by general groups. He excluded Catholics from his church, but admitted Lutherans, who unfortunately, however, did not want to have anything to do with Daillé.[5] The Arminians received the Calvinists, but these rejected the Arminians. M. Guizot,[6] in the last century, proposed to hold to the following dogmas : The Creation, Providence, original sin, the Incarnation and Redemption. But some zealous pastors no longer wished to have original sin ;[7] others found that the dogmas of the

[1] But many did not want it, " because the Papists also could put their signature to that." (See Mgr. Baudrillart, in the *Diction. théol.* of Vacant. I, col. 2026.) [2] Cf. Palmer, *Treatise on the Church*, 125.

[3] Thus Calovius in his *Commentary on the Augsburg Confession, dedicatory epistle*, demands that the following be recognised as " fundamental articles "—that God is not the author of sin, that God has not decreed absolutely the damnation of any one, etc., which is the contrary of the teaching of Calvin. While Philipp Eibracht (*Epanorthomata*, chap. 14) demands free will, the co-operation of free will with grace, etc., which Luther had forbidden.

[4] In his *Preface* to the *Works* of Luther.

[5] Jean Daillé, *Apologie des Églises réformées*, Charenton, Samuel Petit, 1663, pp. 31-47.

[6] *Méditations sur l'essence de la religion chrétienne*, 2nd Meditation. Cf. Paul Janet, *Problèmes du XIXe siecle*, Paris, Michel Levy, 1873, p. 466.

[7] M. Guizot himself, having to draw up a formulary to serve as a declaration " of principles " at a pastoral conference, at Paris, did not dare to mention original sin, about which the pastor A. Coquerel teases him (*La conscience et la foi*, p. 157.)

Incarnation and Redemption were no longer "popular"[1] and not even useful, if there is no original sin. Hence all the articles could be at last reduced to two: Creation and Providence. But others could with difficulty believe in Providence;[2] and some even had scruples about admitting the creation.

So it was necessary to commence all over again.

And in the course of these recommencements the dogmas become segregated more and more. The tendency of the variations becomes ever clearer. Private judgement is seen to be an inclined plane down which, from one negation to another, Protestantism rolls towards rationalism and free thought, and even lower still, to doubt and the negation of everything.

In philosophy, in science and in the professions private judgement is applied. It is a question in these of human truths, and it is the duty of men to seek for them with their reason only; although, to reach their goal, they ought not to eliminate entirely tradition and teaching, and above all not to volatilise, in the fantasies of private judgement, the very data of the problem which is to be solved. They are not bound to be infallible, and they are sometimes mistaken; but the results which they reach by experiment show them where the true route lies; and their immediate interest urges them to enrich instead of squandering the heritage of the past.

It is not the same with a religious doctrine. The richer that is, the more truths it imposes on our belief and the more sacrifices it compels us to consent to. The prize is worth the effort, certainly, for our nobility, our destiny and the satisfaction of all our aspirations are at stake.

[1] The pastor Chantre in the *Alliance libérale*, Nov. 5, 1882.

[2] For example, Eugène Ménégoz, *Le salut par la foi*, Paris, Fischbacher, 1913, pp. 188-92; Wilfred Monod, *Aux croyants et aux athées*, etc.

But these results are attainable only in a distant future, while present experience does not reveal them. So, when men think that they have the doctrine wholly in their power, the temptation is great for them to diminish rather than to increase it, in order to present the end in view at the most favourable price. Should this ill-assorted doctrine break down completely, private judgement quickly relieves it of its most cumbersome features. For it seems probable that its future " travels " will be easier, if the doctrinal luggage is made lighter, and that success in preserving the equilibrium will be perhaps achieved, now that there are fewer ideas to keep united. The Protestants, at first, wanted a great bundle of dogmas ; but they soon reduced their claims, and finally found they could get along very well with only one.

Yes, they actually come down to *one*! It is impossible to be more accommodating than they are, or to come nearer to rationalism, which wants no dogmas. However, they still demand *one*, but no more. But will that " one " be able to keep a stable equilibrium ? Can Protestantism stop itself upon the perilous descent ? Can it avoid taking the last step and slipping down still further, to the end ?

Alas! they ask for only one dogma, but which one ? Who is to make the choice and be responsible for it ? How can it be authenticated by God ?

Chillingworth demanded faith in the truth of Scripture.[1] Crocius said : Believe in the remission of sins through the merits of Jesus Christ ; " if this article holds, the Church will stand erect and salvation will be assured."[2] Locke found a way to simplify the code

[1] *La religion protestante, une voye sûre au salut.* Edit. française, Amsterdam, 1730, Vol. II, pp. 54, 288, 326.

[2] Jean Crocius, *Anti-Becanus*, Cassel, 1643, Vol. I, Controv. 3, sect. 9, note 21.

still further: "Jesus is the Messiah," he said;[1] that contains everything. But what is the Messiah?

One thing, at least, is evident. It is that even the theory of the fundamental articles has not been sufficient to prevent the descent of doctrine and the crumbling of the Christian revelation, any more than it has sufficed to harmonise the Protestants themselves. Chillingworth, in a treatise which his friends proclaimed to be "the impregnable citadel of Protestantism" made indeed one despairing attempt, by saying that the fundamental articles could not be the same for all; a fact which would explain so many divergencies. But he finally confessed that it is impossible to say exactly what the fundamental articles are.[2]

This was already in 1659 also the opinion of the celebrated Spanheim,[3] who, after a long study of the question, concluded thus: Harmony in that respect "would be no doubt desirable, but it is necessary to renounce for ever all hope of such a thing."[4] Subsequent facts have proved him right.

But through losing all hope of coming to an agreement, Protestants have finally found that harmony is undesirable or, at least, useless. "More and more," lately wrote the Protestant professor of theology, E. Doumergue,[5] "we hear it said that there are no essential fundamental points. . . . . Then, for those whose common sense can admit only one religion, the fact that a Church has no doctrine brings doubt, hesitation, disquietude and fear."

But to what makes some uneasy, others quickly

[1] Cf. Palmer, *op. cit.*, 125.
[2] Chillingworth, *op. cit.*, chap. iii, sect. 13 (Vol. II, 52-4).
[3] *Disputatio 1a de capitibus fidei fundamentalibus*, Heidelberg.
[4] *Optandam quidem esse, sperandam nunquam.*
[5] *Foi et vie*, No. of June 1, 1922, cited in *Études*, April 5, 1923, p. 81.

resign themselves. One of these is Auguste Sabatier, the celebrated theologian in whom even to-day so many Protestant consciences find their leader. "We have," he said, "observed with interest and even with sympathy the attempts which have been made to agree upon a certain number of unchangeable and absolute dogmas in one or another of the Protestant Churches. The subtlest theologians have worked upon the plan, but all have failed. This defeat has been as conspicuous and inevitable in the Anglican Church and in German Lutheranism, very akin (!) to Catholicism, as in the reformed Churches of France, Switzerland, Scotland and America. It is because everywhere the attempt implies contradiction."[1]

Yes, the error which reflection unmasks, is a "wanderer," and the system of private judgement which Protestantism cherishes in its bosom, is a principle of dissolution. Under its corroding action, dogmas cannot be "changeless and absolute." They become transformed, disintegrated and imperceptible, and end by disappearing entirely.

III

THE OUTCOME

The disappearance of dogma and all precise faith—this is indeed the inevitable outcome of Protestantism. Moreover, among the majority of its theologians and a notable part of its lay members it is a result already achieved.

Each with his private judgement goes his own way, and when one wishes to unite with a religious society, one finds no longer anything positive to agree upon.

[1] Auguste Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire*, Paris, Fischbacher, 2nd. edit. 1897, p. 288.

The decisive proof of this has been given ; for those who found harmony " desirable " have tried to realise it by one supreme endeavour. They said to themselves : Instead of wishing to fix in advance, in discussions which never end, the dogmas that are to be believed, let us on the contrary admit that the fundamental dogmas are those which actually are professed by all Christian Churches, whatever may be their contradictions on the other points. In this way, harmony will be established among us by the facts themselves, and this will be sufficient to found the unity of the Church of Christ.

Yes, but in this way also God is taken in tow, as it were, by man, and the religious work which he wished to do in the world is left to the mercy of the first heretic who comes along. It will be enough that one man refuses to believe a dogma revealed by God, for the whole of mankind at one stroke to be dispensed from believing it, and by that very fact for the dogma necessarily to disappear from the number of fundamental articles. Truly a strange way of preserving to the world the divine revelation ! We may well conclude that God is not the inventor of it.

But, however it may be with the principle, let us examine its practical application, and enumerate the dogmas universally admitted in the Protestant Churches. Alas, there are none.

In 1637, Chillingworth said proudly to his adversaries : " On the one hand, the Divine truths . . . on which they (the Protestants) universally agree, and which you reduce to *one or two*, then to *one only*, and hardly even to that, would mount to *millions of millions*, if one could make of them an exact estimate. On the other hand, the points in which they differ are so few and of such a character that error in this respect is not incompatible with the faith and obedience essential

to the Covenant ratified by Jesus Christ between God and men."[1] Even then, this was a piece of brilliant audacity; but where are the Protestants of our day who would dare to sign such declarations? The "points in which they differ" are of such a "character" that they affect the very essence of Christianity and all religion, and are so numerous that everything finds its way to them. Far from having "millions of millions of divine truths" to hold in common, they have not one, and they confess it. They confess that there is no longer a word in the religious vocabulary on which they can agree, or, if by chance they do happen to utter the same word, we can be certain that they do not understand by it the same thing.[2] One of their theologians, Nicholas Harms, said already in the first years of the last century: "I could write on my thumbnail all that is left of the dogma generally believed in the Protestant Church."[3] There is no need of his thumbnail. Of the whole Christian revelation, of the compact group of dogmas which the Reformation was able to borrow either from the traditions of fifteen centuries, or from the original documents contemporary with the Apostles, of all the dogmas which were her heritage, she has kept nothing, absolutely nothing.

Not even faith in the Gospel. The great leaders of Protestant exegesis, Strauss, Paulus, Bauer, etc., have used the whole force of their inventive genius to disqualify it.

Not even the divinity of Christ. In Germany there are only two faculties of Protestant theology left

[1] *Op. cit.*, II, 283. The first Engl. edit. is of 1637.

[2] "There is not one of the terms of the religious vocabulary which some have not deprived of the meaning ascribed to it by others." (Charles Bois, Prof. of Theology in the Protestant Faculty of Montauban, in *Évangile et liberté*, 1869.)

[3] Cited by Alzog, *Histoire de l'église*, Paris, Lecoffre, 1855, Vol. III, sect. 420, p. 580.

where it is still taught.[1] At Geneva, already in 1816, the Society of Pastors recommended silence or prudence on this question and hunted down those who showed too much zeal.[2] To-day, as regards the catechism, one has the choice between those who teach the divinity of Jesus, those who deny it and those who declare it " very impertinent and very absurd " to put such a question.[3] In England, even in the Anglican Church, the deniers of dogmas abound, and the *Modern Churchmen*, who represent the extreme Anglican left, in their congress at Girton College, Cambridge, in 1921, heard at least three of their speakers deny, categorically, the divinity of Christ.[4] In France, Pastor T. Fallot attributes to Him a *derived, limited* and *temporary* divinity.[5] But many among the most distinguished—Eugène Ménégoz,[6] for example, Auguste Sabatier,[7] and his pupil Henri Monnier, whom the Protestant consistories, *honoris causa*, presented, in 1901, for the chair of theology in the Sorbonne by a vote of sixty-two to thirty-nine[8]—do not go so far.

[1] Denifle, I, Preface, p. liv. See G. Goyau, *l'Allemagne religieuse, le Protestantisme*, Paris, Perrin, 1908, especially chap. ii and iii. On p. 150 is this anecdote: In 1893, M. Langin, pastor at Karlsruhe, publicly denied the divinity of Christ. He had made part of the general synod of Baden; and ninety-nine theologians of Baden sent him their public approbation.

[2] Cf. Goyau, *Ville Église*, II, pp. 56-82.

[3] See the references in Goyau, *Ville Église*, II, 199 *seq.* The theologian, G. Berguer (*Quelques traits de la vie de Jésus au point de vue psychologique et psychanalytique*, Geneva, edit. Atar, 1920), applies to Jesus the Freudian method of psycho-analysis!

[4] *Nouvelles Religieuses*, Oct. 15, 1921, p. 473 and Nov. 15, p. 522, Rev. R. Parsons called Jesus " a Palestinian Jew worthy of profound respect." (According to M. d'Herbigny, *Anglic. et Orthodox*, p. 77.)

[5] T. Fallot, *Le livre de l'action bonne*, Paris, Fischbacher, 1905, pp. 169 *seq.*

[6] Eugène Ménégoz, *Le salut par la foi indépendamment des croyances.* Paris, Fischbacher, 1913, pp. 132-77.

[7] Aug. Sabatier, *Les religions d'autorité et la religion de l'esprit.* Paris, Fischbacher, 4th edit., pp. 457 *seq.*; 503-9.

[8] Cf. *Études*, Aug. 5, 1903, pp. 365 *seq.* In 1921 began to appear

If Jesus is not God, there is no obligation to consider his doctrine as sacred. "Let us believe *in* Jesus," writes Edmond Stapfer, "but let us not believe *like* Jesus."[1]

But is it really necessary for Protestants "to believe in Jesus"? An American, W. B. Smith, published, in 1906, a book to prove that Jesus never existed. One of his colleagues of the Faculty of Zurich, Schmiedel, wrote the preface to it, and another of his colleagues in Paris, Ménégoz, has found that, in spite of this intellectual "eccentricity," one can very well have saving faith.[2]

Is this "saving faith" perhaps faith in the supernatural? "Liberal Protestantism," declares one of its champions, Prof. Jean Réville, "rejects the supernatural, in order to associate the religious sentiment with the modern conception of universal order."[3] "We hold it to be a right and a duty," exclaimed Pastor Felix Pécaut, "to liberate our piety and our moral activity from our belief . . . in the supernatural intervention of God."[4] "M. Maeterlinck," says Pastor

the *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuse*, published by the Protestant faculty of Theology of Strasbourg. The pastor Doumergue, analysing the first No., concludes: "Such is the theological Manifesto, the radicalism of which seems to me terrifying. . . . The programme is, in my opinion, subversive of all that I consider as the historical doctrine of Christianity and of evangelical Protestantism." (According to the *Nouvelles Relig.*, May 1, 1921, p. 205.)

[1] *Jésus-Christ pendant son ministère*, 1897. Quoted by Rose, *Études sur les Évangiles*, Paris, Welter, 1902. p. 91. And there are legions who say the same, or do it without saying it.

[2] According to Lebreton, *l'Encyclique et la théologie moderniste.* Paris, Beauchesne, 1908, p. 59.

[3] Jean Réville, professor attached to the Protestant Theological Faculty of the Universiy of Paris, *Le Protestantisme libéral*, Paris, Fischbacher, 1903, p. 151.

[4] *Manifeste du Christianisme libéral*, Neufchatel. This quotation is reproduced by Ferd. Buisson, in *La foi laïque*, Hachette, 1912. p. 2. In a lecture, reproduced by the *Rev. du christianisme libéral*, Feb. 2, 1869, the same Pécaut said: "We no longer admit the supernatural and superhuman in doctrine, any more than in acts . . . no more in the doctor than in the doctrine."

Giran, " denies all religion ; he rejects all creeds, all rites, all miraculous and final revelations, all kinds of dogmatism and clericalism. This negation is also the *nucleus of a religion* without dogmas, without rites, without clergy, without a miraculous and final revelation. But for Liberal Christians this religion is not a new one ; it is the religion which they try to realise in their lives and to make known to others."[1] Will it be sufficient, then, in order to be a Christian, to believe in God, in the God of philosophy ? M. Ferdinand Buisson, when he founded at Neufchatel, in 1869, together with the pastors Jules Steeg and Félix Pécaut, the " Liberal Church," did not require so much as that. He wrote calmly : " If there were found even men who claimed to be atheists and who nevertheless assumed, like the others, the serious obligation of joining with all their might in the moral effort which the words ' worship of the good and love for humanity ' presuppose, the Liberal Church ought to receive them in the same rank as all their brothers." And it did receive them and continues to receive them, and Auguste Sabatier does not disapprove ; for he tells us[2] : " For this (to be religious) it is not necessary to believe in God in the traditional meaning of the word." Nor does Pastor Wilfred Monod disapprove, for whom a certain kind of atheism is " more religious " than theism, " more religious " than traditional Orthodoxy.[3]

[1] Quoted by Emile Doumergue, Prof. of Theology (Protestant) at Montauban, *Les Étapes du fidéisme*, Paris, Fischbacher, without date (1906?), pp. 29 *seq.* M. Doumergue quotes disapprovingly.

[2] *Relig. de l'esprit*, 493. This conception was brought to the *Parliament of Religions* at Chicago. (Cf. Lucien Arréat, *Le sentiment religieux en France*, Paris, Alcan, 1903, p. 107.)

[3] Wilfred Monod, *Aux croyants et aux athées*, cited by Paul Stapfer, *L'inquiétude religieuse*, Paris, Fischbacher, 1912, pp. 133 and 150. " An absolute freedom of thought, united with the purest religious fervour ; that is what M. W. Monod shows us in his book, and

And others, still more "advanced," are received into the bosom of Protestantism. "If one finds in our theory," said the great theologian and exegete, Strauss, "the expression of the most complete materialism, I shall not contradict it."[1]

And is it necessary even to believe in matter? One believes and one preaches what one wishes to, or nothing at all, if one prefers. "If the doctrine of Buddha were preached to-day in our pulpits, we should not be surprised," wrote in 1899 Henri Secrétan, an evangelical pastor of Geneva.[2] Eight years later, in 1907, in the first consultative assembly for the reorganisation of the Church of Geneva, Pastor Henri Berguer demanded that "Positivists, Free-thinkers, Buddhists, and the disciples of the Koran should be declared excluded from this Church." It was asking too much. His voice was lost in the wilderness.[3]

Protestantism has, therefore, descended to the point where all positive doctrine disappears, and where it is

that is, in its plenitude, the spirit of the Protestant Christian." *Ibid.*, 149.

[1] David Friedrich Strauss, *The Old Faith and the New*. The author adds to the words above quoted these: "at first" (after the words "if one finds"). But the restriction is purely apparent. He hesitates between "materialism" and "idealism," because, he says, all that comes practically to the same thing, and because materialists and idealists, instead of fighting one another, would do better to unite their efforts against spiritualism. Moreover, he expressly denies freedom, and he sees in God conceived as a person "a mere product of our imagination." It is true, in the preface of the fourth German edition, he speaks of his "renunciation of the existing religion," but it would be interesting to know if, in his chair of theology, he professed very different ideas. However that may be, von Bernhardi (*Notre avenir*, trans. by Emile Simonot, Paris, Conrad, 1915, p. 20) confesses that "From private judgement, the inevitable product of the Reformation, has issued a materialistic philosophy." Another Protestant, Gabriel Monod, wrote in the *Rev. historique*, May, 1892, p. 103, "Protestantism is only a series and collection of religious forms of free thought."

[2] *Lettre à M. Louis Emery*, Lausanne, 1899, pp. 9 and 19-20. Quoted by Goyau, *Ville-Église*, II, 206.

[3] Goyau, *ibid.*, II, 292 *seq.*

impossible to draw a boundary between itself and free-thought.

And it is not in its power to disavow a single one of these negations, or a single one of the fanatical sects which profess to be connected with it. All varieties of "illuminati"—Anabaptists, Quakers, believers in Joanna Southcott, disciples of Queen Esther, of James White, of Alexander Dowie, Latter Day Saints, Mormons, Christian Scientists, etc., etc.—are authentic and legitimate children of private judgement, to which to-day the essence of Protestantism is reduced, as almost all its theologians proclaim and facts confirm.[1] But also and above all, *de jure* and *de facto*, as we have seen, all the negations also proceed from private judgement; and, as Bayle, who could have presented himself as an example of the fact, has said, "those who deny are the best Protestants, Protestants in the full meaning of the word, because they protest against all truth."[2]

While some proclaim their revolt against all revelation or even against all religious doctrine with a kind of bravado, others have reached that point quietly, with muffled footsteps, gentle gestures, impressive words and a heart made tender by piety.

[1] The pastor Nippold, Professor of Theology in the faculty of Berne, in his analysis of the reports presented, on all sides, officially on the "essential principle of Protestantism," declares it impossible to bring back Protestant forms to "one unique type," and that the "unique principle of Protestantism . . . is nothing but the right of the religious individual to determine his religion for himself." *Rev. de Théologie et de philosophie*, 15th year, Lausanne, p. 173.

[2] Quoted by Théodore de la Rive, *Vingt-cinq ans de vie catholique*, Plon, 2nd edit., 1909. Preface pp. xxvii *seq.* J. de Maîstre had already said (*Du Pape*, 423) that the Protestant can keep his name, even if he changes his doctrine, for his name is purely *negative* and signifies only a "giving up of Catholicism. The less he believes and the more he *protests*, the truer he will be to himself."

On the historical origin of the name *Protestant*, Cf. *Augsburger Postzeitung*, No. of Aug. 27, 1904, and Janssen, III, 152-59.

They have been led to it, not by the " forlorn hope " of the army of humanity, but often by their most serious, most respected and mentally best-balanced leaders. They have come to it from all directions ; by devious paths and many transformations, fideists and agnostics, mystics and sceptics, orthodox and liberals, have furnished recruits to the theory which claims that religion can with a clear conscience do without the truth. It is nothing more than a certain emotional mode of life, which, in order to be good and beautiful, does not need to be in agreement with reason.

These theologians distinguish, therefore, between *faith* and *belief*, making of the former an " act of the heart and will," and of the latter " an act of the intellect." It seems that only the first of these is important, and " no one, in recent times, has contributed more to the spread of this happy distinction than M. E. Ménégoz."[1] The latter sums up his " conception of the Gospel " in the following words, which form the title of one of his works : " Salvation by faith independently of beliefs."[2] He does not say that faith is *independent* of beliefs ; he knows very well that what we think reacts on what we feel ; but he says : " I teach that *we are saved by faith independently of beliefs*. That is my formula, the authentic formula of *fideism*. It is the only one I authorise my opponents to attribute to me."[3] He does not, therefore, with a gesture of disdain reject the truth ; he consigns it to a subordinate position. He sees in it a " pedagogical instrument of the first order," and that is why he attaches " such a great importance to the purity of Gospel preaching."[4]

[1] Auguste Sabatier, *Religion de l'esprit*, 510, 511, note.
[2] Paris, Fischbacher, 1923, cf. Preface, pp. v *seq.* and pp. 33-35.
[3] *Op. cit.* 36 *seq.*
[4] P. 39. On the liberal side, see J. Réville, *Le Protestantisme libéral*, pp. 48 *seq.*

But others have arisen, who attach no importance to it at all, and take the formula in the sense which M. Ménégoz does not authorise. Paul Stapfer, for example, is not content to *distinguish* faith from belief; he wishes that it should not be *connected* with it, but that it should be able to *free itself* from it and be *separate* from it. "Since so many old beliefs have become obsolete, let them fall away and let us not replace them. Let us do better. Let us also abandon in particular the error that the *truth* of religious beliefs is essential for the Christian."[1] Here is a new way by which Protestantism, after all these negations, ends in something worse, namely a disdain of the truth.[2]

[1] *L'inquiétude religieuse*, 131 *seq.* Emile Doumergue, in *Les étapes du fidéisme*, 25-37, cites much testimony in the same sense, which he then criticises vigorously.

[2] By a sort of fatality, which pursues it through all its transformations and a whole series of insoluble difficulties, it always displays an internal contradiction in the very formulas which express it. Here, this contradiction bursts forth on all sides: 1st: Religion, having for its mission to lead man to his goal, ought to show it to him; having for its mission also to obtain from us acts done with all our soul, it ought to respect the unity of our nature and the hierarchy of our faculties, and to furnish us with motives which *reason* approves and which justify our acts. If religion cares nothing for the truth, it is nothing better than a nurse who lulls the disquietude of mankind to sleep with fairy tales. This theory lowers, therefore, both man and religion. 2nd: Moreover, it is impracticable. Even when reduced to mere sentiment, faith lays down conditions of an intellectual order. And, first, it is necessary to know well in what this sentiment consists, in order to be of any value. It consists in "repentance and the gift of the heart to God," Ménégoz tells us (*op. cit.*, 44, 47, 193, etc.). "It consists in recognising in Jesus Christ our guide and our Saviour," says Stapfer (*op. cit.*, 131). And what shall men do in order to *feel* that, if they do not commence by thinking it? And in order to think it, it is necessary, first to be convinced that Jesus Christ exists, that God exists, that He is good, that He has promised forgiveness on a certain condition, and not on some other. Here, then, are intellectual questions to be solved (which for M. Ménégoz, pp. 188-92, are not easy, nor for M. Stapfer, pp. 121-50), and to be solved conformably to the truth, under penalty of mistaking the way. It is true, they appeal "in the last analysis" to the "testimony of the Holy Spirit" (Ménégoz, 189; Sabatier, *Religion de l'Esprit*, 430); but it is not clear what they mean by that expression, unless it be finally "their

Such then, under one of its two forms—negation, or the disdain of every religious truth—is the outcome of the system of private judgement. Such is the conclusion of the Protestant variations.

Well, have these variations terminated their travels at least here? Will the Protestant, who has descended to the end of the inclined plane, find here at last a final halting-place; a solid bit of earth on which to pitch his tent? No. Wherever he halts, it is always only for a day or an hour. Even in believing, he doubts, and in saying: "This is my truth," he must add below his breath: "until the next command comes to move on." If not, then he is untrue to the spirit of private judgement, the only principle which he must hold sacred. "My ideas, my opinions about the Gospel," said the theologian Colani,[1] "I believe to be true; but something tells me that they . . . correspond to a particular state of my soul, which experience will modify, and that, even if they suit me now, the time is approaching when they will no longer entirely suit me." Colani only stated a fact, but others have proclaimed it a duty. "*A duty*," writes M. Ferdinand Buisson; for the human individual "can no more annihilate his liberty than allow it to be annihilated by others." Whoever fetters it, "can euphemise the action by any name he likes, and may call it faith, piety, devotion, religious sentiment, supernatural light or divine grace. It matters little. The fact is there. He dares not be a man, dares not be free, dares not be himself."[2] "Our sole credo," he writes again, "is to have

idea." And here, in spite of them, is an intellectual element, of which, however, it cannot be said that it is related to logic. In short, they might well apply to themselves the words of a co-religionist, Fèlix Bovet: "*I believe*, but I do not find *any* formula to express my faith." (Quoted by Stapfer, 87.)

[1] Quoted by Mgr. Freppel, *Tertullien*, 27th lesson.

[2] *La foi laïque*, Paris, Hachette, 1912, p. 192.

none ; because every credo is an unlawful petrifaction of human thought."[1]

The mind has not, therefore, for its aim to believe or to find correct ideas and true thoughts which correspond to reality ; but to find thoughts which are always mobilised, thoughts which pitch their tent for the moment only, but never become *fixed*, thoughts that *travel*. *Private judgement perpetually on the move* is, at the point which it has now reached, the last word of Protestantism.

And if anyone wishes to know what the first word of Protestantism is, found everywhere and always, and what is the least requirement which can possibly be called sufficient, it can be found in the utterance of a Protestant theologian, Ernst Troeltsch, who proclaimed it at the congress of Mannheim in 1914. " To-day," he said, " in regard to doctrines they (the Protestants) know positively and exactly only one thing, and that is that they are not Catholics."[2]

One thing alone is necessary, and that is to deny some Catholic dogma, and first of all the Pope. " *No popery* "! That is the dogma in which all the Protestants in England are in full accord, just as " *Los von Rom*! " is the rallying cry of all the Protestants of Germany. " In religion, the German Protestant has not, and does not wish to have, any positive, fixed, obligatory rule. He has only one placard bearing the words : *Dangerous turning ! Look out for Catholicism !* As one of them (P. Tschackert) has said : They feel

[1] Quoted by Hedde, in *Diction.* of d'Alès, II, col. 1874.

[2] Quoted by Pinard, *Études*, Jan. 20, 1914, p. 209. W. Wallace relates (*De l'Évangile au Cath.*, 240) that, while he was still a Protestant minister, in Ireland two beggars asked alms of him, and said to him, to make him well disposed towards them : " We are Protestants." " What do you understand by being Protestants? " he asked. The reply was unhesitating : " Well, not being Catholics! "

furious anger against every movement towards Catholicism."[1] Newman, before his conversion, saw in hostility to the Pope " a rigorous duty " ; " because the prescription of such a protest (against the Church of Rome) was a living principle of my own Church, as expressed not simply in a *catena*, but by a consensus of her divines and by the voice of her people."[2] Even to-day, the Anglican bishops, so indulgent to all doctrinal fantasies, still reserve their fulminations for the ritualists, who draw near to Rome. In 1819, the Abbé Vaurin wrote : " If the inhabitants of Geneva were trepanned, and if all the anti-catholic fibres were removed from their brains, there would be nothing left that would bear the least resemblance to Christianity."[3] And in how many foreign missions is the Protestant apostolate limited to distributing Bibles, without adding any other commentary than that of warnings against Catholic doctrines!

In 1920, there was founded in America a federation, which voted 100,000,000 dollars (more than two billions of francs at the then rate of exchange) with a view to " foreign missions," meaning thereby France, Belgium and Italy, especially Rome. This federation claims to represent 200,000,000 Protestants.[4] There

[1] J. Paquier, *Les suites de la Réforme*, in *Lumen*, July, 1922, pp. 542 *seq.* We willingly admit that, among a certain number, this " furious anger " agitates the brain more than the heart ; and we believe also that it has become less general in the last few years, and that here and there, among the Episcopalians of the *World Conference* and in certain circles of the *High Church* in England and Germany, it tends to disappear ; but it is precisely in the circles which tend to rid themselves of Protestantism and in exact proportion as they do so.

[2] Newman. *Apologia*, 54 *seq.*

[3] In a letter to Lamennais, quoted by Goyau, *Ville-Église*, II, 51.

[4] A manifest exaggeration, for all the Protestants in the world do not exceed 186,056,000 (according to H. A. Krose, in *Cath. Encyclop.* article *Statistics*. These figures are based upon work done in this direction during the first decade of the twentieth century).

are, therefore, in it all imaginable and unimaginable varieties of belief and negation; and all united to "convert" the Catholics! To convert them is not to connect them with this or that belief. 200,000,000 Protestants could not be found to work for such an ideal. To "convert the Catholics" means *to draw them away from their own beliefs*. Let them throw their dogmas overboard, as many as they like, but at any rate the supremacy of the Pope, and lo! there they are —*converted* and Protestants! They protest against something; they deny something. On that point the millions of the federation are agreed. On that, but on nothing else.

A principal of denial, the right of private judgement, and a hatred of the Pope,—these are all that the Protestantism of to-day finds in common.

Protestantism, as it left the hands of Luther, was rich in dogmas and thoroughly determined to take a position in the intellectual world, to show its true face, and to prove its identity by precise and categorical confessions of faith. But, annoyed by the truth, against which it collided at every turn, it could not remain in one place, and began to travel. It became the wandering Jew of doctrine, unable to halt anywhere. The history of its innumerable variations is only the history of its difficulties. Panting under the load of dogmas which Luther had laid on its shoulders, and wearied by its vain attempts continually to readjust them and to make them hold together, it soon began to throw off the most burdensome, and, little by little, has strewn them all along the route. It still continues to run on, having kept only two things: one the free interpretation of the Scriptures, the private judgement of which it has made very short, and the other a hatred—the hatred of the Pope.

Private judgement filled Luther with horror, but by their hatred of the Pope he recognised Protestants as the true children of his heart. Among the signs by which theology recognises that we are pleasing to God, he places "hatred of the Pope."[1] This "sign" he himself had. It is the only point on which he never varied. "Since I cannot pray," he wrote one day, "I can at least curse. Instead of saying: Hallowed be thy name! I will say, Accursed, damned and disgraced be the name of the Papists! Instead of repeating: Thy kingdom come! I will say: May the Papacy be accursed, damned and exterminated! And, in fact, that is the way I do pray all day long incessantly, either with my lips or with my heart."[2] In 1537, during the illness which almost carried him off, he made his will: "After my death," he dictated, "retain of me this only: hatred of the Pope (*Impleat vos Dominus odio papae*!)."[3] His last piece of writing, in 1545, has for its title: "Against the Papacy founded in Rome by the devil."[4] The evening before his death, he wrote with chalk on the wall: "*Pestis eram vivens; moriens, ero mors tua, papa.* (Living, I was a plague to you; dying, I will be your death, O Pope.)"[5] Here he prophesies; a dangerous thing to do when one is not a prophet. Luther was not one. Already, in 1522, he had said: "In spite of all the gates of hell and all the powers of the air and earth and sea, my dogmas shall endure and the Pope shall fall. God will see who shall perish first, the Pope or Luther."[6] God has seen. We also see it. The dogmas of

[1] *Comm. ad Gal.*, II, 164. [2] Quoted by Janssen, II, 187 *seq.*
[3] Cf. *Études*, Aug. 20, 1904, p. 354; Janssen, III, 388.
[4] Cf. Janssen, III, 588-90. A Protestant, Charles Adolphe Menzel (quoted *ibid.*, 589, Note 2) says on this subject: "Luther revels in invectives, for which he ought never to have found a pen, still less a printing press."
[5] *Ibid.*, 591, Note 2. [6] Denifle, III, 486.

Luther have not endured. They have travelled far, and have been dispersed like dust along the route. The Pope is still vigorous. Luther has not been able to make God an accomplice in his hatred. But he has been more fortunate with his successors.

"Retain this only," he said to them; and they have retained it, "this *only*," together with private judgement, the monopoly of which he had desired to keep for himself.

A principle of negation and a hatred,—really these are too little with which to represent the Christian religion.

In this spirit of hatred it is impossible to recognise the heart of Him who said: "I am meek and lowly of heart. Blessed are the meek! Love them that hate you"; and who said in so many words to Peter: "Blessed art thou, Simon, son of Jonas. . . . Thou art Peter and on this rock I will build my Church. . . . I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not. . . . Feed my lambs, feed my sheep."

In this scepticism, which declares the truth of beliefs to be useless, we can indeed find again the spirit of Pilate, asking: *Quid est veritas*? What is truth? even while turning his back upon it; but we cannot see in it the spirit of Him who said to Pilate: "For this cause was I born and came into this world, that I might bear witness to the truth."

In those who scatter all dogmas to the winds of human caprice, we do not find the disciples of Him who said: "Teach all nations, teaching them to keep all that I have taught you: *quaecumque mandavi vobis*."

This society of adepts, in which the divinity of Christ and his very existence can be denied, is not

that of which Christ said : " Lo, I am with you always to the consummation of the world."

This religion, in which God and the human soul can be denied, is not a religion.

This doctrine which changes constantly, and which under all its transformations, bursts into contradiction, is not the truth.

Disciples are often better than their masters ; and men are often better than their doctrines. The Protestants, for the most part, are better than Protestantism. There are souls everywhere and there are hidden graces for all the souls of good faith. The others God alone is able to judge. But the doctrine itself can be judged by the words : "You contradict yourself, you vary ; hence you are false."

Besides these conclusions, there is one other which is derived from them : the history of Protestant variations is a brilliant confirmation of the thesis presented in the preceding chapter ; and if, in Catholicism, we find, instead of innumerable variations, an immutable stability, and instead of progressive dissolution, a living growth, we shall be able to say with all confidence : " The finger of God is there."

Chapter III

THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO THE FACT OF CATHOLICISM

Summary. I.—The *doctrinal progress* in Catholicism. The creeds, instead of being dispersed, increase from century to century. The development is not made by additions placed contiguously, but by assimilation and growth. II.—The *immutability de jure*. Catholicism declares that it has nothing to withdraw, nothing to modify, nothing to add to the divine revelation. III.—The *immutability de facto*. (*a*) A first glance over history; (*b*) some decisive experiences.—*Conclusion*.

I

DOCTRINAL PROGRESS IN CATHOLICISM

By the time that Protestantism had existed only a few years, it had already poured out upon the world, under the name of "confessions of faith," an avalanche of the most contradictory credos. The men who drew these up were often the same, as were also perhaps the ink and paper with which they were written. But the dogmas were not the same. They changed as often as the moods of their signers, and at the least shock of discussion, like the forms and colours in a kaleidoscope. Soon, after having tried to believe everything, they found it simpler to deny; and the dogmas in the constantly shaken kaleidoscope became smaller and smaller and fewer and fewer in their dance. Then, little by little, the entire credo having been worn away, doubt and negation shrouded everything in darkness. In short, there are still religious souls among

the Protestants, and there are still certain dogmas professed in this or that group ; but, of the whole body of doctrine bequeathed to them by the founders, their heirs no longer retain anything upon which they can all agree. " Where are the professions of faith of the sixteenth century ? In books." Do not look for them in souls.[1]

Catholicism is fifteen centuries older than Protestantism. On its human side, it has been subjected to the same perils as Protestantism, and even to still greater ones, peculiar to itself. But one fact is clear as sunlight. Its doctrine has not crumbled into fragments under the shocks of discussion or tempestuous winds. It has, on the contrary, blossomed out, and each new generation, instead of ruining the heritage of its ancestors, has transmitted it to the future richer than it had received it.

Take, for example, the Apostles' Creed. Historically, it is not certain that the Apostles drew up its formula ; but it is certain that it expresses their thought and dates from their time. In the beginning it was not written.[2] Candidates for baptism learnt it by heart, and it was subsequently given as a password, to enable Christians to recognise one another. As S. Augustine[3] said, it was necessary to have a formula *simple* enough to be within the comprehension of all minds, *short* enough not to burden the memory too much, and *full* enough—though not complete—to define the doctrine.

Compare now this creed with the Nicene Creed of A.D. 325. Between the two there lie three centuries of struggles. Yet not an iota has fallen from the first ; only other words are added to it, to form the second. " I believe in God the Father Almighty," said the

[1] J. de Maistre, *Du Pape*, 407.

[2] The first mentions of it, known in the written texts, are of the second century. Cf. Denz., No. 1.

[3] *Serm.*, 213.

Apostles' Creed. It is already clear from that that this infinite God is unique and the first cause of all that exists; but because some heretics have cast doubt on these conclusions, the Nicene Creed affirms them: "I believe in *one* God, the Father Almighty, *Maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible.*"

I believe "in Jesus Christ his only Son," said the Apostles' Creed; but, in A.D. 325 Arius was there, who denied the divinity of Christ; and the Nicene Creed therefore insists: "I believe in Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, born of the Father before all ages, God of God, light of light, true God of true God; begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made."

And so on to the end, the second Creed being at no point the negation of the first, but its development.

The Council of Nicæa was scarcely concluded, when Nestorius and Eutyches exaggerated its decisions, one putting the God in Christ on a level with, but apart from man, and making thus two distinct personalities; the other absorbing the man in the God, as a drop of water, he said, is absorbed in the sea, thus reducing all to one single nature.

Against these errors rose the Athanasian Creed,[1] in which the Catholics, even before any official decision had been made, unanimously recognised the expression of their faith: "The right faith," says this Creed, "is that we believe and confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man; God of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; perfect God and perfect man, consisting of a reasonable soul and a human flesh; equal to the Father as touching his Godhead, and inferior to the Father as touching his manhood. Who, although He is God and man, yet He is not

[1] In spite of the name by which it is designated, S. Athanasius is not the author of it.

two, but one Christ. One, not by the conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by the taking of the manhood into God. One altogether ; not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person. For, as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ."

With the Athanasian Creed we have only come to the fifth century. At that time, there lived on the Côte d'Azur a monk, Vincent of Lérins,who, not content with the doctrinal progress which he beheld, asked for and foresaw other dogmas and, so to speak, formulated their theory.

The living man, in order to develop, has no need of theory, it is enough for him to live. This is what the plant does under the caresses of the sun ; this is what the child does, aided by his teachers. But when the child has become a young man, he has, without abandoning the paternal counsels, the opportunity of reflecting on his own experiences and of formulating for his own use a method for the development of his muscles or for the progress of his intellectual and moral life. This is what the Church did under the impulse given by Vincent of Lérins.

" O Timothy," exclaimed this theorist of progress ; " O priest, O jeweller, O doctor . . . cut the precious stones of divine dogma, set them faithfully. Know how to polish them with skill, and cause their brilliancy, their charm and beauty to shine forth. Through thee, let the future better comprehend what the past has already venerated. Let there be progress and the greatest possible amount of it, but let it be real progress, and not mere change. *Progress* means that what exists shall develop ; *change* signifies that one thing shall become another. . . . The religion of souls must conduct itself as bodies do, which, in the course of years, develop and extend their limbs, without however ceasing to remain the same bodies. Let

us take care not to scatter the tares of error where our ancestors in the faith sowed the good grain of truth; but let us rather cultivate our patrimony; let us allow the crop to ripen, and let the harvest become more and more beautiful, without changing its nature. That is the task of the Church, guardian of the sacred deposit. By its wise administration and vigilant industry let the dogmas, still in embryo, unfold and grow; let those which are enveloped in shadow come into unclouded light; let those which have once been stated and defined remain immutable."[1] And, turning towards the future, he cries: "*Crescat igitur oportet et multum vehementerque proficiat* . . . It is necessary, therefore, that there should be growth and ample and intense progress, in the rational knowledge of each member and of the entire Church, according to the development of centuries and ages."

This wish of the monk of Lérins the centuries which have since elapsed have realised. New definitions have been added by hundreds to the Apostles' Creed, as in the spring-time to the vigorous tree young growths are added, which will make of it little by little the giant of the forest. But Catholicism has never terminated its growth. Even yesterday, the Council of the Vatican revived, in the same words, the wish of Vincent of Lérins and once more bequeathed it to the future.[2] Moreover it set the example. Twenty-two times[3] it pronounced the sacramental formula *anathema sit*; which rejects heresy for ever, and enshrines in the treasury of defined truths the doctrine of which that error was the denial.

In contrast to the Protestant fact, here, at a first glance, is the Catholic fact: Its doctrine, instead of

[1] We translate by selecting here and there. The whole text is to be found in the *P.L.* of Migne, Vol. L. [2] Denz., No. 1647.
[3] Denz., No. 1648, 1665, 1669, 1671, 1677, 1683.

being scattered in fragments, increases from century to century.

If it were of merely human origin, this would be, as we have proved, impossible. Every man-made religion, however little it may try to live, to adapt itself to its environment and to mingle with the movement of a world in which men think and examine closely before believing, will, if put to that proof, inevitably perish. Under the superhuman effort which is incumbent on it to correspond to everything, it is at first convulsed with contradictory affirmations; then, little by little, it crumbles into fragments under the shock of negations, and finally becomes dispersed like a vapour. Applied to religion, said Joseph de Maistre,[1] science, reflection, criticism "are a kind of acid which dissolves all metals except gold." Only the gold of a divine religion can resist it. Like Protestantism, and even more than Protestantism, the Catholic religion, if it were not divine, would have inevitably submitted to this law. After these nineteen centuries of discussions, it ought now to appear to us old, disjointed, worn out, decomposed, and having no longer any semblance of a coherent and erect organism, but on the contrary presenting the appearance of a swarm of multitudinous, diminutive sects fighting for the possession of its corpse.

Well, is that really the spectacle that is offered us by Catholicism? Is Catholicism a swarm of sects fighting for the possession of a corpse, or is it the magnificent unity of a great living body? Is it a disjointed doctrine no longer existing in a state of affirmation, save in scattered fragments, in temporary groups; a dust-cloud of ideas, of which each can pick up a grain at random, to change it for another at the call of his caprice, or else to cast it behind him and go away empty-handed?

[1] *Du Pape*, 407.

Rather, is it not, plainly, one solid mass, in which everything stands firm, and all of which must be accepted, under penalty of letting everything fall, and of which every member, unless he is false to himself, actually does accept everything, when he recites his act of faith: "My God, I believe *all* that the holy Catholic apostolic and Roman Church believes and teaches, because Thou, who art the Truth, hast revealed it to us and because Thou canst not be mistaken or deceive us." "All that the Church believes!" Is this nothing? Is it reduced to zero in regard to the dogmas that can be held in common? Or, does it not, on the contrary, with its dogmas, its moral code, its sacraments, its rites and its hierarchy, all cemented together; does it not, thus adapted as it is to all ages, offer a logical and practical response to all the questions asked by life and death, by the head and the heart, by the need of reasoning and the need of believing, by the care for oneself and the care of others, by duty and love, by virtue and repentance, by the appeal to justice and to mercy, by all the noble qualities and all the weaknesses, by all the needs and all the aspirations of the human soul? Such was and such is still the Catholic doctrine. It cannot be said with truth that its nineteen centuries of life have exhausted it, or that it offers, either at the first glance or after the most careful examination, the appearance of a decomposing corpse, or shows the slightest signs of senility.

If it is of human origin, it should have become volatilised, like the others. As a matter of fact, it has amplified itself from century to century. Hence it is divine.

II

IMMUTABILITY DE JURE

But if it is divine, then it should have wrought another and more difficult miracle: it should, while living and developing, have remained identical with itself; and, while progressing, should have remained unchangeable.

Well, has it remained unchangeable?

I affirm, first, that, when confronted by this condition, imposed on the truth of a doctrine, it has never resorted to evasions. From the very beginning, throughout its long history, it has unhesitatingly and steadily declared that it has nothing to retract, nothing to modify, nothing to add to the Christian revelation.

Nothing to retract.

It has adopted the precept of Christ: "*Docentes servare quaecumque mandavi vobis.*" Teach them to observe "Whatsoever I have commanded you." It believes in the divinity of Christ and it knows that God never retracts what He has said. It knows that all that is perishable will perish, and that the stars of heaven and the fashion of this world will pass away, but that the words of the Word will not pass away. (Mark xiii, 31; Luke xxi, 33; 1 Cor. vii, 31.)

It has adopted the precept of Paul to Timothy: "*Depositum custodi*, guard the deposit" (1 Tim. vi, 21). It has the usufruct of it, but not the ownership. It has not the right to injure it, to take anything from it, to let any part of it be lost—no, not one particle of that sacred gold, not one iota of these dogmas.

Nor has it anything to modify.

It is not the formulas which form the richness of the deposit, but its contents. The dogmas are not words intended merely to agitate the air. Under those words

are truths destined to nourish souls. The words are human, the truths divine. The words are only the envelope of the ideas. The Church can change the words, if they deteriorate by use, and if others in the course of centuries are better adapted to preserve the idea unchanged. *But the idea must remain intact.* Thus, during the first three centuries, nothing prevented the declaration that Jesus Christ was ὅμοιος Πατρί. That signified to all Christians "equal to the Father." But then appeared Arius, who denied the divinity of Christ, and said that ὅμοιος could mean, no longer *equal*, but *like*. In order to retain the same meaning for the Christian faith, it was necessary to change the word, and the Council of Nicæa inserted in the creed a word expressly framed for this emergency, ὁμοούσιος, which removed the ambiguity by affirming of Christ that He is consubstantial with the Father. The modernists, on the contrary, have claimed that they guard carefully all the words of the ancient definitions, while giving them, if necessary, a new meaning. This method would have been a very convenient one with which to smooth away all the errors and to justify all the transformations. But, already in advance, the Council of the Vatican had prepared an answer for them: "The doctrine of the faith revealed by God has not been offered to the human mind as a philosophical discovery which the human mind would have to make perfect; it has been confided to the spouse of Christ as a divine deposit which the Church was to guard faithfully and to make known infallibly. This is why it is necessary also to preserve perpetually for the sacred dogmas the definite meaning given them by one first declaration of our holy Mother Church, and it is never permissible to depart from this meaning under the appearance and the pretext of a higher understanding."[1] And after these

[1] Denzinger, 1647.

considerations comes the sentence: "If anyone says that, in regard to the progress of science, it may be allowed sometimes to attribute to the dogmas enunciated by the Church a meaning different to that which the Church has understood and understands, let him be anathema!"[1] Thus the dogmas, just as Christ bequeathed them, and the official declarations which the Church has at any time made in the name of Christ, must for ever retain their meaning.

In short, all that has been uttered, as an affirmation from God by Christ, by the Apostles, or by the Church, is acquired, in the precise sense in which it has been said, for ever and beyond any possible alteration. This is terrible for the Church if it is not divine; but it is logical. The witnesses being held to be infallible, their testimony must be unchangeable. There is nothing to modify.

Nor can anything be added to it.

The Church is not God, but his representative. It has no revelation of its own to make to the world, but it has the revelation of Christ to transmit to it. And it must transmit this without any mixture. "Thou hast received gold," said Vincent of Lérins; "and thou must deliver gold. I do not want any substitution. I do not wish that thou shouldst fraudulently give me either lead or alloy. I desire not a semblance of gold, but natural gold," genuine and stamped.

But could not God add to the deposit, thus confided to the Church, some new revelations? No doubt. He knows more than he has imparted to us, and he would have no more lack of means than of knowledge, if he chose to multiply his revelations to mankind. But we know from Scripture that the mission of Christ marks in this respect the fulfilment of the promises, the fulness of time, and the last stage before the final

[1] Denz., 1665.

revelation, which will be that of the divine essence in the life eternal. We are on the way to it, the complete vision is reserved for the end. God has told us all that was necessary to indicate the goal and to guide us on the road ; all that was needful to enable us to comprehend his plan of redemption, and to make us co-operate in its fulfilment with our reason, our freedom, our whole soul, and, if we are willing, with a great transport of love. The revelation destined for and given to all mankind closed with the death of the last Apostle. The Church knows it and proclaims it. If she sometimes approves certain private revelations, she means to say thereby that they are not contrary either to faith or morals, and can be discreetly regarded in general as coming from God. But she does not claim for herself the right to impose them on the faith of the faithful. She can take occasion thereby to state precisely some ancient dogmas, but not to formulate, as dogmas, doctrines which find in these occurrences their only source. Thus, on the occasion of the revelations of Paray-le-Monial, she emphasised in various ways the contract of love which Jesus Christ sealed with man on Calvary ; but not one of the words of Jesus at Paray-le-Monial will ever become an article of faith.

The Church has, therefore, admitted to the full the immutability which her rôle as guardian of the divine truth imposes on her. She recognises for herself the absolute obligation to take nothing from it, to modify nothing in it and to add nothing to it.

If she invites progress, she rejects change. It is not divine truth that the Church wishes to advance, any more than science advances nature ; it is the knowledge which we have of it and the good we can derive from it, which must progress. Science adds nothing to Nature, modifies nothing of nature and takes nothing from nature. When Newton, seeing an apple fall, discovered in

that fact the law of universal gravitation, he did not create a new fact, he understood and better explained a very ancient one. When the eye, in a dimly-lighted room where it at first saw only the principal pieces of furniture, perceives at last, little by little, as it looks intently, their reliefs and small details, it does not create these, it sees them better. When a gust of wind disperses the clouds it does not create the sun; it reveals its splendour. Thus the Church also claims to formulate new dogmas on the background of a changeless revelation. It liberates conclusions, dispels obscurities, and causes certainties to shine resplendently.

Depositum custodi! But it wishes only to open and bring forth the gems already contained in the sacred deposit. It sees in it the leaven of which the Gospel speaks,[1] which will leaven the whole lump of human thoughts with which it shall be mixed. But after that action of presence—to use the language of modern science, in regard to ferments—the leaven must find itself intact, having lost nothing of its essence, any more than of its fecundity. The Church still sees, in the Christian revelation—to use another Gospel metaphor[2]—a living germ, the grain of mustard-seed destined to become a tall, robust, luxuriant tree, stretching out its boughs and branches, to offer its fruits to be gathered in proportion as mankind shall need them. But the Church admits no "saltations" in that vital evolution; it wishes that all may be impregnated with the same divine sap, and that everything, by the movement of life which utilises the propitious seasons, may come forth from the germ originally sown by Christ.

Such is its immutability *de jure*. Logic requires it. The Church proclaims it.

[1] Matt. xiii. 33; Luke xiii. 21. [2] Matt. xiii. 31; Mark iv. 31.

III

IMMUTABILITY DE FACTO

But have the facts corresponded to this? If the Church is of human origin, we have proved such a thing impossible. In that case variations must appear, manifest and innumerable. Let us see.

Is there a single dogma transmitted by its founders, which it has deliberately thrown away upon its lengthy journey, in order to lighten its load of doctrines. No; and if it meets in Scripture or tradition an authentic testimony of Christ or his disciples, it is enough to cause the Church to conform its faith to it.

Is there a single official definition of its Councils or its Popes which it no longer wishes to retain or the meaning of which it seeks to evade, in order one day to deny what it affirmed the day before? No; whenever it has taken up again an ancient definition, it has always been to maintain it or to improve upon it by defining it more exactly; or else to oppose to a new form of denial a clearer, more complete and more decisive affirmation, which should exclude every chance of evasion. In proclaiming the Nicene creed, it has not disavowed that of the Apostles, which has remained in the daily prayer of its disciples. Nor has the Athanasian Creed excluded that of Nicæa, which still keeps its place in the liturgy of the Mass. Subsequent definitions have left intact the Athanasian Creed, which priests recite on certain days in the office of Prime, and theologians continue to invoke as a document of faith in dissertations on the Trinity and the incarnation.

Finally, is there on this great tree of Catholicism, which has grown ever more robust and solid during 1900 years; is there, amid the abundant flora of its dogmas,

one single artificial flower, attached to it from without by an arbitrary definition, a counterfeit, a deception, a human invention fraudulently labelled as a divine dogma? No; in defining dogma, the Church is always careful to show that it is based upon an affirmation of God, that it thrusts its roots deep down into the Christian revelation, and that the new flower is only a growth from the old sap.

No doubt, the detailed proof of this would be long and it would be necessary to pursue, one by one, each dogma through its lengthy history. That is the work of theologians. But we can dispense with this effort and reach the conclusion by a shorter route. We have proved that, if the Church is not divine, not only could it not succeed in its task, but it must have failed in it so conspicuously that its fall would be at once relentless and spectacular. Like Protestantism, it would at the first glance present manifest, contradictory and innumerable doctrinal variations. Innumerable? Certainly not in its case. Nobody has ever thought of taking Catholicism in this respect for a Wandering Jew, and nobody would dream of making for Catholicism a counterpart of the "History of the Variations." On the contrary, how many times the absence of variations in it has been noted! How often have men greeted with a cry of admiration or of anger this miraculous immutability of the Church, proudly held aloft as a defiance to this changing world! In 1804 the President of the Corps Legislatif, L. de Fontanes, in his address to the Pope, could say of the Church: "Around it all has changed; it alone has not changed." And who does not know the apostrophe of Lacordaire?[1]: "Wilt thou, then, never change, O race of granite?" No; let the earth tremble as it will, that granite does not move.

[1] 29th *Conference de Notre-Dame.*

But, considering the matter well, would it not be possible, in spite of everything, in the long course of nineteen centuries of life and strife, to find at least one variation, only one, thoroughly authentic and perfectly manifest? That would be enough to give to the enemies of Catholicism the right to say: "You vary; therefore, you are false."

No; that too is hopeless, as is proved by several lessons of experience which in this respect are decisive.

We have already said that there have been bad Popes. Alexander VI was one of them. J. de Maistre does not hesitate to call him "a bad fellow."[1] But this bad fellow was a great sovereign, an excellent administrator, an able politician, a patron of letters and the fine arts and a friend of the people, who loved him in return. Strange to say, he was a very popular ruler.[2] He could easily have believed that to him everything was permitted. And he was the Pope! He had complete control of the Church's doctrine. Mohammed, in a similar situation, caused an opportune revelation to come from heaven to justify his vices. Alexander VI must have had the same temptation. But he, who yielded to so many other temptations, did not yield to this. Not having the courage to make his life accord with his doctrine, he did not have the weakness to make the doctrine, of which he had the custody, conform to his life. He is called "a bad Pope"; but he should rather be called "a bad man, a bad fellow." For against him, *as Pope,* there is nothing to be said. "The collection of Papal bulls issued by him is irreproachable," declares J. de Maistre.[3] And as much

[1] J. de Maistre, *Du Pape*, 274.

[2] See Ludwig Pastor, *History of the Popes*, Paris, Plon, 1888-1913, Vol. V, 371-81, *et passim*.

[3] *Du Pape*, 481. L. Pastor himself has written: "We must render him this justice, that he was a vigilant guardian of the purity of doctrine." (*Op. cit.*, VI, 144; cf. 97-154.)

must be said of the other Popes whose private life was questionable. Against them no objection in the matter of doctrine has ever been raised.

History, in this respect, has brought out serious objections against only two Popes, and one of these, Honorius, was a holy man. The other, St. Liberius, was inscribed, in various martyrologies, simply as a saint. These objections have been thoroughly sifted by historians. There has been much dust raised in the process, but the accusation has not been proven; it has "not passed through the sieve." Historically the question is closed.[1]

But let us suppose that the dust raised by the discussion obscures your vision, and that you say doubtfully: "Perhaps." I reply: "That is sufficient for me." We have said that, unless the Church is divine, it will show *innumerable* and *manifest* variations. But two variations in nineteen centuries would not be "innumerable," and if they were muffled up in a "perhaps," they would not be "manifest."

Another point:

John Henry Newman was one of the founders of ritualism, and its most prominent leader.[2] In the spring of 1839, after his conversion, he wrote: "My *position* in the Anglican Church was then at its height. I had supreme confidence in my controversial status and I had a great and still growing success in recommending it to others. . . . It was, from a human point of view, the happiest period of

[1] On the subject of Liberius, see a résumé of the question and of numerous references in the article of A. d'Alès, *Dict. apologétique de la foi catholique*, Paris, Beauchesne, Vol. II, col. 1842-51. On the subject of Honorius, cf. the article of Dom Cabrol, *ibid.* col. 514-19, and Granderath, *Histoire du Concile du Vatican*, ed. française, Brussels, Dewit, 1908-13, Vol. II, 1st part, pp. 335, 403; 2nd part, 191-216; Vol. III, 1st part 174-78.

[2] See Paul Thureau-Dangin, *La renaissance catholique en Angleterre*. Paris, Plon, 7th edit., 1908, I, chap. iii.

my career."[1] But some weeks later, while studying the history of ancient heresies, a doubt concerning the *position* of his Church assailed him ; is it not heretical ? He suffered cruelly, for he loved his Church and he had only violent prejudices against the Church of Rome. But he wished above all to let himself be guided by the truth. At last, after long-continued anguish, he asked of history to remove the doubt which it had awakened and, in 1844, he began to compose his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, hoping thereby to show that, by some modifications, Anglicanism could re-enter, as a part of the whole, the great Catholic family. But, as he pursued his studies, he saw that the facts always showed that the Church of Rome, and only that Church, was in the right. Even though he still regarded the Anglican Church with all the respectful tenderness of a son, and even though he hoped that it might eventually accept ritualism, it appeared to him clearly impossible to win it over then to the necessary doctrinal standpoint. But the more he considered the Church of Rome, the more he saw, shining resplendent across all the incidents of an intense doctrinal life, that miraculous immutability which proves it to be built upon the rock, against which all the powers of hell are shattered. Newman finished his book. It was as a ritualist that he had thought of it, had conceived its plan and had realised it ; but it was as a Catholic that he put his name to it.[2]

Yet he would not have signed it as a Catholic, nor would he have deserted the group of ritualists, then so

[1] Newman, *Apologia pro vita sua*, London, Longmans, 1890, p. 93.

[2] On October 6, 1845, he wrote the last page, of which Stanley said that it is " one of the moving pages ever written by an uninspired pen." The abjuration took place only on the 9th, but the decision had been made since October 3. (See Thureau-Dangin, I, 319 *seq.*) The work was already partly printed. (Cf. the *Postscript*, added by Newman to the *Preface* of the 1st edition, 1845.)

full of life and so rich in hopes, and of which he was the pride, the founder and the leader, if, in the course of his long and minute researches into the development of dogma, he had seen, even once, the Church of Rome pay tribute to the inevitable fragility of human doctrines; and if, on the contrary, he had not been able to say to it with full certainty: "I seek the miraculous sign of *immutability in progress*. I do not see it, and I cannot see it in my own Church. But I have seen it on thy forehead. Thou, therefore, art the spouse of Christ; it is thou who art my mother."[1]

Finally, this last fact:

In 1864 Pius IX announced his plan for an Ecumenical Council. The work of preparation for it continued for five years. The programme was immense; but at first, there was no question of papal infallibility. Nevertheless, man proposes and God disposes. It was the enemies of Papal infallibility who, ever since July, 1868, had been bringing that question before the world with such violence that all the papers, all the reviews, all the salons, all classes of society, all Catholics, all Protestants, the entire body of Freemasonry, all the representations of free thought and the governments themselves, had joined in the debate On December 8, 1869, the date fixed upon, the Council assembled. It discussed and voted on six of the articles of the vast programme. But the excitement throughout the world was so great that the discussion in regard to the infallibility of the Pope became paramount.

[1] Cf. his *Apologia*, pp. 197-200, 328 *seq.* Gladstone said regarding this conversion, that "the year 1845 had marked the greatest victory that the Church of Rome had gained since the Reformation" (quoted by Thureau-Dangin, *op. cit.*, I, 327). Towards the end of his life, seamed with many severe trials, Newman declared that since the day of his conversion not a doubt of the divinity of Catholicism had ever occurred to him. (Cf. Thureau-Dangin, *Newman catholique*, Paris, Plon, 1912, pp. 220 *seq.*)

Out of 714 members present at the Council 150 were at the beginning opposed to the definition; most of them, however, contested only the opportuneness of it. Among them were men of great talent, fortified by arduous study, who had delved into history and theology; they were bishops, men within the Church, who were able to recognise the strength and the weakness of the doctrine. They had only to stretch out their hands to collect, among men outside the Church, friends and enemies, all the weapons prepared against the thesis which was to be debated. They took them, and all the objections were gathered together and examined minutely in interminable discussions. All the subtleties, all the artifices of Parliamentary opposition were also introduced into the Council to prevent the debate from coming to a conclusion. But it came to a conclusion nevertheless. The objections and the dilatory measures having been exhausted, on July 18, 1870, there was held, after the 85th general congregation, a public session, for the final vote. There were present 535 Fathers; 533 voted *Placet* (yes); two voted *Non placet* (No). Pius IX rose, and in one sentence declared that the dogma was defined. The people were assembled in a dense expectant crowd before the portals of the Vatican. The Pope had not desired that the thunder of the cannon of the castle of San Angelo should join in the acclamations of the populace; but a violent storm passed over the dome of S. Peter, and the dogma was proclaimed, as was formerly the law of Sinai, in the midst of thunder and lightning.[1] On the following day, war broke out between France and Prussia—new lightning flashes and new thunder!

We have said that there were two prelates who voted

[1] Theodor Granderath, *Histoire du Concile du Vatican*, French ed., Brussels, Dewit, 1908-13, Vol. III, 2nd part (Vol. V), pp. 142-45.

No. They were Mgr. Riccio, bishop of Caiazzo in Sicily, and Mgr. Fitzgerald, of Little Rock, in the United States. But scarcely had the Pope pronounced the definition, when the Sicilian bishop threw himself at his feet, declaring himself ready to defend the dogma with his life. The American advanced to the Pontiff and spoke these simple words: "Holy Father, I now believe."[1]

Fifty bishops had left Rome voluntarily, on the evening before the voting, in order not to participate in it. These were the irreconcilables of the opposition. The votes of the absent do not count; but their souls count nevertheless; and a unanimous adhesion would strengthen the argument which we desire to establish. But what has become of these irreconcilable opponents? They were at once surrounded with admirers, fêted, extolled and flattered; committees were formed in public and conspiracies in private, to keep them steadfast in their opposition.[2] But "a very large number" of them had, on leaving Rome, declared in advance that they would submit to the decision of the Council, whatever it might be;[3] the others, one by one, made their submission, and mostly in the first days.[4] One only, torn by conflicting emotions, waited for some years, till 1877.[5] The schism, which had been predicted, dis-

[1] Theodor Granderath, *Histoire du Concile du Vatican.* French ed. Brussels, Dewit, 1908-13, Vol. III, 2nd part (Vol. V), p. 147 *seq.*
[2] *Ibid.*, 190-385 and *passim.* [3] *Ibid.*, 137, 191 *seq.* [4] *Ibid.*, 190-271.
[5] 204-44. "From no part of the minority of the Council was it possible to expect a longer delay in assenting to the decisions of the Vatican than from the French bishops." They alone, in fact, numbered half (25 members) of those who had left Rome on the evening before the Council; and, on returning to their country, they found there the devastations of war. Now, out of the twenty-five, "six only put off till the following year the explicit declaration of their adhesion," and these, with the exception of the bishop of La Rochelle, were precisely "the pastors of the dioceses which had had to suffer especially from the war." (*Ibid.*, 245.) "In one respect (that o ardent faith) the French bishops here carry off the palm" (286 *seq.*). And also their disciples: "From the day of the definition (in spite of the passionate violence of the polemics before and during the Council)

counted, desired and promoted by every means, and which certain governments, like those of Switzerland and Bismarck, favoured with all their might—the schism of the Old Catholics—did not find in the whole world a single bishop to put at its head ; it was able to recruit—and that not without difficulty—only a few rare thousands of adherents, almost all in Germany, supported by one illustrious theologian, Döllinger.[1]

There is the fact ; here is the argument : To proclaim to the nineteenth century the infallibility of the Pope, is equivalent to saying that he has been infallible in the past, as he will be in the future ; and consequently that the definitions of all the Popes agree through nineteen centuries down to the present time, and that they have not shown a single doctrinal variation. Well, if in truth there had been in the past one single, manifest variation, the enormous effort made throughout the entire world by all the enemies of the Church and by a certain number of its bishops, conspiring together for two years (from 1868 to 1870) to produce this proof ; this effort of an entire world to reveal a *manifest* thing, would, I say, have come to a conclusion ; and if it had come to a conclusion and had revealed

all contradiction ceased in France." It " had no case of apostasy to deplore . . . except in wholly isolated cases, like those of the unhappy Père Hyacinthe and the abbé Michaud." (270 *seq.*)

[1] " The principal leaders were professors of the universities. . . . Dominating them all, as the director of the whole movement, appeared the man who had been for ten years utilising the incomparable position which his scientific labours had gained for him." He was the same Döllinger whom we have often quoted in this volume. His purpose was to procure " for the priests of science," as he called the scholars at whose head he found himself, " a power similar to that of the Prophets of the Old Testament, before whom the heads of the Church themselves were to bow " ; but in particular to glorify the *German universities*, as the true and legitimate universities, and as " the supreme tribunal of the nation in questions of the mind." (*Ibid.*, 271 *seq.*) " Döllinger actually never officially joined the sect of the Old Catholics " (*Ibid.*, 290) ; but he acted exactly like them, even till his death in 1890.

the desired manifest variation there would not have been 533 bishops out of 535 to vote for the dogma in opposition to that evidence. And the fifty bishops who had fled from Rome, if they had carried away with them that evidence, would not have come back again, and their colleagues throughout the world and the 300,000,000 Catholics would surely not have left to Döllinger, Hyacinthe Loyson and their few disciples, of whom scarcely one remains, the care of defending, together with the rights of the truth, the honour and the future of Catholicism.

We have, therefore, the right to assert that all the intelligence and resources existing in the world about the year 1870, which were set to work with the most diverse intentions, benevolent or hostile, but chiefly hostile, did not succeed in revealing one single manifest variation in the long series of pontifical definitions. But if the doctrine of which the Popes possess the custody had been of human origin, the variations would have been not only manifest but numberless. Hence this doctrine is not of human origin; it comes from God, who gave it to the world and who, faithful to his promise, watches to see that it is well guarded.

"Eighteen centuries of logic," said the Duc de Broglie one day, "is something."[1] It is indeed something so powerful, that men are not capable of producing it. God is needed for it. If God is not a part of it, the effect is without a cause. "If the work is human, there is no way of explaining its success. If we deny the miracle in it, we substitute another miracle in its place."[2] If we exclude the miracle of a divine intervention, we introduce the impossible miracle of an effect

[1] Cf. Abbé de Broglie, *Religion et critique*, Posthumous work published by the Abbé Piat, Lecoffre, 1906. Preface, p. xxviii.

[2] J. de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France*, new edit., Pelagaud, 1845, p. 75.

without a cause. Logically, then, we must choose; either to resign ourselves to believe in an absurdity, or to make an act of faith.[1]

[1] Confronting the doctrinal coherence and stability of Catholicism, Chesterton, who contemplates this "whirling adventure" with the ravished gaze of the artist, exclaims: "This is the thrilling romance of Orthodoxy. People have fallen into a foolish habit of speaking of Orthodoxy as something heavy, humdrum and safe. There was never anything so perilous or so *exciting* as Orthodoxy.

"It was sanity; and to be sane is more dramatic than to be mad. It was the equilibrium of a man, behind madly rushing horses, seeming to stoop this way and to sway that, yet in every attitude having the grace of statuary and the accuracy of arithmetic. The Church in its early days went fierce and fast with any warhorse, yet it is utterly unhistoric to say that she merely went mad along one idea, like a vulgar fanaticism. She swerved to right and left, so as exactly to avoid enormous obstacles. She left on the one hand the huge bulk of Arianism, buttressed by all the worldly powers to make Christianity too worldly. The next instant she was swerving to avoid an orientalism, which would have made it too unworldly. The Orthodox Church never took the tame course or accepted the conventions; the Orthodox Church was never *respectable*. It would have been easier to have accepted the earthly power of the Arians. It would have been easy, in the Calvinistic seventeenth century, to fall into the bottomless pit of predestination. It is easy to be a madman; it is easy to be a heretic. It is always easy to be a modernist, as it is easy to be a snob. It is always easy to let the age have its head; the difficult thing is to keep one's own. To have fallen into any of those open traps of error and exaggeration, which fashion after fashion and sect after sect set along the historic path of Christendom—that would indeed have been simple. It is always simple to fall; there are an infinity of angles at which one falls, only one at which one stands. To have fallen into any one of the fads from Gnosticism to Christian Science would indeed have been obvious and tame. But to have avoided them all has been one whirling adventure; and in my vision the heavenly chariot flies thundering through the ages, the dull heresies sprawling and prostrate, the wild truth reeling, but erect!" (*Orthodoxy*, end of chap. vi.)

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¶ *The Holy Father, to whom Cardinal Bourne at the request of the Editor had presented a statement of the object of the series of books described overleaf, has been pleased to express his approbation in the manner described in the following letter:*

THE VATICAN,

May 28, 1927.

YOUR EMINENCE,

The undertaking lately determined upon of explaining all the doctrines of the Christian religion in a series of books to be published in the vernacular is certainly a most praiseworthy one; particularly inasmuch as it provides that even those who have little or no technical knowledge of philosophy and theology may be able to acquire a deeper appreciation of the sacred teachings.

The Holy Father, on being informed of the proposal, was pleased to examine the list of subjects which are to be dealt with in the respective books by Bishops or by learned men among the clergy. He anticipates great results from the " Treasury of the Faith " series. It will be a boon to the faithful who, with a fuller knowledge of the truths of their faith, will be strengthened in their conviction and in their observance of those truths, and better fitted to maintain and propagate them. Another good result which may be hoped for from your work, with God's help, is that there will be many non-Catholics who, on reading these books, may be moved to forsake their present opinions and to embrace Catholic wisdom. May God grant, then, that you who are undertaking so holy a labour for the increase of the Christian religion may find all these your desires fulfilled.

And to the end that this may be so the Sovereign Pontiff lovingly imparts to Your Eminence and to all those who are engaged in preparing and publishing these books the Apostolic Benediction. . . .

P. CARD. GASPARRI,

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

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
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